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| | Chapter 5: Probabilism and Induction (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-06) |
 | | The estimation theorem, and de Finetti's laws of large and small numbers, are especially accessible parts of probabilism's solution to the new problem of induction As the theorem and the law are consequences of the axioms (3) (5) of probability logic, this solution can be seen as borrowing its credentials from those axioms. |
 | | De Finetti's subjectivism implies that the basic axioms governing est (or, if you prefer, the corresponding axioms for prob) are all the universally valid principles there are, for this logic. |
 | | De Finetti also omits axiom (5), presumably on the ground that the estimates of magnitudes are to represent estimates of the utilities you expect from them, where the estimated utility est X need not be measured in the same units as X itself, e.g. |
| www.princeton.edu /~bayesway/ProbThink/Chapter5.html (5363 words) |
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