| |
| | Exporting Disaster |
 | | AECL manager Irwin Rummel admitted that he was aware that army conscripts were used as unskilled labour on the site, but dismissed reports of "slave" labour.{152} In 1989, in an attempt to speed up construction at Cernavoda, Ceausescu increased the work force 5,000 to more than 14,000. |
 | | AECL staff had condoned the situation for many years, and claim that in 1988 they had threatened to pull out of the project.{174} AECL's resolve was never tested however, since the 1989 revolt intervened, and the project was subsequently restructured. |
 | | AECL contracts amounted to $950 million, of which $450 million went to Korean subcontractors, with about $500 million coming to AECL and Canadian suppliers.{196} As compared to the Wolsong-2 deal two years earlier, the percentage of Canadian content (in dollar terms) of the Wolsong-3 and -4 deal was about 40% less. |
| www.cnp.ca /issues/exporting-disaster.html (18046 words) |
|