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Topic: Analytic truth


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In the News (Wed 16 Dec 09)

  
  A Priori and A Posteriori [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
The a priori/a posteriori distinction is epistemological and should not be confused with the metaphysical distinction between the necessary and the contingent or the semantical or logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
The claim that all bachelors are unmarried, for instance, is analytic because the concept of being unmarried is included within the concept of a bachelor.
By contrast, the truth value of contingent propositions is not fixed across all possible worlds: for any contingent proposition, there is at least one possible world in which it is true and at least one possible world in which it is false.
www.iep.utm.edu /a/apriori.htm   (5580 words)

  
  PA018
Analytic truths cannot be used to make clear the meanings of their constituent terms if, as suggested previously, the truth of an analytic statement depends solely on the meanings of its constituent words.
It might then be thought that analytic truths are such that each one has "behind it" another proposition which states a convention for the use of the terms in the analytic truth; such statements about linguistic conventions would supposedly explain the necessity of analytic statements.
Analytic truths, we were told, were to be identified as those statements which asserted the single-criterion of a particular word (the subject of the statement); moreover, a criterion had to be taken as a necessary condition for the correct use of the word in question.
www.cmfnow.com /articles/pa018.htm   (17205 words)

  
 Analytic-synthetic distinction - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Intuitively, analytic propositions are those which are true simply in virtue of their meaning, while synthetic propositions are not.
The judgment "Either it is raining or it is not raining" is not an affirmative subject-predicate judgment; thus by Kant's definitions it is neither analytic nor synthetic.
synthetic proposition: a proposition that is not analytic
en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Analytic_truth   (1613 words)

  
 Alex Byrne and Ned Hall: Necessary Truths
An analytic truth is one that is “true solely in virtue of meaning”: any list of examples invariably includes “Bachelors are unmarried”; others might be “If Socrates drank hemlock quickly then he drank hemlock” and “Quadrangles have four sides.” Merely understanding these sentences puts one in a position to know that they are true.
Second, since analytic truths are “true in virtue of meaning,” and since what a word means is a conventional matter, it is natural to think that analytic truths are somehow “true by convention”—that the basis of their truth lies in our decisions or intentions concerning the use of words, rather than in the (extra-linguistic) world.
As Ayer put it, analytic truths are true “simply because we never allow them to be anything else.” But now, if we assume the equivalence, then necessary and a priori truths are also true by convention, in which case they are not about the world either.
bostonreview.net /BR29.5/byrnehall.html   (3530 words)

  
 [No title]
Analytical truth is a logical conclusion following from a set of axioms that are in accordance with a given set of invented rules of one sort of logic or another, be it Aristotelian logic, Socratic logic, or the modal logics of contemporary thinking.
The truth of an analytic assertion is based on the testing of the consistency of a given set of axioms and their logical consequences.
But one cannot prove the truth of a religious assertion the way that a scientific or an analytic truth are proven, because it is not defined in their respective contexts.
www.compukol.com /mendel/articles/On_Concepts_of_Law_and_Truth.doc   (2688 words)

  
 Logical Truth (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
That a logical truth is formal implies at the very least that all the sentences which are appropriate replacement instances of its logical form are logical truths too.
If one thinks of the concept of logical truth simply as the concept of analytic truth, it is especially reasonable to accept that the concept of logical truth does not have much to do with the concept of model-theoretic validity, for presumably this concept does not have much to do with the concept of analyticity.
The claim that all analytic truths ought to be derivable in one single calculus is perhaps plausible on the view that analyticity is to be explained by conventions or "tacit agreements", for these agreements are presumably finite in number, and their implications are presumably at most effectively enumerable.
plato.stanford.edu /entries/logical-truth   (9703 words)

  
 [No title]
The truth of analytic statements depends only on the meaning of their constituent elements, and it does not depend on confirmation by empirical testing.
Ayer rejects the rationalistic assertion that empirical truths are deducible from a priori propositions.
Truth is a criterion by which propositions may be validated, but it is not a quality or a relation.
www.angelfire.com /md2/timewarp/ayer.html   (1480 words)

  
 Dorit2
In “Truth By Convention” Quine argues that whatever the separation between mathematical/logical truths and the rest comes to, it cannot be drawn in terms of convention.
Kant characterizes an analytic truth as one in which no more is attributed to the subject of the statement that is already contained in the subject.
The truth of the sentence "Building x is rising in the air" would stand in conflict with the truth of the law of gravity, which is embedded pretty deeply within the network.
www.unc.edu /~ujanel/Dorit2.htm   (2729 words)

  
 Analytic/Synthetic - (A reply to Michael Heumer) *
An "analytic" truth is one whos predicate states a characteristic contained within the sense of the subject, whereas a "synthetic" truth is one in which the predicate states a characteristic that is not contained within the sense, but is contained within the reference.
If so-called 'analytic' statements really do not have any characteristic whatsoever in common and differ from so-called 'synthetic' statements in no way whatsoever, then the philosophers who claim there is a distinction must really be classifying statements entirely at random.
On the analytic end of the spectrum are those statements which require, in order to determine their truth value, no more experience than was necessary to form the concepts, whereas synthetic statements are those which do require experience in addition to those required by the concepts themselves.
tomsphilosophy.tripod.com /id10.html   (1596 words)

