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Topic: Anti-realist

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Critical Thinking and the Realism/Anti-realism Debate On the other hand, Robert Sutton, an anti-realist, argues that "realism is in serious danger of falling into the pile of irrelevant Western ideas."[3] For, he maintains, the facts just do not stack up for realism. Thus a realist might recognize an effective, or even a powerful argument from an anti-realist who is his professional peer, while having to endure reading mediocre student papers arguing for realism. He may even praise his anti-realist peer on his critical acumen, while despairing at his student's lack of such ability. pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th /~hsoraj/web/CT.html   (4545 words)

REalism2 Thus for the realist the O/T distinction does not mark the crucial distinction that it is for the anti-realist: all statements forming accepted scientific beliefs are to be understood as potentially true, and all putatively referring terms are best understood as in fact referring to something, whether that referent is "observable" or not. For the realist, these problems all suggest that the O/T distinction will not bear the weight that empiricistic anti-realists want to place on it; however, realists argue that these problems can be adequately addressed by a realist defense of rationality in terms of truth and reality. Remember that the realist does not deny the anti-realist assertions about theory acceptance as based on empirical adequacy, but claims in addition that the remarkable success which theories of mature science enjoy is best explained by holding that real things at least approximately correspond to the putatively referring terms of such theories. www.loyno.edu /~folse/REalism2.html   (4545 words)

Right Reason: The Metaphysics of Conservatism If one takes the approach of just talking about metaphysical realism broadly, then one can be a realist without being endorsing universals, and being a nominalists isn’t variety of metaphysical anti-realism. So the latter are obviously "endorsing" universals, and the former, since they deny realism about universals, are "anti-realist." I'm not sure why you say that "talk of nominalists being anti-realist and realist endorsing universals" is incorrect. rightreason.ektopos.com /archives/2006/01/the_metaphysics.html   (3396 words)

Semantic Challenges to Realism These semantic formulations of realism are unacceptable to realists who are deflationists about truth [see the entry truth: deflationary theory of] however with the unfortunate consequence that many such realists tend to simply ignore the anti-realist's legitimate semantic challenges to their position. But it does not refute realism unless realism is committed to determinate reference in the first place and it is not at all obvious that a belief in the mind-independence of reality does commit the realist to determinate reference. A consequence of their view is that reality is indeterminate in surprising ways — we have no grounds for asserting that Socrates did sneeze in his sleep the night before he took the hemlock and no grounds for asserting that he did not and no prospect of ever finding out which. plato.stanford.edu /entries/realism-sem-challenge   (8579 words)

God and Realism Byrne’s innocent realism is heavily dependent upon a scientifically realist ontology, but in my view, as I shall suggest a bit later, this distorts his account of theistic realism. If there is not, then Byrne needs to supply another reason for being a realist about his theos, but this I did not discover. To approach the realism question as primarily an ontological one would require proof (or disproof) that God exists, but Byrne thinks this unlikely to be forthcoming. www.arsdisputandi.org /publish/articles/000157/article.htm   (1510 words)

REalism2 Therefore the realist's defense of claiming that realism, as a philosophical theory, explains the success of scientific theoreis by the (alleged) fact that such theories are (at least approximately) "true" is question begging for Fine, because he rejects the view that any theories "explain" anything at all. Fine clearly rejects theory realism insofar as it depends on such a correspondence notion of "truth," and he does so because he rejects the realist notion that theories are intended to explainanything at all. Fine does not regard his position as "anti-realism" because he admits that one is as rational to believe in the existence of the microentities of theoretical physics (assuming such theories are well confirmed by the evidence), as one is to believe in the ordinary size objects which are the "things" of my everyday existence. www.loyno.edu /~folse/REalism2.html   (2753 words)

20th WCP: Realism, Modality and Truths about the Past On the contrary, she is putting forward a realist or platonist notion of mathematical proof, just as anyone pointing out that there could be some yet unaccessible document or testimony in favour of "Caesar crossed the Rubicon", is putting forward a realist notion of empirical and historical evidence. What such a person is saying or, at least, what her statement implies, is that the conjecture may be true although we are still unable to find out that it is true, the reason being that our mathematical abilities have not yet taken us far enough to unable us to grasp a proof of it. It is very clear that I have proposed to ground realism on natural possibilities, in the sense that the possibility of the combined truth and pro tempora undecidability of past tense statements follows from our knowledge of the workings of nature. www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/Lang/LangPata.htm   (4330 words)

