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 | | The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different patterns, with significantly different outcomes, depending on whether the features of the model are classically perfect or stochastically imperfect (Axelrod 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990, 1992; Sigmund 1993). |
 | | The ideal strategy for an imperfect world, in fact, is a 'Generous Tit for Tat' <1-, 1/3>, returning cooperation for cooperation at a rate infinitesimally close to 1 but responding generously to defection with cooperation at a rate of 1/3. |
 | | But from the point at which silence is reached, evolution of the array becomes simply a random matter of where food happens to fall, and thus of whether individuals with consistently open mouths get a better balance of 'gain' and 'loss' than the constant zero awarded to cells which never open their mouths (Figure 3c). |
| www.sunysb.edu /philosophy/faculty/pgrim/evolution.htm (4796 words) |
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