
	Where results make sense

Topic: Agranat Commission

In the News (Sun 27 May 12)

EXECUTIVE POWER

Iran

ANALYSIS

Pakistan

Family compact

	H-Law \| Reviews
		Agranat had already acquired a reputation as a learned and thorough judge who relied on a wide range of British and American sources and wrote lengthy, scholarly decisions; thus, he was a natural candidate for the new all-Jewish Israeli Supreme Court.
		Agranat's discomfort with being the focus of criticism by the press, politicians, and the general public became particularly difficult as he faced his gravest public challenge.
		Agranat would puff on his pipe for a longer time and would answer questions defensively, generally by reading aloud from the official report and reiterating its statements, a glimmer of suspicion in his eyes.
	www.h-net.msu.edu /~law/reviews/lahavp.htm (3807 words)

	Kahane Commission - CAABU (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		The Agranat Commission also dealt (in Section 32 of its partial report) with the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister and arrived at the conclusion that she was not to be charged with any responsibility for her actions at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War and afterwards.
		The Agranat Commission did not discuss the question of a minister's responsibility for the shortcomings and failures of the apparatus he heads and for which he should not be charged with any personal responsibility.
		No commission of inquiry would fulfill its role properly if it did not exercise such scrutiny, in the framework of its competence, vis-a-vis any man whose actions and failures were under scrutiny, regardless of his position and public standing.
	www.caabu.org /press/documents/kahan-commission-part7.html (832 words)

	1031 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		The Salmon Commission's stance is based on its perception that the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings and the consequent pain that they may cause to individuals mean that tribunals should be used as sparingly as possible.
		The commission, having been mandated by either the Executive itself or by Congress, will increase the chances that its recommendations would be followed, partly because of the status of the commission itself and partly because both the executive and the legislative branches will by nature be responsive to the pressures of national opinion.
		The Agranat Commission of Inquiry on the Yom Kippur War n130 found the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army to be directly responsible for the errors committed on the eve of the war and recommended that he leave office.
	law.hku.hk /lawof/UploadFile/1031.htm (12065 words)

	The Agranat Commission (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		Responding to the pressure of public opinion in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the government on 18 November 1973 formed a state commission of inquiry to investigate the reasons for Israel's "mehdal" (failure due to oversight) regarding the war.
		Its mandate was to investigate two issues: The information available during the period preceding the war as to the enemy's moves and intentions, and the evaluations by the military leaders concerned; and the preparedness of the IDF before the war and its functioning during the first three days of the fighting.
		The commission found that the IDF had received appropriate information regarding Egyptian and Syrian preparations but it was not interpreted correctly because of the adherence to a mistaken conception, namely that Egypt would not attempt a war without a strong air force, which was not achievable in late 1973.
	www.jafi.org.il /education/jafi75/history/agranat.html (327 words)

	Amazon.com: Books: Judgement in Jerusalem: Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		Agranat is seen as the pivotal force who ``steered the Israeli judiciary away from legal formalities and toward a more substantive understanding of the meaning of law.'' Occasionally, Agranat disappoints Lahav's own, more liberal stances on separation of church and state and the rights of Israeli Arabs to mount political challenges to the Jewish state.
		Lahav sets Agranat's most public episode, the Eichmann trial of 1960, within the ideological context of universal ``Utopian'' Zionism's struggle with the insular ``Catastrophic'' Zionism; the latter wins out as Agranat betrays his former opposition to the death penalty as a lesson to the world.
		Simon Agranat (1906-1992) was the third chief justice of the Israeli Supreme Court and a founding father of Israeli law.
	www.amazon.com /exec/obidos/ASIN/0520205952/thealmostcomplet (1141 words)

