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Topic: Condorcet criterion

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	Condorcet Method Encyclopedia Article @ ITheVoter.com (I The Voter) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		A Condorcet method is a voting system that will always elect the Condorcet winner; this is the candidate whom voters prefer to each other candidate, when compared to them one at a time.
		Condorcet methods are named for the eighteenth century mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, but the Condorcet criterion was also discovered independently by Ramon Llull in 1299
		Condorcet methods are not currently in use in government elections anywhere in the world, but a Condorcet method known as Nanson's method was used in city elections in the U.S. town of Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s
	www.ithevoter.com /encyclopedia/Condorcet_method (0 words)

	Condorcet's method
		Condorcet is partly an electoral system, and partly a way of thinking about preference electoral systems that elect one candidate.
		The easiest way to visualize how a Condorcet election would work is to imagine an election for the capital of Tennessee, a state in the United States that is over 500 miles east-to-west, and only 110 miles north-to-south.
		Marquis de Condorcet described his preferred method, which is to choose the candidate who has the smallest defeat to any other candidate.
	www.ebroadcast.com.au /lookup/encyclopedia/co/Condorcet's_method.html (0 words)

	[No title]
		The Condorcet tally is designed to satisfy the Condorcet criterion: if the majority %%@ of voters prefer candidate A to candidate B, then $A \succ B$ in the outcome of the tally.
		The Condorcet tally produces a transitive outcome for this graph, and it is trivially possible to embed this graph in a larger diameter graph with the same set of properties.
		Condorcet probability characteristics can be used to describe the ``stability'' of a graph, in terms of its %%@ reaction to small perturbations, so, given that these graphs are often seen in practice as descriptions of complex systems, such a %%@ result is potentially very interesting.
	web.mit.edu /gpickard/www/thesis.txt (0 words)

	Election methods and criteria (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		Condorcet methods satisfy the Condorcet criterion, which says that if there is a candidate who could beat any other candidate in a one-on-one election (i.e., if there is a candidate who "pairwise beats" every other candidate), this candidate must be elected.
		Condorcet methods need to compare v[a,b] with v[b,a] to establish which of A and B defeated the other pairwise.
		The Plurality criterion says that C must be elected with no greater probability than A. If C is elected, it could be viewed as an obvious mistake, as there is no way to adjust the ballots voting for C so that there are as many C first preferences as A first preferences.
	nodesiege.tripod.com /elections (0 words)

	[R-G] Nader the Condorcet Winner in 2000
		The Condorcet criterion is a desirable method of choosing among multiple candidates because it sets the threshold of victory high.
		Condorcet argued that a winning alternative ought to be capable of defeating all other alternative in head-to-head comparisons.
		It is reassuring that different voting schemes -- simple plurality rule, the Electoral College, the Condorcet criterion, and perhaps even approval voting -- all select the same candidate in each of the last four elections with significant minor parties (Brams and Fishburn 1983; Brams and Merrill 1994; Kiewiet 1979).
	lists.econ.utah.edu /pipermail/rad-green/2004-March/013416.html (0 words)

	Vote Aggregation Methods
		Although the Condorcet criterion is a popular means for evaluating voting systems, there are some situations in which it is not clear that the Condorcet winner represents the collective choice.
		The first consequence of the independence criterion can also be understood by considering Vickrey's definition: ``The social choice between any two alternatives shall not be affected by the removal or addition of other alternatives to the field of feasible alternatives under consideration'' [103].
		However, approval voting has a higher Condorcet efficiency than plurality voting, selecting the Condorcet winner in all cases where it is selected by plurality voting as well as in other cases where it it may not be selected by plurality voting [17].
	lorrie.cranor.org /pubs/diss/node4.html (0 words)

	Math Forum - Ask Dr. Math
		Date: 02/13/2002 at 17:31:59 From: Doctor Paul Subject: Re: Modern Math - Condorcet candidate Why did you pick A? If you want to see if this election satisfies the Condorcet criterion, compare each candidate against the declared winner (i.e., candidate B) to see how B fares in head-to-head matchups against the rest of the competition.
		We don't need to consider B vs. C or B vs. D because we already know that this voting scheme violates the Condorcet criterion if B is declared the winner.
		Thus if this election is going to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, then candidate A had better be declared the winner.
	mathforum.org /library/drmath/view/52276.html (0 words)

	Approval voting - Biocrawler (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		Approval voting passes a form of the monotonicity criterion, in that voting for a candidate never lowers that candidate's chance of winning.
		It should be noted that Approval voting does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
		Unlike Condorcet method, instant-runoff voting, and other methods that require ranking candidates, approval voting does not require significant changes in ballot design, voting procedures or equipment, and it is easier for voters to use and understand.
	www.biocrawler.com /encyclopedia/Approval (0 words)

