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	Mackubin Thomas Owens on War on National Review Online
		Clausewitz developed a theory of war, the elements of which appear to be universal and timeless.
		Clausewitz was reacting against a belief that took hold during the latter part of the 18th century: the idea that war could be quantified and thereby rendered predictable in a mathematical sense.
		Clausewitz dismissed such attempts to reduce the conduct of war to quantitative principles as "completely useless" fantasies.
	www.nationalreview.com /owens/owens032803.asp (1496 words)

	Karl von Clausewitz (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Karl von Clausewitz, the son of a retired army officer, was born in Burg, Germany on 1 June 1780.
		Clausewitz is known today as the most important writer on military science in the Western world; worldwide, his fame is exceeded only by that of Sunzi (Sun Tzu).
		Clausewitz was a powerful influence on Moltke, and through him on the scientific management movement.
	www.thoemmes.com /encyclopedia/clausewitz.htm (598 words)

	Carl von Clausewitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Clausewitz' father was an officer in the Prussian Army; Carl entered the military at the age of 12, eventually attaining the rank of Major General.
		Clausewitz used a dialectical method to construct his argument, leading to frequent modern misinterpretation.
		For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is merely a continuation of politics," while accurate as far as it goes, was not intended as a statement of fact.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Clausewitz (589 words)

	Carl von Clausewitz (Site not responding. Last check: )
		But Clausewitz's ideas were recognized and taught in North America, and many of the European soldiers who fought in the Civil War were very familiar with his writings.
		Clausewitz was not so concerned with tactics and the correctness of operational doctrines as were other military theorists of his day; he was most concerned with the grand strategy of warfare.
		Based on his logic and realism regarding the science of war, he advocated the concept of total war, in which all of the nation's wealth and resources would be brought to bear in destroying not only the enemy's armies, but its property and citizens as well.
	civilwar.bluegrass.net /ForeignInfluences/carlvonclausewitz.html (394 words)

	N. Spencer: Clausewitz and Pynchon
		Clausewitz is brought back from the brink of abandoning the concept of absolute war by the reality of Napoleonic war, and he is consequently exultant that the actions of Napoleon have replaced the cautious emphasis on contingency and chance with a proud and reckless spirit of intrinsic force and the will to power.
		Clausewitz speaks scathingly of those "Brahmins" who propagate "the illusion" (Clausewitz 344), destroyed by Napoleon, that battles may be limited or even avoided, and he will accept no reason for not unleashing the "annihilation-principle" (Clausewitz 342) of total war (Clausewitz 305, 328, 345).
		Clausewitz was aware that Napoleonic war was enabled by political factors, namely, that total war was made possible by the total involvement of the population.
	prometheus.cc.emory.edu /panels/4E/Spencer.html (2732 words)

	Clausewitz FAQs
		Clausewitz first entered combat as a cadet at the age of 13, rose to the rank of Major-General at 38, married into the high nobility, moved in rarefied intellectual circles in Berlin, and wrote a book which has become the most influential work of military philosophy in the Western world.
		Clausewitz's fame is largely due to the importance and influence of his magnum opus, On War, unquestionably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and of strategy, although both the book and its impact have been interpreted and misinterpreted in wildly varying ways.
		Clausewitz's most famous argument is that "War is merely a continuation of politics"— or "of policy"—"by other means." This famous line is widely quoted and widely misunderstood.
	www.clausewitz.com /CWZHOME/FAQs.html (3022 words)

	Carl von Clausewitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (June 1, 1780 - November 16, 1831) was a Prussian general and influential military thinker.
		Clausewitz's Christian name is sometimes given in non-German sources as Carl Phillip Gottlieb, Carl Maria, or misspelled Karl due to reliance on mistaken source material, conflations with his wife's name, Marie, or mistaken assumptions about German orthography.
		Clausewitz, Karl Von; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Karl_von_Clausewitz (589 words)

	RealClearPolitics - Articles - Clausewitz in Wonderland
		Clausewitz, to be sure, was no stranger to irregular warfare; in fact, On War was initially meant as the first part of a triptych on conventional warfare, irregular warfare and tactics.
		Clausewitz may not be the "Madhi of the masses" derided by Liddell Hart, but he has certainly become the Madhi of a military lumpen intelligentsia for whom the fine art of asking the right questions has been made irrelevant since the master has already provided all the right answers.
		Clausewitz is so acutely aware of the need to remedy his deficiencies in the diplomatic department that, for five years, he keeps hoping for an ambassadorship (London first, then any ambassadorship) -- and will suffer a stroke when he finally realizes it ain't gonna happen.
	www.realclearpolitics.com /articles/2006/09/clausewitz_in_wonderland.html (8433 words)

