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Topic: Bell La Padula


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In the News (Fri 24 May 19)

  
  Bell-LaPadula model - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Bell-LaPadula Model was developed by David Bell and Len LaPadula in 1973 to formalize the U.S. Department of Defense multilevel security policy.
The model is a formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules by the use of security labels on objects, from the most sensitive to the least sensitive, and clearances for subjects:
Bell, D. Elliott and LaPadula, Leonard J. Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and MULTICS Interpretation".
en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Bell_La_Padula   (576 words)

  
 Biba model - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Conversely, users can only view content at or above their own security level (a monk may read a book written by the high priest, but may not read a pamphlet written by a lowly commoner).
As with Bell-La Padula security model Biba model defines a Simple Security Property and a * (star) property.
The Simple Security Property states that a subject at a given level of integrity may not read an object at a lower integrity level (no read-down).
en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Biba_model   (248 words)

  
 I would like to know how the Bell la Padula model works.   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-02)
Bell la Padula is generally used in military or government environments because of its tight control.
A subject (usually a user) is only allowed write access to an object (usually a file) if the security level of the object is greater than or equal to the clearance level of the subject.
One of the three main properties of the Bell LaPadula security model (the others being the *-property (star property) and the tranquility property).
www.itsecurity.com /archive/asktecs/apr3902.htm   (546 words)

  
 [No title]
The classical Bell and La Padula formulation of mili­ tary ``multilevel'' security is a model­based specification that exhibits the problems of this approach to security re­ quirements specification [2].
The Bell and La Padula model also illustrates the need for care in interpreting formal demonstrations of consis­ tency in security requirements specifications: one of the most useful ways to examine a formal requirements spec­ ification is to check whether it is consistent with some al­ ternative formulation, or entails some expected property.
The ``Basic Security Theorem'' of Bell and La Padula was a demonstration of this kind that was advanced by some (though not by its authors) as evidence that their model captures the ``essence'' of security [9].
www.csl.sri.com /cgi-bin/rushby/ps2ascii.pl?~rushby/papers/sreis01   (2786 words)

  
 Formal OS Security Models   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-02)
Bell-La Padula security model (BLP) first presented in 1973 One of first abstract security models with the purpose of modeling unauthorized disclosure (i.e.
BLP deals only with flows for subjects reading or writing an object It is a static machine model using ACM.
Limiting the size of the authorization system is another way of making the safety problem tractable: If the number of subjects is finite, the safety problem for an arbitrary authorization system is decidable.
gaia.ecs.csus.edu /~mitchell/csc250/lecture_notes/ossec/sl9_ossec.html.save   (406 words)

  
 [No title]
To complete their state machine, Bell and La Padula introduced a set of state transformations, called rules of operation, that modeled basic changes in a protection state and then rigorously proved that the rules of operation preserved the identified state invariants.
The intent of the state invariants identified by Bell and La Padula is that information is allowed to flow from one entity to another only if the second entity is at an equal or higher security level than the first.
This rather general view, which is an analogue of the original *-property of Bell and La Padula, allows the illustration of some basic issues in the use of levels, but it is overly simple in some respects.
www.remainsecure.com /whitepapers/rainbow/tg10.txt   (21482 words)

  
 CSFW 1996 Extended Abstract
Since the establishment of this model’s non-disclosure properties is attributed to a large extent to two of its properties, the Simple-Security-Property and the *-Property, these two properties are regarded as the core of Bell and La Padula’s model.
Examples of such environments are, of course, the operating system model chosen by Bell and La Padula and the assumptions made by, Feiertag/Levitt/Robinson (1977).
Lemma 5 establishes the form of the Simple-Security-Property as it is defined by Bell/La Padula (1975) and Proposition 2 establishes its validity in an environment in which assumptions (A1) to (A9) hold.
www.informatik.uni-bonn.de /~adrian/per/csfw96ab.htm   (6879 words)

  
 comp.security.misc: Re: Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall
Re: Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall
In reply to: KT: "Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall"
What are the differents between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall.
www.derkeiler.com /Newsgroups/comp.security.misc/2003-03/0315.html   (240 words)

  
 David Elliott Bell
Bell's systems work extends beyond security architectures and security for OSs, networks, and DBMSs to include preparing system descriptions before Federal solicitations; technical and programmatic monitoring of Federal acquisition projects; bidding on Federal and state solicitations; and executing technical tasks under Federal acquisitions.
Bell's research is known primarily for his ground-breaking security modeling.
Bell has served as FFRDC support to the Federal government on acquisitions; directly as a Federal employee; and both as prime and sub contractor, seeking an award.
www.star-property.com /resume.html   (1440 words)

