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| | Omega-inconsistency in Gödel’s formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-31) |
 | | However, we cannot construct a Turing machine T that is independent of n, and which will decide, for any given n as input, whether R(n, p) holds or not. |
 | | Thus the omega-inconsistency of P can be seen as a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, negative proof of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem under a constructive standard interpretation for P. References |
 | | Assuming that r is a PROOF of a given FORMULA n, it seems to make the invalid assumption, “[r]= |
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