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 | | Although, in the present case, the appellant's petition was not filed under any of the available statutory schemes, the appellant argues that, as a psychological parent, her status is equivalent to that of a biological parent, thereby allowing her to petition for custody of the child outside of an existing statutory scheme. |
 | | She makes this argument on the theory that as a psychological parent she is the equivalent of a biological parent and thus, has the same protected privacy rights as the appellee. |
 | | In essence, appellant's sole argument is that once she establishes that she is a psychological parent to appellee's biological child, she is on equal footing with the appellee and no longer confronts the aforementioned impediments to seeking custody or visitation with the child. |
| www.parentsrights.org /states/fl/fl62399.htm (2658 words) |
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