Realism The realist wishes to claim that apart from the mundane sort of empirical dependence of objects and their properties familiar to us from everyday life, there is no further sense in which everyday objects and their properties can be said to be dependent on anyone's linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, or whatever. Whereas the realist and the error-theorist agree that the sentences of the relevant area are truth-apt, apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity, the realist and the expressivist (alternatively non-cognitivist, projectivist) disagree about the truth-aptness of those sentences. The expressivist about a particular area will claim that the realist is misled by the syntax of the sentences of that area into thinking that they are truth-apt: she will say that this is a case where the conventional association of the declarative mood with assertoric force breaks down. plato.stanford.edu /entries/realism   (4330 words)

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism The Nominalists, who should be called rather the anti-Realists, assert on the contrary that the individual alone exists, and that the universals are not things realized in the universal state in nature, or subsistentia. The former or the Realist, more numerous in the early Middle Ages (Fredugisus, Rémy d'Auxerre, and John Scotus Eriugena in the ninth century, Gerbert and Odo of Tournai in the Tenth, and William of Chapeaux in the twelfth) attribute to each species a universal essence (subsistentia), to which all the subordinate individuals are tributary. For a long time it was thought that the problem of universals monopolized the attention of the philosophers of the Middle Ages, and that the dispute of the Nominalists and Realists absorbed all their energies. www.newadvent.org /cathen/11090c.htm   (4330 words)

Ludwig Wittgenstein [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] It is also worth noting that supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics. There is something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found to 'agree' with it. Cora Diamond The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind (MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991). www.iep.utm.edu /w/wittgens.htm   (4330 words)

Untitled Document Realism, at least theory realism, is often oppugned by means of raising difficulties with theories of reference pertaining to the terms that refer to the entities of a theory that a realist asserts are real. The brand of realism I propose, however, has much to recommend it beyond merely a denial of anti-realism: it accords with a sophisticated conception of common sense, it is internally consistent, and it does justice to the findings of science. This argument doesn't address reality about entities that are truly "in principle unobservable." Such entities include but are not limited to Newtonian gravity, black holes, and the classical astronomical agon of epicycles/deferents vs. eccentric orbits. www.sewanee.edu /philosophy/Journal/Archives/2001/clayton.htm   (5232 words)

sutton He must shoulder the same burden with his red herring that anti-realism's denial of objectivity is to be equated with denying that some judgements are better than others. At this point, the discussion could move to counterclaims being made concerning the contradictions inherent in a realist epistemology but, once again, such arguments are really pointless. Realism, like many items of the past, has outlived its usefulness since, once having acknowledged and openly stated that the emperor wears no clothes, it is hard to pretend he does. www.chss.montclair.edu /inquiry/summ95/sutton.html   (2286 words)

realism.txt Metaphysics and the special sciences (29) A. must also distinguish realism in general from realism in particular B. that is, one could be a realist in general while doubting the reality of some particular entity, say, photons 1. Movements, not doctrines (26) A. realism and anti-realism are more like movements in philosophy of science than a specific set of doctrines 1. to believe in the truth of a theory is not necessarily to believe in the reality of the entities that it postulates a. www.iit.edu /~schmaus/Philosophy_of_Science/lectures/Hacking/realism.txt   (1166 words)

Critical Realism However, such is the influence of various kinds of idealism and relativism in recent social theory that realists increasingly find that they must first answer to epistemological questions these anti-realist position raise before they can get their main case heard regarding ontology and explanation. Importantly, realists argue that people are ‘produced’ by the structures, and in turn, they ‘transform’ them. Social reality is viewed as a socially constructed world in which either social episodes are the products of social actors’ cognitive resources (i.e., the social has to be interpreted and understood), or social arrangements are the product of material but unobservable structures of relations (e.g., patriarchy, capitalism, and industrialism). uk.geocities.com /balihar_sanghera/carcrealism.html   (1166 words)

feb04.html This led to a side discussion of the difference between generally realist attitudes to those that may be called "anti-realist" - a division that affects many philosophical debates. Realists believe in the objective, mind-independent status of certain facts or events. The question was raised of whether it is an unjustified prejudice to think that the goal of obtaining one's own food directly is more important or fundamental than that of obtaining the latest sneakers, and so whether it can be objectively maintained that those chasing sneakers are worse off than those chasing antelopes. grimpeur.tamu.edu /~colin/Phil205/feb04.html   (1166 words)