	ASHER MAOZ \| Law and History—A Need for Demarcation \| Law and History Review, Volume 18 Number 3, 18.3 \| The ...
		Abraham stresses the lack of credibility surrounding the findings of commissions of inquiry that endeavor "to 'set the record straight,'" by providing "political truth." The situation may be more positive in Israel due to the composition of the commissions and their independence.
		By and large, commissions of inquiry may be of two types: commissions with an eye to the past, having as their main purpose calming the public about past events, and commissions with an eye to the future.
		However, the commission attributed indirect responsibility to some of Israel's officials, including Minister Sharon, on the ground that they should have foreseen that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps would endanger the population and that they were under duty to take precautions against this.
	www.historycooperative.org /journals/lhr/18.3/maoz2.html (3279 words)

	Why Israel Was Surprised In October, 1973
		The Agranat Commission was set up immediately after the war to study what went wrong.
		The Agranat Commission, while clearly laying blame on the Military Intelligence Branch of the IDF, also pointed out flaws known to exist in the intelligence community a decade earlier.
		The Agranat Commission does not acknowledge that the flaws within the Israeli intelligence community were known to the Prime Minister and other government officials, but just that the flaws were identified earlier and not acted upon.
	www.globalsecurity.org /intell/library/reports/1990/LKA.htm (4442 words)

	sandiego.indymedia.org \| SENSATIONAL REVELATIONS IN A NEW BOOK (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		After the war, Golda Meir's government appointed the Agranat commission to investigate the reasons for the failure (the terms of its appointment included limitations that were actually intended to blame the military).
		During the commission's deliberations, in order to cast off the blame, or at least to share it with the Mossad, Military Intelligence's Eli Zeira gave his assessment that the Mossad's senior agent was a double agent, who had deceived Israel.
		Even though the Agranat Commission did not accept Zeira's explanations, he did succeed in planting doubts as to the reliability of the senior agent.
	www.sdimc.org /es/2003/09/100731.shtml (3670 words)

	Jerusalem Post \| Breaking News from Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish World (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		The Agranat Commission was established to investigate the intelligence failure whereby Israel was caught by surprise by Egypt and Syria at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War.
		The commission, in accordance with regulations governing judicial commissions of inquiry, established a 30-year moratorium on the classified sections of the report as well as the minutes of the meetings and the government documents used by the commission to complete the report and reach its conclusions.
		The Agranat Commission recommended that as the deadline approached, the government might want to reconsider the 30-year moratorium that it had set and amend the Commissions of Inquiry Law accordingly.
	www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1105418785677 (455 words)

	Result of the Yom Kippur War of 1973
		In its interim report of April 1974, the Agranat Commission, a body established after the war to determine responsibility for Israel's military unpreparedness, claimed that it couldn't take Moshe Dayan's military background into account, and that it should judge him as a "civilian" defense minister.
		As such, the commission concluded that Dayan did not bear any personal responsibility, and that his ministerial responsibility was a public and political question rather than a judicial one.
		Upon publication of the Agranat Commission report, Prime Minister Meir, whose performance was praised by the commission, took full responsibility, resigned on April 11, 1974 and brought about the establishment of the first Rabin government.
	www.palestinefacts.org /pf_1967to1991_ykwar_result.php (1159 words)

	Yes, Minister!
		Shimon Agranat, a respected Supreme Court judge, was appointed chairman of a commission and asked to apportion blame for the fateful failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
		All three resemble each other: They were appointed by the political leaders, they are forbidden to investigate the political leadership and tasked with inquiring only into the quality of the information supplied by the intelligence agencies to the political leaders.
		And since the intelligence chiefs are appointed by the political leaders, no wonder that their concepts almost always suit the concepts of the leaders.
	www.strike-the-root.com /4/avnery/avnery3.html (1368 words)

	Jerusalem Post \| Breaking News from Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish World (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		An amendment to the Commissions of Inquiry Law was approved overwhelmingly that will enable the prime minister to establish a public commission to consider whether to publish a report out of consideration for state security.
		According to a provision in the law, a public committee must be established by March 15 for the Agranat Commission, and if not the material is to be made public.
		At the end of that time, all of the material is to be made public unless it is transferred to the discretion of a public committee out of concern for state security, foreign relations or protection of the safety of individuals.
	www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1106740796294 (441 words)

