Factbites
 Where results make sense
About us   |   Why use us?   |   Reviews   |   PR   |   Contact us  

Topic: Biological Weapons Convention


Related Topics

In the News (Mon 6 Oct 08)

  
  Biological Weapons Convention - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The BWC specifically does not outlaw use of such weapons, only their production, storage, and means of delivery.
Use of such weapons could, however, be considered unlawful by a number of existing Geneva Convention protocols and international law.
Early in 2001, however, the Bush administration, after conducting a review of policy on biological weapons, decided that the proposed protocol did not suit the national interests of the United States, claiming that it would interfere with legitimate commercial and biodefense activity — unlike most arms control agreements, the BWC also applies to private parties.
en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Biological_Weapons_Convention   (355 words)

  
 Biological Weapons Convention
Biological and chemical weapons have generally been associated with each other in the public mind, and the extensive use of poison gas in World War I (resulting in over a million casualties and over 100,000 deaths) led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of both poison gas and bacteriological methods in warfare.
Under the terms of the convention, the parties undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as weapons and means of delivery.
Nothing in the convention is to be interpreted as lessening the obligations imposed by the Geneva Protocol, and the parties undertake to pursue negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons.
www.state.gov /t/ac/trt/4718.htm   (2791 words)

  
 David Kopel & Glenn Reynolds on the Biological Weapons Convention on National Review Online
The treaty — actually a "protocol" to the 1972 Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention (BWC) that the United States has already joined — purports to establish enforcement measures that will make violation of the 1972 Convention more difficult.
Before the convention, the assumption had been that any progress made by the Soviets would simply be matched by the Americans.
The Cato Institute study Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the Biological Weapons Convention, explained that the protocol would have required searches of American businesses without the proper legal warrants, in violation of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be based on warrants issued by a magistrate and based on probable cause.
www.nationalreview.com /kopel/kopel090601.shtml   (1210 words)

  
 NTI: WMD 411
Since the BWC prohibits the possession of biological agents for offensive military ends while permitting their use for peaceful scientific, therapeutic, or defensive purposes, judgments of treaty compliance may hinge on an assessment of intent.
Because of these dual-use dilemmas, the BWC Protocol was not designed to be capable of detecting violations with a level of confidence equal to that of treaties controlling nuclear or chemical arms.
University of Bradford, The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Database
www.nti.org /f_wmd411/f2j.html   (2064 words)

  
 Armageddon Online - The Biological Weapons Convention
Biological Weapons Convention, abbreviation: BWC) was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons (with exceptions for medical and defensive purposes in small quantities).
Although usage of such weapons could be considered unlawful by a number of existing Geneva Convention protocols and international law.
Early in 2001, however, the Bush administration, after conducting a complete review of policy on biological weapons, decided that the protocol did not suit national interests of the United States, that it would interfere with the legitimate commercial and biodefense activity.
www.armageddononline.org /biological_weapons_convention.php   (399 words)

  
 Biological Weapons Convention
Another key objective for a Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention would be to deter or complicate the ability of a rogue state to conduct an illicit offensive biological weapons program.
And, given the distribution of biological activity around the world, despite the best efforts at finding a "smoothing function" to distribute on-site activity, the overwhelming bulk of such activity would take place on the territory of those States Parties least likely to be proliferation candidates.
It is the responsibility of all of us, since we are already parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, to inhibit or prevent biological weapons being in the hands of any state or party whatsoever, by both national and international means.
www.state.gov /t/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm   (4351 words)

  
 Biological Weapons - Global Issues - Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Biological weapons are pathogens (bacteria, viruses or fungi which cause disease) or toxins (chemical substances obtained from living organisms including microbes and plants) that are used to kill or injure people or animals, or to destroy crops or plants.
Biological weapons are difficult to detect, can be disseminated quietly by rudimentary means in crowded urban environments and, if infectious, could quickly spread beyond the site of the initial attack.
The BWC does not explicitly ban the use of biological weapons, which are already banned by the Geneva Protocol, but the prohibitions it contains and the requirement that states parties destroy any stockpiles accumulated before accession, amount to an effective ban on use.
www.dfat.gov.au /security/biological_weapons.html   (2286 words)

  
 Opening Speech Biological Weapons Convention
If we are to successfully reduce the threat from these horrific weapons — whether biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear — we must work together to ensure the traditional regimes remain rigorous, effective, and relevant in the new circumstances of the twenty-first century.
We have seen recent misuse of biological materials to induce terror in the US with the anthrax attacks in 2001 and, in the mid-1990s, in Japan when the Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted to use biological agents before their more popularly-known attacks in Tokyo involving chemical agents.
Indeed, we are all on a steep learning curve as we grapple with the complexities of how we might raise the barriers to bio-terrorism and the proliferation of biological weapons in ways that do not hamper the growth and sharing of scientific knowledge and the global spread of beneficial advancing technologies.
www.minister.defence.gov.au /HillSpeechtpl.cfm?CurrentId=4648   (1795 words)