	Dan Lynch Online :: View topic - Condorcet Voting
		The true Condorcet winner is the one candidate who would be able to win a two-way race against each and every one of his opponents.
		However, the fact that a given election method violates the participation criterion is rather an academic concern since this fact cannot be misused for strategic purposes.
		Condorcet methods violate the participation criterion only in the very unlikely event that there are 4 almost equally strong front runners.
	www.dglynch.com /board/viewtopic.php?t=122 (0 words)

	Homework Solutions to Chapter 1 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		Since C did not win, the Condorcet criterion is violated.
		(b) The Condorcet candidate is C. (c) The Condorcet Criterion is violated in this election because there is a Condorcet candidate (namely C) but it did not win the election.
		When the losing candidate D is removed, the winner changes, which means the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion is also violated.
	www.math.rutgers.edu /~cobbs/Ch1Solutions.htm (0 words)

	The Cardinal
		The Condorcet criterion seems to be the most complete and satisfying definition of majority rule that is available to us.
		Also, it does not satisfy independence of clones, unless the definition of the criterion is adapted to require that candidates must be given the same rating as one another in order to qualify as clones.
		It is important to have a method that, in addition to recognizing a Condorcet winner when one is clearly expressed, works to protect sincere Condorcet winners from being obscured by strategic incursion.
	fc.antioch.edu /~james_green-armytage/vm/weighted_pairwise.htm (0 words)

	Definitions and Criteria
		If a voting method always elects a Condorcet winner when one exists, the method is Condorcet-efficient, and passes the Condorcet criterion.
		Candidate C is the Condorcet loser, because it loses all of its pairwise comparisons.
		However, in many Condorcet completion methods, it is possible for the B supporters to change the result to their advantage.
	fc.antioch.edu /~james_green-armytage/vm/define.htm (0 words)

	Complexity-Theoretic Aspects of Political Science
		Regarding the latter, the Condorcet criterion is that an election is won by any candidate who defeats all others in pairwise majority-rule elections.
		The Condorcet Paradox, dating from 1785, notes that not only is it not always the case that Condorcet winners exist but, far worse, when there are more than two candidates, pairwise majority-rule elections may yield strict cycles in the aggregate preference even if each voter has non-cyclic preferences.
		In particular, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who defeats each other candidate in pairwise majority-rule elections.
	www.cs.rochester.edu /u/lane/political-science.html (0 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		A social choice procedure is said to satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion (CWC) provided that it there is a Condorcet winner (an alternative that wins every pairwise contest with other alternatives), then it alone is the social choice.
		A social choice procedure is said to satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) provided that it there is a Condorcet loser (an alternative that loses every pairwise contest with other alternatives), then it is not in the social choice.
		If there is a Condorcet winner, it is declared to be the social choice.
	www.goshen.edu /~dhousman/math100/Handouts/Day09.doc (0 words)

	[No title]
		If the number of voters is odd, and we are interested only in voting systems that never result in a tie, then majority rule is the only voting system for two alternatives that satisfies the three conditions just listed.
		A Condorcet winner defeats each of the other candidates in a head-to-head election.
		Monotonicity- if an alternative is a winner, and a new election is held in which the only ballot change made is for some voter to move the former winning alternative higher on his or her preference list, then the original winner should remain a winner.
	www.svsu.edu /~agm/m125-Ch12-NOTES-w05.htm (0 words)

	The Case for Condorcet Elections (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		Any Condorcet method must come along with an ambiguity resolution procedure for cases in which there is no winner by this first criterion.
		Condorcet is a system devised several hundred years ago that is very difficult to carry out, but logically superior to every other system.
		This site exists for the express purpose of explaining and advocating Condorcet Elections, which are the solution to an age-old dilemma and the key to a new era of Democracy.
	cgi.stanford.edu /~pflueger/condorcet (0 words)

	Marquis de Condorcet (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		The Condorcet Criterion gets its name from the Marquis de Condorcet, an 18th century mathematician, philosopher, and political thinker.
		Condorcet first proposed an election procedure based on the results of head-to-head matchups among the candidates.
		There is a formula that tells us the total number of head-to-head matchups for a given number of candidates.
	www.ctl.ua.edu /math103/Voting/marquis.htm (0 words)

	Condorcet Tally Table
		For a voter the solution is as easy as saying 1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice.
		The people who count ballots can then use Condorcet's rule to elect the 1 candidate who can top each of the others in a series of 1 on 1 tests.
		A candidate may say she won a majority; but she cannot honestly say she won the majority.
	accuratedemocracy.com /c_tally.htm (0 words)

	Evaluation Criteria
		Brams and Fishburn have analyzed the ability of plurality and approval voting to select a Condorcet winner when voters use poll data to vote strategically [17].
		While it is certainly a deficiency of plurality DSV that the Condorcet candidate cannot win unless it is one of the top two in the polls, it is a deficiency shared with plurality voting in many real election situations.
		DSV violates the independence from irrelevant alternatives criterion for the same reason that STV violates it: the outcome may be affected by the removal or addition of alternatives.
	lorrie.cranor.org /pubs/diss/node20.html (0 words)

