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Topic: Ariane 5 Flight 501

	Ariane 5 Flight 501 at AllExperts
		Flight 501, which took place on June 4, 1996, was the first test flight of the Ariane 5 expendable launch system.
		The Ariane 5 software reused the specifications from the Ariane 4, but the Ariane 5's flight path was considerably different and beyond the range for which the reused code had been designed.
		Flight 501's high profile disaster brought the high risks associated with complex computing systems to the attention of the general public, politicians, and executives, resulting in increased support for research on ensuring the reliability of safety-critical systems.
	en.allexperts.com /e/a/ar/ariane_5_flight_501.htm (857 words)

	Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure: Report by the Inquiry Board
		The design of the Ariane 5 SRI is practically the same as that of an SRI which is presently used on Ariane 4, particularly as regards the software.
		The same requirement does not apply to Ariane 5, which has a different preparation sequence and it was maintained for commonality reasons, presumably based on the view that, unless proven necessary, it was not wise to make changes in software which worked well on Ariane 4.
		An underlying theme in the development of Ariane 5 is the bias towards the mitigation of random failure.
	www.cs.wm.edu /~coppit/other-papers/ariane5.php (5591 words)

	Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure - Praxis101Wiki (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		However, using the Ariane 5 rocket launch failure as an example of a high profile software bug is wrong and reenforces an "urban legend" of software engineering.
		The Enquiry Board Report on the Ariane 5 event clearly indicates that the launch failure was not caused by a software bug, but rather by a failure of sytems engineering, including design, deployment, and testing.
		The Ariane 5 flight 501 termination was the result of a systems engineering assumption; viz., any exception thrown by the inertial guidance software must indicate a hardware failure.
	www.praxis101.com /wiki/index.php/Ariane_5_Flight_501_Failure (1102 words)

	ESA Portal - Press Releases - Ariane 501 - Presentation of Inquiry Board report
		A chain of events, their inter-relations and causes have been established, starting with the destruction of the launcher and tracing back in time towards the primary cause.
		These provide the technical explanations for the failure of the 501 flight, which lay in the flight control and guidance system.
		Despite the series of tests and reviews carried out under the programme, in the course of which thousands of corrections were made, shortcomings in the system approach concerning the software resulted in failure to detect the fault.
	www.esa.int /export/esaCP/Pr_33_1996_p_EN.html (631 words)

	RUCS: Computer Ethics - Ariane 5 report (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		The ARIANE 5 Flight 501 Failure Report, 19 July 1996, from the European Space Agency (ESA) makes fascinating reading.
		The design of the Ariane 5 SRI is practically the same as that of an SRI which is presently used on Ariane 4, particularly as regards the
		The same requirement does not apply to Ariane 5, which has a different preparation sequence and it was maintained for commonality reasons, presumably based on the view that, unless proven necessary, it was not wise to make changes in
	www.cafm.sbu.ac.uk /cs/people/jpb/teaching/ethics/ariane5anot.html (5568 words)

	ARIANE 5 Failure - Full Report
		- the guidance, navigation and control performance in the whole flight envelope,
		- the flight software (On-Board Computer) compliance with all equipment of the Flight Control Electrical System.
		p) Ariane 5 has a high initial acceleration and a trajectory which leads to a build-up of horizontal velocity which is five times more rapid than for Ariane 4.
	sunnyday.mit.edu /accidents/Ariane5accidentreport.html (5614 words)

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