  
 Philosophy- Squashed Ayer - Language Truth and Logic - Condensed Abridged
The empiricist must deal with these truths in one of two ways: either say that they are not necessary truth, and then account for the universal conviction that they are; or say that they have no factual content, and then explain how a proposition without factual content can be true and useful and surprising.
Analytic propositions or judgements, as defined by Kant, are ones in which the predicate B of a subject A is covertly contained in the concept of A. In contrast, in a synthetic judgement the predicate B lies outside the subject A, though standing in connection with it.
Traditionally, the analytic character of the truths of formal logic was obscured in speaking always of judgements instead of propositions, and introducing irrelevant psychology, giving the impression that logic was concerned with the workings of thought.
www.btinternet.com /~glynhughes/squashed/ayer.htm   (8174 words)

  
 enlightenment: IOE, The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy
To deny an analytic truth is to endorse a self-contradiction, but to deny a synthetic truth is merely to endorse a falsehood.
The truth of propositions such as 'men use tools', 'so do chimps', 'men play music', 'men have the capacity to blush' and our ability to know that these propositions are true, precedes the construction of a definition.
Truth and Falsity are properly predicated of propositions in virtue of their correspondence (or failure thereof) to reality.
enlightenment.supersaturated.com /essays/text/ioe1/09.html   (2148 words)

  
 Definitions
Analytic truths are considered to be those sentences that are logically entailed from defining axioms.
For example, term subsumption in the KL-ONE family of representation languages is an analytic truth in that it is determined solely on the basis of term definitions.
The semantics of defining axiom and analytic truth is formally defined as follows.
logic.stanford.edu /kif/definitions.html   (1213 words)

  
 Peter Suber, "Truth Trees for Propositional Logic"
Truth trees have all the virtues, and none of the vices, of all the known methods of testing validity.
They have the virtues that truth tables possess over derivations in that they are effective (dumb, mechanical, infallible); they test both validity and invalidity; they produce counterexamples in case of invalidity; and they may test validity directly on the argument or by testing its corresponding conditional for tautology.
Trees are superior to truth tables, and have the virtues of derivations, by remaining economical even with a very large number of variables, and by applying to both propositional and predicate logic.
www.earlham.edu /~peters/courses/log/treeprop.htm   (722 words)

  
 Analytic Philosophy [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
Because of this emphasis on language, analytic philosophy was widely, though perhaps mistakenly, taken to involve a turn toward language as the subject matter of philosophy, and it was taken to involve an accompanying methodological turn toward linguistic analysis.
This post-linguistic analytic philosophy cannot be defined in terms of a common set of philosophical views or interests, but it can be loosely characterized in terms of its style, which tends to emphasize precision and thoroughness about a narrow topic and to deemphasize the imprecise or cavalier discussion of broad topics.
What mattered for the development of analytic philosophy on the whole was the emergence in the second decade of the twentieth century of a new view of reality tailored to fit recent developments in formal logic and the philosophical methodology connected to it, as discussed in Section 2b.
www.iep.utm.edu /a/analytic.htm   (12255 words)

  
 Davidson and Rorty - on Truth Reshaping Analytic Philosophy for a Transcontinental Conversation - Mike Sandbothe
According to that notion, truth is to be understood as a non-causal and atemporal relation between linguistic statements and extra-linguistic reality, supposed to explain why a statement is capable of consensus or coherence.
Since for Davidson translatability and truth are inseparable, the notion of a conceptual scheme whose truth value could be determined solely on the basis of the content schematized by it is unintelligible and hence must be abandoned.
From Rorty’s point of view, a Tarskian theory of truth is nothing but a descriptive systematization of inferences that we have learned to make within the internal, normative perspective on the basis of relations of justification and recognition and which we have learned to question with the aid of the cautionary use of “true”.
evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com /sandbothe.htm   (7664 words)

  
 20th WCP: The Geometry of Ethics
Analytic means "true by definition," while synthetic means "true because of the facts." That is, it’s a matter of fact whether, e.g., Madeleine Albright is in Washington now.
Murder is wrong — this is an analytic truth; and wrong means not right, which means not good — no matter what good means.
But it must be admitted that geometrical truths do not admit of very much change, while the concepts of ordinary language (of which ethical language is a part) can slip and slide with the times.
www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthStan.htm   (2931 words)

  
 Possible Worlds
I take an analytic truth to be a sentence or proposition that is true by definition, whose denial is contradictory, and which can be known just through attention to the meanings of terms (I take all those to be at least materially equivalent).
This is consistent with its being an analytic truth.
So, on his analysis, if it is analytic that if A then B, for any A and B, then it will have to be analytic that in the nearest possible world in which A holds, B holds.
home.sprynet.com /~owl1/lewis.htm   (4820 words)