	Voting Terminology -- CRG4.com
		These methods all have their supporters, and the arguments for various methods are often based on desirable criteria possessed by the systems.
		Condorcet criterion: The winner is the Condorcet winner, if one exists.
		Condorcet loser: a candidate that is pairwise defeated by every other candidate.
	math.crg4.com /votingTerminology.html (0 words)

	The Debian Voting System
		The answer is twofold: first, Condorcet voting is better than other voting systems.
		If a majority prefers one particular candidate to another, then they have a way of voting that will ensure that the other cannot win, without any member of that majority reversing a preference for one candidate over another.
		The implementation of quorum and supermajorities sacrifices most of the good properties of the Condorcet voting system, but a majority of Debian developers seems to think that this implementation has benefits which outweigh the loss of these properties.
	seehuhn.de /comp/vote.html (0 words)

	gmane.politics.election-methods
		This is the point of the original Condorcet method, that somebody will always have a droop quota (which is a majority in a two-way race) of votes.
		An election in a condorcet method is a comparison between candidates to pick N-winners pitted against each other in several N+1 elections.
		I've been told in the past that the Condorcet method "wasn't meant to be applied to proportional elections".
	blog.gmane.org /gmane.politics.election-methods (0 words)

	Condorcet method - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:
		The winning votes method would pick B anyway.
		Other terms related to the Condorcet method are:
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Condorcet_method (3734 words)

	Learning Module 1 - Concepts
		The majority criterion: If a majority (remember, a majority is more than half; a plurality is just the largest number, even if not a majority) of voters rank a candidate first, that candidate should always win the election.
		A voting system passes the Condorcet Criterion if whenever there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate always wins the election.
		Sadly, most of our systems fail the Condorcet criterion - which means we can make up examples where there is a Condorcet winner but that candidate doesn't win the election under Plurality, or under Borda, or under instant run-off.
	voyager.dvc.edu /~sneedham/06concepts.html (0 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		An election violates a criterion if the person who is supposed to win, according to the criterion, does not win under the chosen voting method.
		For example, the Condorcet Criterion is violated if there is a Condorcet candidate (beats everyone head-to-head) and that candidate does not win.
		To show that an election violates a criterion you have to: (a) Find the candidate that wins under the chosen voting method, (b) find the candidate that the criterion says should win, and (c) check that those two candidates are actually different.
	www.math.umn.edu /~jhall/courses/1001/q6.html (0 words)

	1 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		If a choice gets a majority of first place votes in an election, then that choice should be the winner of the election.
		Note that the Plurality Method may violate the Condorcet Criterion.
		Someone who votes preferences in a different order in order to influence the outcome of an election against a particular candidate is practicing Insincere Voting.
	home.comcast.net /~jleslie9431/1101webpages/1-2notes1101.htm (0 words)

	NEP-CDM-1998-09-14 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		Although the median rank criterion is a majority principle, it is completely at odd with another majority principle introduced in this paper and called the Extended Condorcet Criterion.
		It may be translated as follows: If a competitor is ranked consistently ahead of another competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he should be ahead in the final ranking.
		This is not only consistent with the Extended Condorcet Criterion but the latter also proves useful in finding Kemeny orders over large sets of alternatives, by allowing decomposition of these orders.
	lists.repec.org /pipermail/nep-cdm/1998-September/000014.html (0 words)

	Theoretical Inquiries in Law
		To improve our understanding of this choice in various settings, Professor Levmore considers the relationship between two well-known contributions to the study of group decisionmaking, namely, the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Condorcet Criterion, which have not generally been treated together.
		Counterintuitively, the essay demonstrates that while the Condorcet Criterion continues to hold great promise as a tool of decision in en banc appellate courts, the Condorcet Jury Theorem is most appealing in judicial contexts that appear less collegial and thus less like a jury.
		Maxwell L. Stearns, "The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore", Vol.
	www.bepress.com /til/default/vol3/iss1/art5 (0 words)

	nep-pbe-1998-09-14 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-16)
		Luisa Fuster ---------- An Extension of the Concordet Criterion and Kemeny Orders ranked ahead of all other alternatives by an absolute majority of voters, it should be declared the winner.
		The following partial extension of this criterion to all ranks is proposed: If an alternative is consistently ranked ahead of another alternative by an absolute majority of voters, it should be ahead in the final ranking.
		Keywords: aggregation, Condorcet Criterion, Kemeny orders, algorithm Downloads: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/w3/recherche/cahiers/1998/9813.pdf (pdf) *(10) Figure Skating and the Theory of Social Choice and the International Skating Union, hereafter the ISU Rule, to aggregate individual rankings of the skaters by the judges into a final ranking, is an interesting example of a social welfare function.
	lists.repec.org /pipermail/nep-pbe/1998-September/000021.html (0 words)

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