	Clausewitz Review (Site not responding. Last check: )
		(Clausewitz's best-known concept is that war is "the continuation of policy by another means.") It's the latest in a barrage of books that draw business lessons from the great thinkers.
		The concepts of monarchy, nobility and war as gentleman's art were being overturned by the French Revolution and the rise of a citizen army.
		Clausewitz saw himself as that kind of leader, Mr.
	www.bcg.com /publications/clausewitz/clausewitz_review.jsp (854 words)

	Clausewitz & the Indirect Approach: Misreading the Master (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz recognized that military means consisted of fighting or the threat of fighting, which he placed under the term engagement, and he defined "the purpose of war" as "fulfilling the ends of policy." In the final analysis, his definition of strategy is the equivalent of Liddell Hart's.
		Clausewitz not immediately and clearly stated that this "extreme" could not be attained in reality due to forces in society and nature but, more important, that it should not be the goal because, as a political tool, war is tempered by the political objective that motivated the resort to war (C,78,81).
		Clausewitz would have been surprised to note that in 1914 man's usual trepidation at taking the offensive was lost by all belligerents, and he would have been deeply disturbed that his explicit statement on the inherent strength of the defense over the offense was roundly and tragically ignored.
	www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil /airchronicles/apj/apj88/davison.html (3767 words)

	Encyclopedia: Carl von Clausewitz (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Carl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz (June 1, 1780 - November 16, 1831) was a Prussian general and influential military thinker.
		Carl von Clausewitz This image is in the public domain because its copyright has expired in the United States and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 100 years.
		A US poster produced during World War II Total war is a 20th century term to describe a war in which countries or nations use all of their resources to destroy another organized countrys or nations ability to engage in war.
	www.nationmaster.com /encyclopedia/Carl-von-Clausewitz (1320 words)

	Clausewitz, Karl von on Encyclopedia.com (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz was an original thinker most influenced by the Napoleonic wars in which he fought.
		Clausewitz argued that although most conflicts tend toward total war in the abstract, the “friction” of reality keeps war limited, unpredictable, and dangerous.
		Clausewitz's chameleon: military theory and the future of war.
	www.encyclopedia.com /html/c/clausewi.asp (444 words)

	Carl von Clausewitz
		Clausewitz became one of the leaders of Prussian Army reform under Scharnhorst but resigned his commission on the eve of Napoleon's invasion of Russia (1812) and, like other German patriots, entered Russian service.
		By means of a lengthy discussion of a variety of situations likely to confront the military leader, Clausewitz tried to develop in his reader a theoretically founded military judgment, capable of weighing all pertinent factors in a given situation.
		Clausewitz was studied closely by his countrymen and left his imprint on German military thought, but his influence on actual German strategy has been overrated.
	www.fortunecity.com /victorian/riley/787/Napoleon/Prussia/Biografy/clausewitz.html (882 words)

	Parameters: Can reading Clausewitz save us?
		Clausewitz, however, unlike Jomini (with whom Fleming appears to confuse him), insisted that such conflicts were in fact a valid form of warfare and had to be dealt with by any useful military theory.
		Clausewitz's overall approach is ruthlessly empirical--it rejects the normative, predictive approach to theory because that approach consistently fails in the real world.
		Fleming fails to understand Clausewitz's final synthesis and assessment of the nature of war, expressed as the "Fascinating Trinity." Clausewitz made no effort to prescribe the proper mix of the elements he actually listed (not "people, army, and government") because his point was that they--and the relationships among them--are not under our control.
	www.findarticles.com /p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_2_34/ai_n6090456 (1283 words)

	CLAUSEWITZ ON WAR (Paul Eidelberg) October, 1997
		As Clausewitz understood, unlimited wars are usually animated by unmitigated ideological hatred [like Islam's hatred of Israel] which cannot be assuaged until the enemy's population is enslaved or annihilated.
		Clausewitz warns: "Philanthropists may readily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war.
		Clausewitz's oft-quoted dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means is often misunderstood.
	www.freeman.org /m_online/oct97/eidelb2.htm (1140 words)

	Clausewitz in the 21st Century Conference 2005 (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz knew that war’s most distinctive feature – its violence – would react upon the aims for which it was employed, and that reconciling ends and means in war could never be automatic.
		Clausewitz` theory of „moral factors“ in war is examined and illustrated in connection with his theory of friction in war.
		Clausewitz contended that it was the defense that was the stronger form of war.
	ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk /Clausewitz.asp (6469 words)