  
 Terminology
This can be expressed by saying that a necessary truth is a proposition that is true in every possible world.
  A contingent truth is a true proposition that could have been false; a contingent falsehood is a false proposition that could have been true.
  The most common characterization of an analytic truth is that it is a necessary truth that is true in virtue of meaning or that is true because the concept of the subject is included in the concept of the predicate.
faculty.washington.edu /wtalbott/phil450/hdmetaepist.htm   (572 words)

  
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 Philosophy Now
Necessary truths are a priori – knowable independently of experience, without anyone needing to go and look; whereas contingent truths can only be found out by observation, or a posteriori.
In Naming and Necessity Kripke cites examples of certain truths that are ‘necessary a posteriori’ – necessary truths that are discovered empirically; and of certain other truths that are ‘contingent a priori’ – propositions which might have been false, but whose truth is knowable a priori.
Kripke found a truth that is necessary a posteriori by revisiting Frege’s puzzle about the identity statement “Phosphorus (the morning star) is Hesperus (the evening star).” The statement’s truth was discovered a posteriori, when both the names were found to refer to the one thing, namely the planet Venus.
www.philosophynow.org /issue41/41greenstreet.htm   (2106 words)

  
 Tyler Burge - Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege - Reviewed by Michael Beaney, University of York - Philosophical ...
On the third point, Burge is also right that Frege did not think that the results of philosophy are mainly analytic truths, and certainly not analytic truths in the modern sense (as true in virtue of meaning).
My suspicion is that he recognized the problematic nature of analytic truth, bound up as it was with his doubts about the status of principles such as Axiom V, and quietly dropped the notion.
However, I do not think that Frege's views on analyticity are enough to disqualify him from counting as an 'analytic philosopher' in the sense that Moore and Russell ­-- and particularly Russell -- count as analytic philosophers.
ndpr.nd.edu /review.cfm?id=7064   (2216 words)

  
 "Analayticity Reconsidered" by Paul Boghossian
The central impetus behind the analytic explanation of the a priori is a desire to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to postulate such a special faculty, one that has never been described in satisfactory terms.
is analyticity; and here the major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statements, the logical truths, but rather in the second class, which depends on the notion of synonymy.
Relative to the Fregean notion, however, the logical truths are trivially analytic; and so, given his apparent desire to restrict his attention to that notion in TD, he simply concedes their 'analyticity' in the only sense he takes to be under discussion.
www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/faculty/boghossian/papers/AnalyticityReconsidered.html   (13504 words)

  
 The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
But, secondly, although the denial of a genuinely analytic claim may well be a “contradiction,” it is not clear what makes it so: there is no explicit contradiction in the thought of a married bachelor, in the way that there is in the thought of a bachelor who is not a bachelor.
And, even if logical truths are analytic, how does claiming them to be so differ from merely claiming that they are obviously and universally correct, i.e.
So-called “analytic” and other sentences purporting to be “known a priori” are, like the laws of logic and mathematics, comparatively central, and so are given up, if ever, only under extreme pressure from the peripheral forces of experience on the web.
plato.stanford.edu /entries/analytic-synthetic   (8166 words)

  
 Quine on the analytic/synthetic distinction
The basic premise underlying Quine’s argument is a simple one: if analyticity is to be used to explain both a prioricity and necessity, then we should be able to explain what analyticity is without using facts about what is a priori and what is necessary in the explanation.
Philosophers often say that analytic truths are true by definition or true in virtue of meaning alone.
The idea here is that if the necessary truths are analytic, then the truth of any sentence of the form ‘Necessarily, all and only Fs are Gs’ will imply that ‘All and only Fs are Gs’ is analytic.
www.nd.edu /~jspeaks/mcgill/415/quine-2dogmas.html   (1444 words)

  
 Study Guide 5
An analytic statement is a statement whose truth value (true or false) depends on nothing more than the meanings of the words the statement contains.
Examples: "No bachelor is married" is analytic, and true; thus, we say it’s analytically true.
Examples: "Some bachelors are tall", "There are three books on the table." An analytically necessary statement is a statement that is analytically true (and consequently, necessarily true).
www.uic.edu /classes/phil/phil203/study_guide_5.htm   (545 words)

  
 On Truth and Reality: Philosophy Physics Metaphysics of Space, Wave Structure Matter. Famous Science Art Quotes
It is obvious to any thoughtful person that our world is in great trouble, that we are heading rapidly towards self destruction due to human overpopulation and the resultant destruction of Nature, climate change and the pollution of air, land and water (contaminating everything we consume).
The best solution to these problems is to found our societies on truth (true knowledge of reality) rather than past myths and customs (which invariably cause harm, our past and present global conflicts confirm this).
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.
www.spaceandmotion.com   (2791 words)

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