Where results make sense

About us   |   Why use us?   |   Reviews   |   PR   |   Contact us

Induction (disambiguation) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Induction in the fields of philosophy and logic, and used in science and the scientific method. Strong induction, or Complete induction, is a variant of mathematical induction. Structural induction is a generalization of mathematical induction. en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Induction   (151 words)

Backward Induction On their view, once the backward induction argument is set out carefully, it will turn out that neither player is in a position to rationally believe everything she must in order for the paradox to follow. The backward induction argument is supposed to show each player, at the start of the game, that rationality requires him to defect in every round -- and in particular in the first. Having resolved the backward induction paradox to their satisfaction, Pettit and Sugden examine the strategies that might be pursued by rational players who are not backward inducers. personal.bgsu.edu /~roberth/bipx.html   (5004 words)

[No title] The backward induction argument states that a rational player who shares the common knowledge of (or belief in) rationality, in a certain kind of games, chooses to end the game at each of his nonterminal nodes. This is known as the backward induction paradox. The conclusion of this thesis is that, although the paradox remains unsolved, the studies on the backward induction paradox have been constructive; the argumentation has revealed a number of interesting properties concerning important assumptions behind the backward induction argument. www.valt.helsinki.fi /gradutmp/vara2/g1931.htm   (266 words)

[No title] The conflict between intuition and game-theoretical concepts of solution is often illustrated through the so called backward induction paradoxes, which generally arise in a dynamic setting as unique but "unreasonable" subgame perfect equilibria and rationalizable solutions. In this setting, they are particularly puzzling, because here the usual attempts to avoid the backward induction solution do not work. In the latter case, it is shown that, unlike the backward induction paradoxes, the assumption of common belief of rationality at each information state doe not necessarily imply the paradoxical conclusions. www.unicatt.it /docenti/ColomboFe/publications/abstract/dp_ucs_20.htm   (189 words)

[No title] Minimal Belief Revision leads to Backward Induction Andr´es Perea Maastricht University This Version: August 2004 Abstract In this paper we present a model for games with perfect information in which the players, upon observing an unexpected move, may revise their beliefs about the opponents' preferences over outcomes. The concepts of (common belief in) belief in sequential rationality and minimal belief revision may thus be viewed as a possible foundation for backward induction, which constitutes one of the oldest ideas in game theory. Consider a profile P = (Pi)i I of strict preference relations Other foundations for backward induction that do allow players to revise their beliefs about the opponents' utilities during the game can be found in Perea (2003a, 2003b). www.science.uva.nl /pub/theory/illc/ResearchReports/PP-2004-25.text.txt   (6828 words)

EconPapers: Backward Induction and Common Knowledge I believe my claim that rational players would not necessarily use their backward- induction strategies if there were to be a deviation from the backward-induction path is now generally accepted. Without intending any disrespect to the authors,2 I believe that there is little of genuine significance tobe learned from any of the literature that ap-plies various formal methods to backward induction problems even when the authors find their way to conclusions that I believe to be correct. It is true that, if we were in serious doubt about whether an author had suc- ceeded in analyzing his or her model correctly, then it would be foolish not to insist that the argument be given in precise terms. econpapers.repec.org /paper/elsesrcls/008.htm   (1541 words)

Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information (ResearchIndex)   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) To derive backward induction, a "forward belief' condition is formulated in... 1 The backward induction paradox (context) - Pettit, Sugden - 1989 1 Grappling with the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction.. citeseer.ist.psu.edu /596821.html   (451 words)

Using Path Induction to Evaluate Sequential Allocation Procedures Path induction is a technique used to speed the process of making multiple exact evaluations of a sequential allocation procedure, where the options are discrete and their outcomes follow a discrete distribution. While the emphasis is on path induction, the techniques used to speed up the analyses of staged allocation procedures can also be used to improve backward induction for such procedures. For each parameter configuration to be evaluated, one reduces the time by a factor of n, where n is the size of the experiment, by using path induction rather than the standard technique of backward induction. epubs.siam.org /sam-bin/dbq/article/29182   (331 words)