	Clausewitz vs. The Scholar: Martin Van Creveld's Expanded Theory Of War
		War Theories -- Clausewitz To acknowledge that Carl von Clausewitz occupies nearly unequalled prominence in the galaxy of Western military theorists is a position that is hardly controversial.
		Had Clausewitz lived to witness the great wars fought during the one hundred and twenty years after his death, he would have easily been able to recognize the general form and manner of their conduct since things were so similar to the strategy of his own day.
		In addition, the object of the war, rather than being as Clausewitz would have seen it, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, became the destruc- tion of the enemy's ability to retaliate in kind and the destruction of his major population centers, government in- stitutions, and industrial complexes.
	www.globalsecurity.org /military/library/report/1992/FKM.htm (6026 words)

	Boyd's Critique of Clausewitz
		Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome or reduce friction/uncertainty.
		Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust adversary by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort.
		Clausewitz incorrectly stated: "a center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely"—then argued that this is the place where the blows must be aimed and where the decision should be reached.
	www.belisarius.com /modern_business_strategy/boyd/patterns/clausewitz_2.htm (194 words)

	Clausewitz and Morality of War (Site not responding. Last check: )
		While Clausewitz does not argue that decisions to go to war should be guided by a common morality, his description of war as a social and historical phenomenon does suggest the possibility of limiting it.
		It is interesting to again recall Clausewitz’s trinitarian conception of war, and the tendency towards unrestrained violence and primordial hatred that he ascribes to the people.
		Clausewitz does not suggest that statesmen should be guided by the morality appropriate to interpersonal relations, but does hold that their actions should be governed by an ethical code based on prudent protection of the interests of the state.
	www.isanet.org /noarchive/nielsen.html (11592 words)

	CLAUSEWITZ FOR BEGINNERS (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz was one of a rare breed of soldiers.
		Along with this practical education, Clausewitz was exposed to a broad-ranging education in history, literature, and professional subjects due to intensive schooling within his regiment and subsequent time as a student at the War College in Berlin from 1801 to 1803.
		The European discovery of Clausewitz was slow and closely related to the emergence of Helmuth von Moltke as chief of the General Staff of the Prussian army and Prussia's successes in the wars of 1866 and 1870.
	www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil /airchronicles/apj/apj89/cannon.html (4819 words)

	Hoover Institution - Policy Review - Clausewitz in Wonderland
		By 1999, the reasons for not using Clausewitz as a textbook had become apparent even to the Clausewitzian die-hards — who nevertheless concluded, in surrealistic fashion: “Because much of the existing literature on Clausewitz explains his significance within an obsolete context, few educators are able to forcefully demonstrate his relevance in the post-Cold War world….
		Clausewitz is so acutely aware of the need to remedy his deficiencies in the diplomatic department that, for five years, he keeps hoping for an ambassadorship (London first, then any ambassadorship) — and will suffer a stroke when he finally realizes it ain’t gonna happen.
		Clausewitz should be not so much retired as kicked upstairs, and made the topic of a yearlong seminar at the doctoral level — once, that is, the future (interagency) National Security University establishes a much-needed doctoral program.
	www.hoover.org /publications/policyreview/4268401.html (8794 words)

	Clausewitz (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz first entered combat as a cadet at the age of 13, rose to the rank of Major-General at 38, married into the high nobility, moved in rarefied intellectual circles in
		Clausewitz's fame is largely due to On War, unquestionably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and of strategy, although both the book and its impact have been interpreted and misinterpreted in wildly varying ways.
		Unfortunately, the annoying thing about Clausewitz is that, in order to understand him, you actually have to read his book—rather than some convenient précis, written, most likely, by some wannabe-competitor, propagandist, special pleader, or historical hack writer.
	www.simpson.edu /~proctorn/STRATEGY-2005_files/clausewitz.htm (1198 words)

	Amazon.co.uk: On War: Books (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz treats war as a natural, social organism, which can best be understood by practical experience.
		The main contribution of Clausewitz is represented by his maxim that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means." In other words, war is basically an extension of politics.
		Clausewitz argues that policy permeates and essentially determines the character and extent of all military operations; the authority of the military commander is circumscribed by the political aims of the state.
	www.amazon.co.uk /exec/obidos/ASIN/0691018545 (1149 words)

	Amazon.com: On War (Everyman's Library (Cloth)): Books: Carl Von Clausewitz (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Clausewitz's answer to question (1) is that war in itself is a duel on a large scale, which unless acted on from the outside, tends towards the maximum possible amount of violence.
		Clausewitz wrote in the context of a military and geopolitical environment that still prized fortresses, depended on pitched battle, celebrated mobile artillery as a modern refinement, and lacked the techno-logistic sophistication to support expeditionary warfare on the scale envisioned by Napoleon.
		Clausewitz wrote extensively of warfare waged by guerrillas in mountainous or other difficult terrain, for example, and concluded that such fighting was useful on the defensive, but insufficient for achieving a decisive outcome -- it merely wore an invader out.
	www.amazon.com /exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0679420436?v=glance (2706 words)

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