| | Backward-chaining & Plato's Philebus (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20) |
 | | Now this point comes back in a very modern form in the distinction between forward chaining and backword chaining in the theoretical foundations of Artificial Intelligence (the distinction has actually much wider application to psychology, cognitive science and the philosophy of science -- but that's another story). |
 | | If we set aside Plato's denigration of the flesh, and the irrelevancy of phenomenal consciousness introduced by Hare, we see that Plato is giving us a general basis for distinguishing between two functional architectures for action or behaviour. |
 | | What is so insightful in the Philebus is the sharp differentiation of the structure of intentional from that of non-intentional action, through the crucial role of goal representation. |
| www.cs.yorku.ca /~peter/philebus.html (450 words) |