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| | Alfred Jules Ayer |
 | | For Ayer it was clear that not all evidence for a statement was to be included in the meaning of the statement: a statement about the blood on Jack's jacket was not included in the meaning of the assertion that Jack was the murderer. |
 | | Even on Ayer's later view, called ‘sophisticated realism’(in Ayer 1973), where our perception of physical objects was indirect, the ‘ultimate basis for perceptual judgments were sense-data, which were now called ‘quale’ (or, if particularized, ‘percepts’). |
 | | That is, non-veridical perceptions could share their intrinsic properties with veridical perceptions, this possibility leading Ayer to claim that it was plausible that the object of perception in both cases was (non-material) experience, and not, as naïve realism would have it, the physical objects themselves. |
| plato.stanford.edu /entries/ayer (6820 words) |
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