[No title]   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) We consider a slight deviation from this assumption: When a player contemplates the best action at a future decision node, she assigns some small probability to the event that other players may reach a different conclusion when they carry out the same analysis. Importantly, this result does not depend on forward induction or reputation reasoning, and thus applies also to finite horizon overlapping generations models with fiat money. This shows that the prediction that money can have no value hinges on the assumption that all players are absolutely confident in their conclusions regarding others’ reasoning. econ.tau.ac.il /research/abstract.asp?id=172002   (158 words)

Backward Induction and Model Deterioration We formalize this issue for games with perfect information, and show that small-probability model deterioration may upset the complete-model backward induction solution, possibly yielding a Pareto-improving long run distribution of play. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the robustness of backward induction. These conditions can be interpreted with a forward-induction logic, and are shown to be closely related to the requirements for asymptotic stability of the backward induction path under standard evolutionary dynamics. www.bepress.com /bejte/advances/vol4/iss1/art2   (135 words)

Using Forward Induction   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) Abstract: Forward induction is a technique to speed the process of making multiple exact evaluations of a sequential allocation procedure, where the options are discrete and their outcomes follow a discrete distribution. Multiple evaluations are needed for determining criteria such as maxima or minima over regions (where the location of the extremal value is unknown in advance), for visualizing characteristics such as robustness, or for obtaining the distribution of a statistic rather than just its mean. While the emphasis is on forward induction, the techniques used to speed up the analyses of staged allocation procedures can also be used to improve backward induction for such procedures. www.eecs.umich.edu /~jphard/abs/forward.html   (219 words)

Intransitivity of collective preferences   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) All you need to do is to bind yourself to choosing the (9,9,8) outcome instead of the (2,0,9), should the game reach that node. If the other two players are convinced/believe you, backward induction will result in the good (9,9,8) outcome. Find Nash equilibrium by means of backward induction. darkwing.uoregon.edu /~osmirnov/347/q2a.html   (715 words)

voluntaryXchange: How Old Should Your Kids Parents Be? It is the process of starting from the outcome you want and working back to where you are now to highlight the path you need to take in the future. The post entitled "Sithwards Induction, or: The Dark Side for Grad Students" at EconLog gives examples of this for both the economics graduate student, and Revenge of the Sith. Almost 20 years later I like to think my backward induction is going OK. I haven't seen Lisa or Mary in ages, but I wonder if their plans worked out. voluntaryxchange.typepad.com /voluntaryxchange/2005/06/how_old_should_.html   (589 words)

Game Theory This process is called backward induction (because the reasoning works backwards from eventual outcomes to present decision problems). Both players must use backward induction to solve the game; backward induction requires that I know that II knows that I is rational; but II can solve the game only by using a backward induction argument that takes as a premise the irrationality of I. This is the paradox of backward induction. If there is even a remote possibility that a player may make a mistake -- that her ‘hand may tremble’ -- then no contradiction is introduced by a player's using a backward induction argument that requires the hypothetical assumption that another player has taken a path that a rational player could not choose. plato.stanford.edu /entries/game-theory   (20977 words)

Backward Induction - Game Theory .net Backward induction is an iterative process for solving finite extensive form or sequential games. First, one determines the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the next-to-last moving player is determined taking the last player's action as given. www.gametheory.net /Dictionary/BackwardInduction.html   (124 words)

[No title] Use backward induction to identify subgame perfect equilibria for sequential games. Agenda Entry games Backward induction Credible and incredible threats Subgame perfection Shape the game Product location games Backward induction Preemption In a multi-stage game, one or more players move first and these moves are revealed to the other players before the other players choose their actions. Given this anticipation, what strategy would you suggest for A? for B? The “best” strategy identified by the extensive form and backward induction is sub-game perfect. www.people.vcu.edu /~emillner/FastTrack/SequentialGamesFastTrack_Baye_C10_20051.doc   (1261 words)

NIM Trick (Backward Induction)   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) In this way, your opponent will always be left with one of the key numbers above. The key numbers can be found by using backward induction. Start at the end of the problem and work backwards. physics.bu.edu /scifest/Math_Exhibits/NIM.html   (400 words)