	Ha'aretz - Article
		"The Agranat Commission did not believe [one of the brigade commanders in connection with his advance to battle], did not understand his reports and drew an inference from this detail about everything he said.
		The Agranat Commission was asked to deal only with the preparations for the war and the war's first three days.
		In the Dayan-Elazar sector, in the narrow sense, or the government versus the army in the broad sense, the History Department effectively adopts the wretched remark of the state president, Ephraim Katzir, that "we are all to blame" - along with the leadership, Katzir implicated the nation that follows its leaders innocently.
	www.mafhoum.com /press3/111S26.htm (1165 words)

	Sabra & Shatilla, the Kahan Commission and Belgium
		Sabra and Shatilla, the Kahan Commission and Belgium
		The Commission's investigations is all the more exemplary, since there have been numerous other inter-ethnic and inter-religious massacres in Lebanon, especially since 1975, none of which were investigated at any level, nor were any indictments brought in any court, or on any instance.
		The Kahan Commission established "indirect responsibility" only for the Israelis investigated, but attributed "personal" responsibility, particularly to Sharon, through "chain of command" - as the person accountable for the military in the government echelons, for the decision to send the Phalange into the camps and for not reporting it to the Prime Minister.
	www.jafi.org.il /education/actual/sabra-shatilla (5297 words)

	FSO: Global Analysis with J. R. Nyquist "Surprise Attacks" 05/13/2005
		Isreal’s Agranat Commission placed blame for the fiasco on excessive centralization (of Israeli intelligence).
		It is fascinating that the Israelis blamed the 1973 surprise attack on centralization, while the post-9/11 Americans blamed their intelligence failure on a lack of centralization.
		He blasts the Commission’s herd animal quest for unanimity, its bipartisan as opposed to non-partisan approach, and its slipshod analysis.
	www.financialsense.com /stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0513.html (1030 words)

	Judgement Day - Israel Facing Apocalypse
		Both as an active Supreme Court justice and as a retired one, it fell to Moshe Landau to deal with the legal aspects of three major traumatic episodes involving the Jewish nation during the last half-century.In 1960, he was the chairman of the special tribunal that presided over the trial of Adolf Eichmann.
		In 1973-74, as a member of the Agranat Commission, Landau investigated the failures relating to the Yom Kippur War and, in 1987, he served as chairman of the government commission that bears his name, which reviewed and rewrote the rules for Shin Bet interrogations.
		In 1973-4, he was a member of the Agranat Commission and, in the 1980 Alon Moreh ruling, he prohibited the expropriation of Arab land for the purpose of building settlements.
	www.christianactionforisrael.org /isreport/septoct00/landau.html (5616 words)

	Ephraim Kam - STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT, Vol 7 No 2
		In the 1970s, the Agranat Commission recommended incorporating greater pluralism into the intelligence community by strengthening the research bodies within the Mossad and the Foreign Ministry so that decision-makers could receive more than one assessment.
		On the contrary, the committee is justified in stressing the necessity of tightening up the political echelon's supervision of the intelligence community.
		However, the Committee of Inquiry that the Knesset committee established is not a national committee of inquiry like the Agranat Commission, which was appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the malfunctions leading up to the Yom Kippur War, or the Cohen Commission, which was established to investigate the massacres committed in Sabra and Shatila.
	www.tau.ac.il /jcss/sa/v7n2p4Kam.html (4374 words)

	FORWARD : News (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		Last week charges surfaced that some commission members had been approached by security officials and asked to express dissatisfaction with the still-uncompleted report.
		Senior intelligence officers told the Forward last week that the Steinitz commission had revealed a disturbing picture: Although Iraq had been one of the main targets of Israeli intelligence-gathering during the past decade, the level of information obtained was very poor.
		Officials point to the record of the Agranat commission, created in 1974 to examine the intelligence failure preceding the Yom Kippur War.
	www.forward.com /issues/2004/04.02.13/news3.html (1191 words)

