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| | Complementarity |
 | | In what follows, I will, first, state the complementarity view; second, explain libertarian agency in contrast to compatibilist models of action, and third, show why "gaps" are part of such agency and illustrate ways that such a model of agency for certain divine acts could be relevant to the practice of science. |
 | | Here is the main issue: the complementarity view does not have the intellectual resources to allow for the precise type of unity necessary for these features of human persons to obtain and if they are, in fact, genuine, then the complementarity view's response to reductionism is simply inadequate. |
 | | On the one hand, it is hard to avoid treating higher levels of description as causally impotent epiphenomena that supervene upon lower level systems because each lowest level physical state is (1) complete at its own level of description and (2) sufficient for the emergence of the higher level state. |
| www.asa3.org /ASA/topics/Philosophy/PSCF3-97Moreland.html (8814 words) |
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