  
 Fact Sheet: The Biological Weapons Convention   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-17)
The 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) establishes a global ban on biological weapons.
Under its terms, countries undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as weapons and means of delivery.
The challenge that lies ahead before the Conference resumes in November is to develop a mutually acceptable approach, building on the foundation of the proposals and themes the U.S. tabled in November 2001.
japan.usembassy.gov /e/p/tp-se0004.html   (462 words)

  
 Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection
International negotiations in Geneva to conclude a protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) collapsed this summer after the United States rejected the protocol in late July, casting uncertainty over the talks’ future.
BWC states-parties had been meeting since 1995 under a body known as the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate the protocol—a legally binding agreement to strengthen the BWC, which outlaws biological weapons but does not contain verification measures.
Mahley explained Washington’s reasoning in detail, contending that the draft text would “do little” to deter countries from seeking biological weapons and that it would not improve the United States’ ability to verify BWC compliance.
www.armscontrol.org /act/2001_09/bwcsept01.asp   (725 words)

  
 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972
The BWC thus supplements the prohibition on use of biological weapons contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Article X requires that states parties facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, and also that the Convention shall be implemented in a way that does not hamper the economic or technological development of states parties.
In order to "strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation" of the Convention, the AHG was mandated to "consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals [...] to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties".
www.fas.harvard.edu /~hsp/biologic.html   (642 words)

  
 Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: 20-21 September 1997, Geneva, Switzerland
The workshop was given a detailed overview of UNSCOM's monitoring of the Iraqi biological weapons programme during 1996 and 1997 and informed of the main measures used by the commission for the verification of Iraqi disclosures.
However, the CWC and the BWC commit states parties, and the extent to which individuals are subject to the prohibitions thereby placed on states depends on the national measures which states parties take to implement these treaties.
The draft international convention prepared by the Harvard Sussex Program is intended to reinforce existing legal instruments and harmonise their provisions and prohibitions by introducing the concept of individual responsibility and establishing a universal jurisdiction.
www.pugwash.org /reports/cbw/cbw1.htm   (3407 words)

  
 Press releases - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to determinedly continue the consultations on containing the dangers emanating from biological weapons and thus to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
This will increase the options available to contain the threat presented by biological weapons, be they in the hands of individual states or those of terrorists.
These are security standards, national legislation, inspections where it is suspected that biological weapons may have been used, improving cooperation with respect to infectious diseases and the drafting of an ethical code for scientists.
www.auswaertigesamt.de /www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=3761   (364 words)

  
 CNS - CBW: Nonproliferation Regime
The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat, Statement by John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, August 26, 2002
Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Report Presented to the British Parliament by the Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, April 2002 (requires Acrobat Reader)
The Biological Weapons Convention: Challenges and Opportunities, Briefing by John R. Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, January 11, 2002, held jointly by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
cns.miis.edu /research/cbw/control.htm   (1015 words)

  
 STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-17)
The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or BWC, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of these weapons.
The BWC supplements the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits use of biological weapons.
Large increases in spending on developing greater capability to respond to a biological weapons attack are in the US budget, indicating the US believes such an attack inevitable and that there are no ways through multilateral negotiation that such an attack might be prevented, or made far less likely.
disarm.igc.org /bioweapDeanart.htm   (10653 words)

  
 Biological Weapons Treaties   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-17)
The Convention was opened for signature in 1972 after the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the text of the Convention.
The fifth BWC review conference is scheduled to begin November 19, 2001 and pressure mounts for reaching agreement on the additional protocol.
Signatories to the BWC are reaching end-game negotiations on the legalization and requirements for mandatory declarations, visits, and investigations to military and private facilities.
www.nawcwpns.navy.mil /~treaty/BWC.html   (734 words)

  
 Biological Weapons Convention Turns 30   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-17)
When the convention came into force in 1975, it made an entire category of weapons of mass destruction illegal, and required states party to the convention to destroy stockpiles of disease-causing weapons.
And, one key failing of the convention, they say, is that it lacks an effective verification mechanism, making it difficult to know whether states are fulfilling their obligations.
The experts say changes to the convention are vital, in order for it to remain relevant in the future.
www.voanews.com /english/2005-03-26-voa10.cfm   (293 words)