	Yes, Minister! Intelligence failure and Iraq's non-existent WMDs
		Shimon Agranat, a respected Supreme Court judge, was appointed chairman of a commission and asked to apportion blame for the fateful failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur [October 1973] war.
		After that, it will be the turn of the British one (which is required to investigate only the intelligence community, after the honorable Lord judge has investigated the political structure).
		Neither of the three commissions will state the obvious: that the intelligence agencies are under the jurisdiction of the president (in the US) or the prime minister (in the UK and Israel), and that these bear the responsibility for their deeds and misdeeds.
	www.redress.btinternet.co.uk /uavnery73.htm (1440 words)

	President of The State of Israel
		During his term of office, in 1974, he monitored the implementation of the Agranat Commission Report on the lessons of the Yom Kippur War.
		On his visits, he always encouraged the local youth to contribute actively to their community, to have faith in themselves, and to aspire to achievement in all fields.
		In 1982, after the massacre in the camps at Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon, President Navon demanded that an official commission of inquiry be established to investigate the events.
	www.president.gov.il /chapters/chap_3/file_3_3_5_en.asp (1074 words)

	\| Book Review \| The American Historical Review, . \| The History Cooperative
		The author not only introduces us to Agranat the person in his formative years and acquaints us with an important part of his legal decisions.
		Lahav also succeeds in presenting Agranat's complex view, his ability to see and present the full range of considerations supporting and opposing his positions, and the conceptual principles grounding his decisions.
		She artistically weaves the strands of Agranat's origins and upbringing into the tapestry of his Weltanschauung, successfully portraying his motive of drawing upon the heritage of our past to resolve the problems of the present, with an eye to the future.
	www.historycooperative.com /journals/ahr/106.2/br_174.html (383 words)

	Moshe Dayan was born on May 20th
		After the “Agranat Commission Report on the Yom Kippur War,” Moshe was forced to resign.
		The “Agranat Commission Report on the Yom Kippur War” was a document, stating all of Israels losses and gains during the Yom Kippur War.
		They also stated in the report that Dayan was more of a civilian than a person who should be on an important committee, like the Agranat Commission.
	talmud.epsb.ca /ourwork/grade9/dayan.htm (646 words)

	History of the Eighth Knesset
		The Agranat Commission, which was appointed to examine the failure, which preceded the outbreak of the war, published its report on 1 April, 1974, and Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned as a result.
		In the course of the term of the Knesset the issue of talks between Israelis and representatives of the PLO came up for debate several times.
		In 1975 A Commission of Inquiry on the Status of Woman was appointed, headed by MK Ora Namir which marked the beginning of a change in the approach to the issue.
	www.knesset.gov.il /history/eng/eng_hist8.htm (615 words)

	Intelligence Failures: Some Historical Lessons, Part 1, June 14, 2002
		Probably no surprise of the 20th century was more thoroughly investigated than the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan in 1941, but historians still debate the levels of responsibility for the failure, and conspiracy theorists assume the failure was intentional.
		Often, during the course of these investigations, it is learned that some key piece of intelligence which, in retrospect, clearly points to the intentions of the enemy, was missed or misread.
		One element seems to have been a conviction that one key intelligence source, reportedly characterized as able to provide "unambiguous" warning, should not be activated until war was imminent.
	www.theestimate.com /public/061402.html (2525 words)

	Our Jerusalem.com -
		The Agranat Commission that buried Dado left him buried.
		Agranat Commission decided what it decided and there is nothing more
		Agranat Commission - which was the last time that what is considered
	www.ourjerusalem.com /history/story/history20020919.html (4391 words)

	Articles - Shmuel Gonen (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15)
		Gonen's response to the Egyptian attack during the Yom Kippur War and his actions during the first days of fighting (culminating in the disaster attack on Hizayon on October 8) was deemed a failure by the army's General Staff, and he was replaced on 10 October by Chaim Bar-Lev.
		The Agranat Commission, which investigated the events leading up to the war, wrote about him that:
		He was removed from all command upon the publication of the Commission's interim report, but this was revoked once the final report was released, and Gonen was given a new position on the General Staff.
	www.mainearth.com /articles/Shmuel_Gonen (852 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)