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Topic: Appellant

	Appellant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In law, an appellant is the party who after eating a vagina, having lost their claim in a lower court decision, is appealing to a higher court to have their case reconsidered.
		This is usually done on the basis that the lower court judge erred in the application of law.
		The appellant in the new case can be either the claimant, defendant, or respondent from the lower case, depending on who was the losing party.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Appellant (132 words)

	69 Wn.2d 264, THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RUSSELL EDWARD JOHNSON, Appellant
		Appellant argues that his proposed manslaughter instruction should have been given because the evidence contained in his own testimony and that of Dr. Lamphere presented an issue of fact as to whether or not appellant had formed an intention, or could have formed an intention or design to effect the death of the deceased.
		Appellant either had a defense to the homicide on the ground of temporary insanity or he was guilty of murder in either the first or second degree.
		Appellant concludes that the testimony of Dr. Jarvis, which was based on only his oral examination of appellant about two days after the homicide was committed, is not properly related to the facts about which he was asked to give his opinion concerning the mental state of appellant at the time of the homicide.
	www.mrsc.org /mc/courts/supreme/069wn2d/069wn2d0264.htm (4014 words)

	MAUREEN KASS, APPELLANT, v. STEVEN KASS, RESPONDENT. (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		Appellant and respondent were married on July 4, 1988, and almost immediately began trying to conceive a child.
		On June 28, 1993, appellant by letter informed the hospital and her IVF physician of her marital problems and expressed her opposition to destruction or release of the pre zygotes.
		Appellant's construction ignores the direction that ownership of the pre zygotes "must be determined in a property settlement" words that also must be given meaning, words that connote the parties' anticipated agreement as to disposition.
	www.law.cornell.edu /nyctap/I98_0049.htm (3988 words)

	Juvenile Law Section Home Page
		Appellant agreed that he understood his rights and that he was pleading true because that was what he intended to do and for no other reason.
		Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient because the State's stipulation demonstrates that the complainant effectively invited Appellant into her apartment when she asked Appellant and another person to help carry a heavy item upstairs to her apartment.
		Appellant's judicial confession constitutes competent evidence under family code section 54.03(f) to satisfy the element concerning entry without effective consent and is legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment adjudicating Appellant delinquent for the offense of burglary of a habitation.
	www.juvenilelaw.org /CaseSummaries2004/04-3-26.HTM (1594 words)

	24181: Bruce D. Roach, Movant-Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent.
		Appellant was sentenced to a six-year term in the Department of Corrections for the class C felony offense of possession of a controlled substance on October 31, 1994.
		Appellant claims that the Circuit Court of Jasper County lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation on October 31, 1999, five years after he was first placed on probation.
		Therefore, the court's attempt to revoke Appellant's probation in June of 2000 was a nullity, and the court's denial of Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief was clearly erroneous.
	www.courts.mo.gov /courts/pubopinions.nsf/0/90f899eb380bc0f086256b45005fba96?OpenDocument (1083 words)

	DONALD JOHNSON, Appellant (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		Appellant asserts that a claimant under the workers' compensation system is not required to be totally unable to perform any and all work to qualify for temporary total disability benefits.
		Appellant certified on each of his weekly unemployment claim forms from November 21, 1992 to September 4, 1993 that he was able to work as a truck driver.
		As appellant was temporarily and totally disabled from his position as a truck driver, he cannot contend that he was "able to work" to secure unemployment benefits as a truck driver.
	www.web.ucrc.state.oh.us /Abstract/Court/c000107.stm (2517 words)

	32 Wn.2d 607, ED HOOVER, Respondent, v. R. W. THOMPSON, Appellant
		Appellant turned west onto the northerly fork of the road leading into the airport, and the two cars collided, resulting in the accident which is the basis of this action.
		Appellant, testifying on his own behalf, stated that, for some time prior to the collision, in connection with his business, he had visited the airport about once a week; that he was driving south on the highway and made a righthand turn to the west to visit the airport.
		James L. Bush, called by appellant as a witness, testified that, on the afternoon of the accident, he was driving a gas truck south along the highway, that appellant's car had passed the witness, and that the witness saw the accident.
	www.mrsc.org /mc/courts/supreme/032wn2d/032wn2d0607.htm (1628 words)

	The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant's statement admissible. [Vargas v. State](05-2-23A)
		In six points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in admitting his statements that were involuntarily made, (2) in admitting unduly prejudicial photographs of the complainant, (3) in allowing a jury charge that commented on the weight of the evidence, and (4) in denying his request for lesser included offenses.
		Appellant recounted the events that took place at Sutton's home, stating that he forced his way into the house after Sutton let Ray in to use the telephone, and then appellant brutally beat, stabbed, and robbed the elderly woman.
		Appellant asserts that the statements were involuntarily given because (1) investigating officers continued to question him after [*6] he invoked his right to remain silent and (2) the statements were improperly induced.
	www.tjpc.state.tx.us /publications/reviews/05/05-2-23A.htm (1947 words)

	Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion
		Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated appellant’s due process rights by denying his fourth motion for continuance, dismissing the case, and denying his motion for reinstatement.
		Appellant contends that because the assertions regarding Cruse’s inability to participate at trial on July 19 were not controverted, the trial court was required to accept them as true.
		Appellant contends that the trial court was required to reinstate his case because his failure to appear was “otherwise reasonably explained” by the existence of Cruse’s medical condition.
	www.1stcoa.courts.state.tx.us /opinions/HTMLopinion.asp?OpinionID=82735 (1785 words)

	Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion
		Appellant asserts 19 points of error in which she challenges, among other things, the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict rejecting the insanity defense, the denial of a motion for mistrial based on false testimony, and the denial of her right to due process by the use of false or perjured testimony.
		She observed that appellant was almost catatonic, did not respond to conversation or made a delayed response, stared into space, trembled, scratched her head until she created bald spots, and did not eat.
		Appellant argues that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was essential to the jury’s “guilty” verdict and that his testimony relating to the “Law and Order” episode was the most compelling testimony supporting Dr. Dietz’s conclusion that appellant knew right from wrong.
	www.1stcoa.courts.state.tx.us /opinions/htmlopinion.asp?OpinionId=81308 (2978 words)

	[No title]
		Steven G. Cohn and Steven G. Cohn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
		Appellant settled her workers’ compensation claim in May 2001. Respondent terminated appellant in June 2001 because, according to respondent’s human resources director, respondent had no available position for her that was suitable and which she could perform with or without reasonable accommodations.
		Appellant states in her brief that respondent’s claim that it could not find work for her “is pretty much unbelievable,” and that her termination took place more than 20 years after she started working for respondent.
	caselaw.lp.findlaw.com /data2/californiastatecases/b172366.doc (2212 words)

	[No title]
		Appellant contends that the trial court decisions are contradictory because, in its July 25, 2001 decision, the trial court denied appellees' motion for summary judgment, but in its January 9, 2002 decision, it granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.
		Appellant further failed to list specific facts to support the notion that appellees had serious doubts as to the truthfulness of the article or that they knew it was false.
		Appellant appears to contend that actual malice is evidenced by the fact that he did not make the defamatory statement, and that Caton was not even present at the February 2001 Board meeting.
	www.nyls.edu /docs/Featherstone.txt (2477 words)

	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
		The jury was instructed that the appellant had an "affirmative defense" if possession and cultivation of marijuana was for the appellant's personal use with the recommendation or approval of a physician, and that appellant had the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
		Appellant should not have been subjected to arrest or prosecution without a case-specific investigation and review of the propriety of the amount of marijuana he was growing and possessed.
		Appellant was deprived of the opportunity to assert his claim of immunity in pretrial proceedings, and his jury was erroneously instructed as to the burden of proof.
	www.canorml.org /prop/mower/appellantbrief.html (9970 words)

	WD57804: Jimmy D. Ballard, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent
		After hearing evidence, the hearing officer rejected the appellant's contention that, in order to make a prima facie case for suspension under section 302.505.1, the Director had the burden to prove probable cause to stop due to the fact that the appellant was under 21 years of age at the time of his arrest.
		Unlike the appellant, the Director asks us to read the statute, as amended, as providing two alternative methods for suspending or revoking the license of an under-21 driver, depending on his or her BAC and whether there was probable cause to stop or probable cause to arrest.
		The judgment of the trial court affirming the Director's suspension of the appellant's driver's license, pursuant to section 302.505.1, is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter its judgment reinstating the appellant's driver's license and considering the appellant's motion for attorney's fees.
	www.doprocess.net /files/duicas~1.htm (3081 words)

	[No title]
		Appellant, a Sergeant with the Department of California Highway Patrol (Department), was suspended for 10 working days by the Department for participating in inappropriate sexual banter with a subordinate officer and for grabbing that same officer by the buttocks and kissing her while off-duty at a Department retirement dinner.
		Appellant now regrets their "couple" bantering, including the statement he made to Adams about her not coming home to sleep, but states that it was all done in fun and that nothing sexual ever transpired in these conversations.
		Adams slapped appellant and assumed that by this action that she let appellant know her feelings with respect to his behavior and felt that the matter was closed.
	www.spb.ca.gov /documents/preced/Carter.doc (2503 words)

	[No title]
		Appellant appealed the Department's decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), alleging, inter alia, that the Department's action was the result of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap (id. at 16a-17a).
		Appellant's principal contention (J.S. 14) is that the courts below erred in holding that he had failed to allege a discriminatory basis for his removal.
		Since appellant's claims are fully comprehended by the review procedure culminating in the decision of the MSPB, he cannot rely on the Constitution as a basis for bringing a new district case arising out of the same events.
	www.usdoj.gov /osg/briefs/1988/sg880178.txt (1664 words)

