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| | DESERT STORM: THE FIRST INFORMATION WAR? |
 | | Like other two-dimensional thinkers, Saddam failed to see the implications of Col John Warden's "air-Schlieffen" plan, but even he could not have failed to understand the seriousness of a powerful two-corps surface force deploying beyond his right flank, with nothing standing between it and Basra (or Baghdad, for that matter). |
 | | To reiterate Colonel Boyd's assessment, they were enmeshed "in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos" and folded "back inside [themselves] so [they could not] cope with events/efforts as they unfold[ed]." The coalition had unquestionably met Boyd's requirement of operating inside the Iraqis' OODA loop, sometimes by a matter of days. |
 | | Col Edward Mann (BA, Pepperdine University; MA, University of Southern california) is chief of the Doctrine Research Division, Airpower Researach Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. |
| www.iwar.org.uk /iwar/resources/airchronicles/man1.htm (5577 words) |
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