CRISTINA BICCHIERI   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) Backwards Forward Induction (with G. Antonelli), in R. Fagin (ed.) Reasoning about Knowledge, Morgan Kauffmann 1994. Knowledge-Dependent Games: Backward Induction in C. Bicchieri and M.L. Dalla Chiara (eds.) Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press 1992. Backward Induction without Common Knowledge, Proceedings of the 1988 Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association, vol. www.phil.cmu.edu /faculty/bicchieri/CV/cv.html   (2960 words)

EconPapers: Behavioural versus Habitual Rationality and Backward Induction Abstract: The problem of finding sufficient conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analysed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. While common knowledge of the former and the structure of the game does not imply backward induction, higher level knowledge of the latter and the structure of the game does. It is shown that similar results can be proven with non-introspective belief instead of knowledge. econpapers.repec.org /paper/wpawuwpga/9905001.htm   (222 words)

Sergiu Hart / papers / Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) Sergiu Hart / papers / Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. Keywords: games in extensive form, games of perfect information, backward induction equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium, evolutionary dynamics, evolutionary stability, mutation, selection, population games www.ma.huji.ac.il /~hart/abs/evol-bi.html   (98 words)

PUBLICATIONS LIST August 2001 We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. www.ssc.wisc.edu /econ/archive/aug01pub.htm   (2525 words)

An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction "Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction," Game Theory and Information 9905002, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, revised 23 Mar 2000. "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. ideas.repec.org /p/bon/bonsfb/228.html   (659 words)

Analyses for Adaptive Designs   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) Our computational approach incorporates backward induction, dynamic programming, and a new technique of forward induction. By utilizing efficient algorithms and careful implementation, we are able to determine exact solutions to practical problems previously approached only through simulation or approximation. Keywords: constrained dynamic programming, forward induction, backward induction, bayesian design, multiple objective criteria, clinical trials www.stat.lsa.umich.edu /~jphard/abs/MtHoly.html   (107 words)

Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science: Alternating Offer Bargaining Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating-offer bargaining games, backward induction. Keywords: experiments, bargaining, alternating offer bargaining, fairness, backward induction. Abstract The experiments show that when subjects have prior experience in the subgames, their behavior conforms more closely to the subgame perfect Nash prediction in alternating-offer bargaining games. www.people.virginia.edu /~cah2k/altoffy2k.htm   (620 words)

Seminar F2002 Pettit and Sugden, The Backward Induction Paradox, Journal of Philosophy, 86, No. 4, On Electronic Reserve Stalnaker, Robert, Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction, Mathematical Social Sciences, 36, On Electronic Reserve How ought we to resolve a host of decision-theoretic paradoxes that arise from infinities, including the heaven/hell problem, the Trump problem, the nonconglomerable dartboard problem, the case of the vexing switches, and the airtight dutch book. webware.princeton.edu /vanfraas/seminarF2002/Syllabus533.htm   (742 words)

MIT OpenCourseWare | Economics | 14.126 Game Theory, Fall 2002 | Calendar   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) Introduction, Definitions (Nash, Perfect, Sequential Equilibrium, Rationalizability, Correlated Equilibrium, Backward Induction, Forward Induction, Sequential Rationality, Self confirming equilibria) Aumann, R. "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality." Ben-Porath, E. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games." ocw.mit.edu /OcwWeb/Economics/14-126Game-TheoryFall2002/Calendar   (233 words)

Arianna Dal Forno and Ugo Merlone: From Classroom Experiments to Computer Code   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05) If we consider a number T of years, the total amount of fish caught across time is: By backward induction it is obvious that, if α is greater than n, it is not rational to fish in periods different from the final one. Vice versa, if α is less than n, not to fish is a dominated strategy. jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk /7/3/2.html   (7827 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)

About us   |   Why use us?   |   Reviews   |   Press   |   Contact us   Copyright © 2005-2007 www.factbites.com Usage implies agreement with terms.