  
 Appendix A. Glossary of Computer Security Terms
A Bell-La Padula security model rule allowing a subject write access to an object only if the security level of the object dominates the security level of the subject.
An example is the model described by Bell and LaPadula in [Bell, D. and LaPadula, L. Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation, MTR-2997 Rev. 1, MITRE Corp., Bedford, Mass., March 1976].
A Bell-La Padula security model rule allowing a subject read access to an object only if the security level of the subject dominates the security level of the object.
techpubs.sgi.com /library/dynaweb_docs/0650/SGI_EndUser/books/TCMW_UG/sgi_html/apa.html   (8942 words)

  
 NCSC-TG-004 [Aqua Book] Glossary of Computer Security Terms [Version 1, 10/21/88]
Bell-La Padula model A formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules.
In this formal model, the entities in a computer system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects.
Formal Top-Level Specification (FTLS) A top-level specification that is written in a formal mathematical language to allow theorems showing the correspondence of the system specification to its formal requirements to be hypothesized and formally proven.
www.fas.org /irp/nsa/rainbow/tg004.htm   (8614 words)

  
 - bel la padula
And you're right, a lot of what is going on in the BLP model is based on rules.
For the CompTIA exam it is important to know BLP is MAC 'just' because an admin sets the controls and the labels (again, not entirely accurate because BLP includes a DAC property...), and therefore dictates the outcome of the rules.
BLP and Lattice are practically the same models, but BLP is a bit stricter in that a user is not permitted to write into a document with a lower security level than the user’s own security level.
www.techexams.net /forums/viewtopic.php?t=3036   (700 words)

  
 Looking Back at the BLP Model   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-02)
The planted backdoor shown was identified by Roger Schell and Paul Karger and was implemented and popularized by Ken Thompson.
This work was what we called "tethered research" and segued into "development." It was not free standing, but a part of a bundle of tasks, most of them engineering.
The advantage was that all users of the network, through the security clearance process, could be plausibly be viewed as "members of a community," cooperating colleagues.
www.selfless-security.org /talks/looking-back/looking-back.html   (3107 words)

  
 - CISSP - Bell-La Padula
Instead of having to design their own system, they can use Bell-La Padula's model as Bell and La Padula did the thinking for them already.
The Bell-La Padula model provides read, write and read/write permissions, which a subject has based on his own clearance and the classification of the object it is trying to access.
Also important to understand is that you won't find this in the kind of operating systems you and I are used to (unless you have experience with military mainframes).
www.techexams.net /forums/viewtopic.php?t=8160   (1868 words)

  
 RSBAC Models
The Bell and La Padula Model describes access by active entities, called subjects, to passive entities, called objects.
This operating system was developed in 1989 by the National Computer Security Center of the USA with classification B1/TCSEC.
However, it is quite difficult to use in a typical Linux environment.
books.rsbac.org /unstable/c1351.html   (1191 words)

  
 [No title]
The technical contribution of this study is the development of algorithms that led to formal transformation rules for both models previously mentioned.
While the translation from ACL to ASL is straightforward, the translation from BLP to ASL, that ensures that both BLP axioms are satisfied, is a substantially harder problem.
To closely mimic the Bell-La Padula axioms this model defines for each security label two associated roles: one for read and one for write.
www.cse.sc.edu /research/isl/SSW/apta.shtml   (568 words)

  
 merged glossary
Bell-La Padula model - A formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules.
For further information see Bell, D. Elliott and LaPadula, Leonard J., Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and MULTICS Interpretation, MTR 2997, The MITRE Corporation, April 1974.
An example is the model described by Bell and LaPadula in reference [2].
www.ise.gmu.edu /~csis/glossary/merged_glossary.html   (19341 words)

  
 Ongoing / Current Researches
Flaws in them may come from a lack of precision or some incoherences in the policy model or from inconsistencies between the model and the code.
In this paper, we build a full mechanized formalization of the well-known Bell and LaPadula policy model, checking all the steps of the proofs.
Such a program implements a transition function which has been formally proved sound according to the three security properties involved in the Bell and La Padula model.
www.lip6.fr /en/production/publications-rapport-fiche.php?RECORD_KEY(rapports)=id&id(rapports)=222   (155 words)

  
 comp.security.misc: Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall
comp.security.misc: Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall
Next in thread: Dave Thornburgh: "Re: Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall"
Reply: Dave Thornburgh: "Re: Different between Bell La Padula and the Chinese Wall"
www.derkeiler.com /Newsgroups/comp.security.misc/2003-03/0313.html   (227 words)

