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| | Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism |
 | | Of course, a causal determinist might contend that it is now causally necessary that Socrates drank hemlock, where p is causally necessary at t just in case, for some q (relevant causal conditions), q is true at t and it is physically, but not logically, necessary that if q is true, then p is true. |
 | | Roughly speaking, the truth or falsity of an immediate proposition is temporally (as opposed to, say, logically or causally) independent of what has been or will be true, while the truth conditions of a non-immediate proposition involve an essential reference to what has been true at past moments or will be true at future moments. |
 | | In short, the argument for determinism from divine foreknowledge is, contrary to what some have claimed, more difficult to contend with than is the argument for logical determinism. |
| www.nd.edu /~ndphilo/papers/accnecdet.htm (8616 words) |
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