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Topic: Common value auction

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	Common Value Auction (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		The value of the prize is the average of these draws, so each bidder only sees a part of the common value.
		You specify the upper and lower bounds of the uniform distribution of value draws, and you may include a required minimum bid (seller reserve price).
		This may cause the winning bid to exceed the common value, which leads to losses.
	veconlab.econ.virginia.edu /cv/cv.htm (450 words)

	The cost effectiveness of the U.S. export enhancement program bonus allocation mechanism. \| North America > United ...
		The auction is common value because the value of the item being bid, namely the bonus payment necessary to consummate an export sale under a particular EEP initiative, should be the same across market participants.
		However, auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction format may not be optimal from the perspective of cost effectiveness in a common-value auction for several reasons.
		Based upon the relevant economic theory of auctions, we evaluate the extant DP format relative to an alternative, uniform-price (UP) auction in which winning bids are all awarded at the amount of the lowest unsuccessful bid.
	www.allbusiness.com /north-america/united-states/138221-1.html (702 words)

	Common value auction - Definition from Investor Dictionary - Define meaning of the word Common value auction
		A common value auction is a term in economics describing an auction in which the good being auctioned is valued the same by each participant.
		Note that this does not mean every participant knows the precise value of the item being auctioned, it just means that all participants neccessarily place the same value on the good being auctioned.
		For example, if a jar full of quarters is being auctioned off, all participants in the auction may have incomplete information as to the value of the jar of quarters, but it is still considered a common value auction since the jar will be worth the same amount to every participant in the auction.
	www.investordictionary.com /definition/common+value+auction.aspx (216 words)

	Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory
		Auction rules and information flows are quite general; participation decisions may be simultaneous or sequential.
		Optimal auctions are otherwise contentless: any auction that sells without reserve becomes optimal by adjusting any one of the continuous, spanning parameters, e.g., the entry fee.
		Many econometric studies of auction markets are seen to be flawed in their identification of the number of bidders.
	ideas.repec.org /p/umc/wpaper/0518.html (739 words)

	Auctions and Takeovers. (ResearchIndex) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		Despite these differences, to a first approximation takeovers are well modeled as an ascending-bid auction with significant participation costs.
		This essay begins by looking at takeover auctions from the point of view of a buyer, focusing on bidding strategy.
		It is useful to distinguish between two ideal auction...
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /277389.html (318 words)

	An Asymmetric Common-Value Auction Model (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		It supposes that there is a common prior distribution on the object's value and that each bidder receives a private signal conditional on the object's unknown true value.
		Placing a restriction on the nature of this difference, I determine the equilibrium bidding strategies for the first-price and second-price auctions.
		The strategies are symmetric, and the second-price auction generates a higher seller's expected revenue, a result that extends the well-known revenue-ordering result of symmetric-information auctions.
	www.rje.org /abstracts/abstracts/1987/Winter_1987._pp._611_621.html (149 words)

	STICERD Econometrics Seminar: Limit Distributions of Equilibrium Bids in Common Value Auctions (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		We derive the limit distributions of equilibrium bids in common value auctions as the number of bidders grows large.
		While the previous literature has demonstrated that information aggregation obtains across all the common auction forms, our analysis uncovers important differences.
		However, this ranking is very sensitive to assumptions about the information structure, with the information aggregation properties of the English and uniform-price auctions being most robust across different assumptions.
	econ.lse.ac.uk /events/abstracts/emetrics-091100.html (175 words)

	Limit Distributions of Equilibrium Bids in Common Value Auctions (ResearchIndex) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		Limit Distributions of Equilibrium Bids in Common Value Auctions
		Abstract: We derive the limit distributions of equilibrium bids in common value auctions as the number of bidders grows large.
		We view the common value auction as a statistical experiment in which the winning bids are estimators of the unknown common value, whereby the question of information aggregation is equivalent to whether the winning bids in a sequence of auctions is a consistent estimator of the true common value.
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /437858.html (547 words)

	Paper abstract - Sequencing lifeline repairs after an earthquake: an economic approach (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		Selection Bias, Demographic Effects and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments
		Ignoring these selection effects is most misleading for inexperienced bidders, as the biased estimates indicate much slower learning and adjustment to the winner’s curse for individual bidders than do the biased estimates.
		common value auction experiments, selection effects, econometric methods, gender and ability effects.
	pareto.uab.es /~mcasari/ABSauction.html (107 words)

	Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions
		We consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization.
		In this framework, an increase in the reserve price as two effects: it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed.
		This statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations.
	ideas.repec.org /p/nwu/cmsems/977.html (410 words)

	SSRN-Selection Bias, Demographic Effects and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments by Marco Casari, John ...
		SSRN-Selection Bias, Demographic Effects and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments by Marco Casari, John Ham, John Kagel
		Ignoring these selection effects is most misleading for inexperienced bidders, as the unbiased estimates of the bid function indicate much faster learning and adjustment to the winner's curse for individual bidders than do the biased estimates.
		Casari, Marco, Ham, John C. and Kagel, John H., "Selection Bias, Demographic Effects and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments" (June 2005).
	papers.ssrn.com /Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=657581 (303 words)

	EconPapers: MATLAB/C code for GIG and BNLG common value auction specifications
		Abstract: Implements "Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common Value Auctions" by Michael B. Gordy, Federal Reserve Board FEDS 1997-5, January 1997.
		Working Paper: Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common value auctions (1997)
		This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
	econpapers.repec.org /software/codmatlab/gigbnlg.htm (110 words)

	EconPapers: Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments
		EconPapers: Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments
		Keywords: Demography; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
		New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
	econpapers.repec.org /paper/fipfednsr/213.htm (206 words)

	Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments - Federal Reserve Bank of ... (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-01)
		Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments - Federal Reserve Bank of New York
		Authors: Marco Casari, John C. Ham, and John H. Kagel
		Receive notice when new publications are available online
	www.ny.frb.org /research/staff_reports/sr213.html (114 words)

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