  
 Computer Security Inference Control
In the Bell-Lapadula model [Bell], a subject may read an object only if its security level is greater than or equal to the object's level of security.
A subject may modify an object only if the object's security level is greater than that of the subject's.
In addition, the use of data padding or cover story should be also taken into account so that an additional means of defence can be used.
www.unesco.org /webworld/public_domain/tunis97/com_54/com_54.html   (1898 words)

  
 4.1 Interface ACC-FS
When laying down the Bell La Padula model an inadmissible information flow is possible if a subject S[i] may modify an object O[j] and a second subject S[k] may read this object O[j], but S[k] possesses a "lower" security level than S[i].
It is sufficient only to investigate direct accesses.
The Bell La Padula model forms the basis for the following rules:
www.informatik.uni-bremen.de /gdpa/methods/ma04a.htm   (448 words)

  
 NCSC-TG-010
La Padula, Jonathan Millen, William L. Harkness, Thomas A. Ambrosi, Paul Pittelli, Dr. Michael
The intent of the state invariants identified by Bell and La Padula is that information is
This rather general view, which is an analogue of the original *-property of Bell and La Padula,
www.iwar.org.uk /comsec/resources/standards/rainbow/NCSC-TG-010.htm   (13006 words)

  
 Network Security Consulting - Glossary of Information Security Terms - SafeIT.ca
a Bell-La Padula security model rule allowing a subject write access to an object only if the security level of the object is higher than, or dominates, the security level of the subject.
More specifically, Bell-La Padula is concerned with confidentiality.
Subjects in the model are forbidden from obtaining (reading) information from an object of higher classification, and forbidden from divulging (writing) information to an object of lower classification.
safeit.ca /securityglossary.htm   (14240 words)

  
 Section 7.3   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-02)
So, if one such person has write access to a document, this reduces the integrity of the document.
This model addresses the lack of integrity in the Bell-La Padula model, but ignores secrecy.
So, one might think that you could just join the two-- not so simple.
www.cs.fsu.edu /~desmedt/course/security00/class-notes/class17-student2.html   (387 words)

  
 Formal OS Security Models
= I(o) 2) Integrity *-property is: When s has R access to object o having integrity level I(o), then s can have W access to object p whenever I(o) >= I(p) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- No widely-used model yet that combines the intensions of BLP and Biba -------------------------------------------------------------------------.
Harrison-Ruzo-Ullman security model (HRU) (1977) BLP has NO policies for CHANGING ACCESS RIGHTS or CREATE/DELETE of subjects/objects; in real computer systems, change needed - HRU defined authorization rules for such dynamic systems - Also uses an ARM that describes the state of the system - Commands can change system state.
To verify compliance with a given security policy, you must check that NO UNDESIRABLE ACCESS RIGHTS CAN BE GRANTED.
gaia.ecs.csus.edu /~mitchell/csc250/lecture_notes/ossec/sl9_ossec.html   (196 words)

  
 Security Policy
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Public Law 104-191, Aug 03; A short page with many additional links on the impact and details of the HIPPA privacy and security mandates as described in Title II of the law.
Security Models, Emm Gun Sirer; This is a nice Power point presentation of security models and how they relate to integrity and confidentiality policies.
It states that the Chinese wall can imitate the BLP model but that the BLP model is unable to imitate the Chinese wall model.
csc.colstate.edu /summers/e-library/policy.html   (5614 words)

  
 Page 24
Padula) that is enforced by the TCB is given in "Secure Computer Systems",
An interpretation of the model for the SCOMP
system is given in "SCOMP Interpretation of the Bell-La Padula Model."
www.governmentsecurity.org /articles/articles2/NCSC-TG-007.pdf_fl/NCSC-TG-007-24.html   (298 words)

  
 InfoSec Resources
BellLa Padula Model is briefly described in this one-page document.
This document contains the links to the original paper by David Bell and Len Padula that appeared in 1976 as a research report of Mitre Corporation as well as other related sources.
In order to facilitate easy access for the students, this paper has been stored in our password protected site.
www.louisville.edu /infosec/resources.htm   (1619 words)

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