  
 Biological Weapons
As he explained to me, "There's a hell of a disconnect between us fossils who know about biological weapons and the younger generation." In 1991, on the eve of the Gulf War, he was summoned to the Pentagon to take part in a discussion of anthrax.
The tiny size of a weaponized bioparticle allows it to be sucked into the deepest sacs of the lung, where it sticks to the membrane, and enters the bloodstream, and begins to rephcate.
As for the biological missues once aimed at the U.S., it doesn't surprise him: "You can put anything in a ballistic missile." Lederberg seems to be a man who has looked into the face of evil for a long time and hasn't bhnked.
www.dhushara.com /book/explod/bio/biow.htm   (12704 words)

  
 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): Latest Additions
The use of chemical and biological weapons in war was prohibited in 1925 as a result of universal abhorrence at their effects on First World War soldiers.
The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction (BWC), which entered into force in 1975, prohibited the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons and required the destruction or conversion of such weapons or delivery means.
The BWC broke new ground in establishing a non-discriminatory prohibition regime, making no distinction between states with existing BW programmes and those without, and explicitly building on the 1925 prohibition on use.
www.acronym.org.uk /bwc   (619 words)

  
 VERTIC Datasets: BW legislation
Article IV of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) requires states parties to adopt appropriate legal measures to ensure that the treaty’s fundamental prohibitions, contained in Article I, are enforceable in national law.
VERTIC has surveyed the status of legislation in all states parties since April 2002, using a questionnaire modelled on that developed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to evaluate legal measures to implement the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
Final report launched at the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, held in Geneva from 10-14 November 2003.
www.vertic.org /datasets/bwlegislation.html   (713 words)

  
 Doorstop Interview Biological Weapons Convention
It’s to encourage countries within the region to develop effective national laws to combat it, to better control the laboratories that deal with the legal use of these toxins and pathogens and also to develop contemporary codes of conduct for the scientists who develop these pathogens.
Yes we would do what ever we can to help them build their protective mechanisms against bio-terrorism because it is not only a threat to them, but it’s a threat to us.
As I said the Biological Warfare Convention really focused on a threat between States, and that has been effectively answered, that’s not the real issue we now face.
www.minister.defence.gov.au /HillTranscripttpl.cfm?CurrentId=4647   (1173 words)

  
 BTWC: Text of the Convention
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocolfor the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.
(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant sto Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Signatories to and Ratifications of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
www.opbw.org /convention/conv.html   (1163 words)

  
 NOVA Online | Bioterror | Global Guide to Bioweapons
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention prohibited the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological agents for use as weapons.
Tragically, as the recent anthrax attacks in the U.S. have demonstrated, terrorists will not hesitate to use such state-derived biological weapons -- or crude versions of them secured from other sources -- to further their deadly goals.
Note that precise evaluation of a nation's biological weapons capabilities is not possible because most bioweapons programs are or were clandestine.
www.pbs.org /wgbh/nova/bioterror/global.html   (237 words)

  
 NTI: Global Security Newswire - Friday, September 6, 2002
Examining satellite photographs, weapons inspectors have identified several nuclear-related sites in Iraq that have undergone new construction or other unexplained changes since they were last visited by international inspectors nearly four years ago, a U.N. official said today (see GSN, Aug. 13).
Formal arms control inspections through the BWC to determine biological weapons activities could not be effective, he argued, because the components can be found in the everyday environment and can simultaneously have legitimate and illegitimate uses.
A State Department fact sheet on the BWC published in May said there was “widespread support” at the conference last November “for U.S. and allied initiatives intended to strengthen the convention through practical, national implementation measures and continuing expert meetings.”
www.nti.org /d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_9_6.html   (4903 words)

  
 Salon.com Politics | Kooks 'R' U.S.
Kooks 'R' U.S. By going its own way on biological weapons, Kyoto, missile defense and a growing list of global issues, the Bush administration is turning the United States into a pariah.
Although it continues to bomb Iraq to enforce admittance of chemical and biological warfare inspectors, the U.S. told its shocked allies this week that it would have no truck with a new inspection regime designed to enforce the 1972 convention banning biological weapons.
But no, as with the biological weapons inspection battle, the administration contented itself with rejecting painstakingly negotiated agreements on which the U.S. had a major input, but had not made a single counterproposal.
www.salon.com /politics/feature/2001/07/27/kooks/?sid=1042829   (740 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)

Factbites
  About us   |   Why use us?   |   Reviews   |   Press   |   Contact us  
Copyright © 2005-2007 www.factbites.com Usage implies agreement with terms.