The Big Questions: Scientific Realism & Anti-Realism An anti-realist responseThe no-miracles argument basically says that the only sensible explanation of the predictive success of scientific theories is that what those theories say about the unobservable entities which give rise to the predicted phenomena is true. According to instrumentalism, what Quantum Mechanics is really saying when it says that the photon is in quantum state S is merely that, if I were to make such-and-such a measurement, I would get so-and-so observable results. I infer from this observation that there really is a 3-dimensional solid table present; but, just as in the cloud chamber case, I do not directly observe the table. www.fi.uib.no /AMOS/fys210/fys210m6/realism.html   (1559 words)

According to Unlike realism, which constitutes a definite doctrine, the anti-realist view is not a specific philosophical doctrine but the rejection of a doctrine. However, the kind of reservation that anti-realism has regarding realism presents a definite character, since it objects what constitutes, according to Dummett, the cardinal thesis of realism: the unrestricted acceptance of the principle of bivalence, the principle that states that every meaningful sentence is determinately true or false. Thus, he considers that it is pointless, at least at the beginning, to formulate the conflict in ontological terms, and proposes to set aside the metaphysical facet of the dispute and start with the disagreement over the correct theory of meaning for mathematical sentences. www.accionfilosofica.com /misc/1111482311art.htm   (10339 words)

Michael Dummett [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] Realism is a metaphysical doctrine; but it stands or falls with the viability of a corresponding semantic theory. Full-fledged realism depends on -- indeed, may be identified with -- an undiluted application to sentences of the relevant kind a straightforward two-valued classical semantics: a Fregean semantics in fact. Commentators who do not accept Dummett's characterization of realism would not necessarily agree with his characterization of Frege as a realist, since it is not a label that Frege himself adopts. www.iep.utm.edu /d/dummett.htm   (8674 words)

Reading "All About" Computerization: -- Rob Kling However, social realists have not developed systematic strategies for analyzing the social character of powerful technologies that are not yet available, in use, for the kind of highly nuanced empirical observation which is the hallmark of the genre. Social realists write their articles and books with a tacit label: "I have carefully observed and examined computerization in some key social settings that can change the way that you think about technology and social life. Social scientists are more capable of developing theoretical inquiries, but they are more likely to publish social realist discourses about computerization or documents which apply existing theory to sharpen realist accounts. www.slis.indiana.edu /kling/read94a.html   (8674 words)

The Film Journal...Passionate and informed film criticism from an auteurist perspective. Dogme 95 itself, the manifesto and movement, can be nothing more than it is: an ephemeral movement, a fleeting political statement that provided the artistic atmosphere for the creation of the films that combine ensemble methodology into the scope of auteurism, that plead anti-genre even in from the cesspool of agreed-upon rules. This unity is finally completed by the supplementary union of method and meaning, in which the actual cinematography of Dogme 95-including the adoption of previous "realist" technical trends, and especially the numerous implications of digital film (gritty frame, shaky transportable frame, lack of depth-of-field)-binds the apparatus to the characters in front of the camera. The Dogme 95 manifesto and its adherents, by appropriating numerous conventions of classical cinema and alternate codes of cinematic "realism," and by transforming them to meet the cultural standards of Realism posited by our technological praxis, have placed themselves in the contextual history of cinematic realism and in rejection of cinematic aesthetics. www.thefilmjournal.com /issue9/dogme95.html   (8674 words)

Logical Positivism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] Schlick, at least in the first stage of his philosophical development, was a realist: science give us a true description of an external world; he professed his admiration for Mach, but also asserted that Machian anti-realism was too extreme and did not correctly depict the real activity of scientists. Mathematician and philosopher, co-author of the manifesto of the Vienna Circle. In 1929, the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, written by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap, was dedicated to Schlick; in 1930 the first article published in the new journal Erkenntnis was Schlick's Die Wende der Philosophie. www.iep.utm.edu /l/logpos.htm   (8674 words)

Referat:Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude and Critiques On Fine’s showing, then, it is this combination of realism and antirealisms which has provided the progression and development of philosophy of science. "The task of 'explaining' is the realist program for identifying a reality underlying the formulas of the theory and thereby explaining tbe predictive success of the formulas as approximately true descriptions of this reality." (390) This is not the only progressive philosophy of science. Realism is just a reflective attempt to defend the 'natural', unreflective, common-sensical reading of the assertions of science. www.drury.edu /ess/philsci/AFine.html   (1454 words)