	Texas Judiciary - Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion #AP-74,029
		The appellant removed the victim from the trunk, and McCoy stated the appellant "chunked her on the ground." The appellant and Lionelle re-taped the victim's arms and legs more tightly than before, beat her, and returned her to the trunk.
		Also entered into evidence was a letter written by the appellant to a cousin in which the appellant claimed he "was just the watch out person and driver of the car," and accused Jennifer and McCoy of putting the victim in the trunk and throwing her in the river.
		The appellant claims that his motion for mistrial should have been granted because the statement regarding the victim's family's wishes was so prejudicial that it tainted the jury's verdict and violated the appellant's right to a fair trial.
	www.cca.courts.state.tx.us /opinions/74029.htm (4582 words)

	Defendant/Appellant's Georgia State Supreme Court Brief
		Appellant thereafter filed his Petition for Leave to Appeal, which petition was granted by this Court on October 7, 1999, and which appeal was docketed on June 5, 2000.
		Appellant presumes that the state of Georgia would proffer as its stated objective its interest in encouraging fathers to take responsibility for children born out of wedlock, which on its face may appear to be a sound, benign objective.
		Appellant would reallege the authority and arguments set forth in the prior section of this brief and show that, since the state?s interest would not meet the intermediate level of scrutiny, it certainly would fail the more demanding strict scrutiny test.
	www.hettyanderson.com /c4m/tpgascbr.html (3189 words)

	[No title]
		Appellant claims that GSA failed in its duty under the clause to restore the building to its condition before the commencement of GSA's lease.
		On December 21, 1994, appellant filed its restoration appeal with this Board; it was docketed as GSBCA 13125.
		Appellant is wrong as to the scope of the waiver.
	www.gsbca2.gsa.gov /oldappeals/w13125a.txt (1474 words)

	§ 1.965 Appellant's brief in - PATENT RULES
		The brief must be signed by the appellant, or the appellant's duly authorized attorney or agent and must be accompanied by the requisite fee set forth in § 1.17(c).
		If the appellant is a third party requester, the appellant must identify the claims that the examiner has made a determination favorable to patentability, which determination is being appealed.
		The contentions of appellant with respect to each of the issues presented for review in paragraph (c)(6) of this section, and the bases therefor, with citations of the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
	www.uspto.gov /web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxr_1_965.htm (981 words)

	[No title]
		Appellant’s duties include ensuring parolees follow all rules and laws; he is called upon to set an example for the parolees under his care. Given the sensitivity of appellant’s position, appellant’s illegal conduct cannot be countenanced.
		Appellant’s criminal behavior is irreconcilable with his job as a parole agent for the Department. The punishment of dismissal is not unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.
		Appellant argues that the appropriate remedy for such a violation is an award of backpay, exclusion of all evidence which resulted from Detective Neiman’s investigation of the disappearance of Mr.
	www.spb.ca.gov /docs/preced/Garcia.doc (3133 words)

	JAMES MULLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		Appellant's attempt to repair the car failed, and further attempts to secure transportation were unsuccessful.
		Appellant's application for benefits was denied on the grounds that appellant had quit his employment with Dun-Well, Inc. without just cause.
		Both of appellant's assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is affirmed.
	www.web.ucrc.state.oh.us /abstract/Court/c000121.stm (662 words)

	Queen v. Clay - NORML
		At some point after the Appellant had set up the store, a government employee came to visit and admitted that, although the store was controversial, it appeared to be a viable business operation and so the loan was approved.
		The Appellant grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of any meaningful response from the politicians to his efforts to reform the law.
		The analysis of these arguments must be undertaken with the recognition that the appellants have the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that their fundamental rights are violated by the law in question.
	www.norml.org /index.cfm?Group_ID=4938 (7824 words)

	O&O IN HARVEY, LINWOOD E. - DC000425W1 - (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		Hicks be allowed to testify at the hearing before the administrative judge regarding the statements the appellant made to them in September 1996; and that those supervisors would have testified, if the administrative judge had not disapproved their testimony, that the appellant's description was inaccurate. Id.
		Wentz’s review of the files and his nonselection of the appellant was sufficient to establish that the disclosures mentioned in the memorandum were a contributing factor in the nonselection. Id.
		Moreover, the appellant’s claim that his disclosures contributed to his nonselection is based on Mr.
	www.mspb.gov /decisions/2002/harvey_dc000425w1.html (1174 words)

	APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN REPLY TO UNIVERSITY APPELLEES
		The limited knowledge of copyright violations that Appellant acquired in October 1997 was not sufficient to activate the statute of limitations, mainly because at that time He did not have the requisite knowledge or expertise to identify and notify the responsible contacts at each Internet domain suspected of harboring those violations.
		Appellant’s State law claim is not fatally vague and conclusory, because it is joined to substantial claims of copyright infringement under COUNT ONE, and of trademark infringement under
		Perhaps it is true that Appellant is one of the first to argue, and to prove with compelling evidence, that the United States District Courts inside the 50 States today are, in theory and in practice, actually legislative courts and not constitutional courts.
	www.supremelaw.org /cc/aol/reply.univ.htm (4450 words)

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