Hume’s Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation She argues that Hume’s causal theory is best understood as ‘quasi-realist’ - an intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. First, it provides a careful and insightful account of the distinction between realism and anti-realism, and a systematic approach to distinguishing quasi-realism as a genuine third alternative across a range of topics. There are some commentators who believe that his theory is a version of realism and many others who argue that it is a version of anti-realism. www.thoemmes.com/404.asp?404;http://www.thoemmes.com/18cphil/hume_theory.htm   (458 words)

Amazon.com: The New Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice: Books: Philip Jenkins It is quite a different matter [however] to say that some essential features of [Catholicism] give rise to evil or abuse and that the evil cannot be prevented without fundamentally changing the beliefs or practices of the religion." The author is a realist, not a sensationalist or somebody looking for controversy. He also explains that "it is not anti-Catholic simply to assert that the Church's position on a given issue is dead wrong, nor that Bishop X or Cadinal Y is a monster or menace to the public good. Catholics and Catholicism are at the receiving end of a great deal of startling vituperation in contemporary America, although generally, those responsible never think of themselves as bigots. www.amazon.com /exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0195154800?v=glance   (3055 words)

Herman Belz: A living constitution or fundamental law? Realist tendencies of this sort were prominent even in the work of traditional scholars, such as Andrew C. McLaughlin and Homer C. Hockett, and before long took on the aspect of conventional wisdom in constitutional history textbooks. Although constitutional realists professed to view the Constitution as a social symbol around which public life was organized, they could not quite overcome their sense of amazement or incredulity at what, from their reform perspective, seemed mere fetishism blocking progressive change. This anti-constitutionalist attitude was often expressed in criticism, if not direct repudiation, of the principle of a government of law. www.constitution.org /cmt/belz/lcfl_05.htm   (3055 words)

blargblog: Revolution? Even so, the use of socialist realist imagery and invoking terms like "revolution" amuses me—not only because it's a bit incongruous given the candidate, but what it says about modern politics. Much public art from the 30s, for example, had very explicit populist, anti-corporate themes, depicting America as the land of equality where the poor and downtrodden would finally get a fair shake. Kucinich has to fight against appearing too "fringe" while Dean has to work at appearing too "mainstream." Yet the use of socialist realism by Dean, even in this minor instance—and probably without his knowing it, because that's what campaign managers and ad teams are for—reveals how casually we reflect our past. www.incontemptcomics.com /archives/000212.html   (3055 words)

rorty.html   Rorty is a metaphysical anti-realist, which leads him to deny epistemological foundationalism. Given that the foundational philosophers have contributed nothing ‘useful’ to moral theory, and in particular to human rights theory, Rorty argues that the best, and perhaps only reason for putting foundationalism behind us is that it would let us concentrate our energies on manipulating the emotions of people.   Given that their system of ethics holds together coherently as its own set of beliefs and principles, and it excludes the idea of human rights, it would appear that Rorty cannot make any claim to moral superiority without an appeal to some variety of foundationalism. artsweb.uwaterloo.ca /~pthurley/index/rorty.html   (3055 words)

rrgop.htm Reagan, being a political realist, must have realized that his activities in behalf of the Anti\_Nazi League in Hollywood during World War 2 were going to be broadcast on Red Channels. That Reagan's membership in the Hollywood Anti-Fascism League via his membership in the Screen Actors' Guild (SAG) was, indeed, highly controversial, vulnerable to attack from the Right, and highly political in nature. As a Hollywood Democrat, he had also been involved in the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League's activities--activities which were at worst liberal, and at best, the height of patriotism. home.att.net /~m.standridge/rrgop.htm   (2960 words)

Professor Ned Block A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response To Block's Harder Problem," Philosophical Issues, 13, (2003):163-204 (The version linked to here may be slightly different from the published version.), and Jakob Hohwy, “ Neural plasticity and consciousness: Reply to Block from the August, 2003 issue. Psychology, came to NYU in 1996 from MIT where he was Chair of the Philosophy Program. www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block   (2960 words)

Reid’s Non-NaĂŻve Direct Realism This understanding of Reid’s direct realism also explains how he can speak of the interpretation of sensations and remain a direct realist.   Berkeley is not a direct realist, however, because he does not share with Reid the commitment to the existence of external objects and our perceptual knowledge of them made in premises PDR1 and 2.   However, these premises don’t yet illuminate why Reid took himself to be a direct realist. humanities.ucsc.edu /NEH/copenhaver.htm   (5112 words)

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