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Topic: Counterinsurgency

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	PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Summer 1996
		Counterinsurgency operations are often protracted, and as the nature of the task may evolve or even change radically long after troops are deployed, the political aim may likewise change over time.
		In counterinsurgency the strategic application of information warfare is primarily concerned with gaining the command advantage at national level, and the preparation and implementation of a strategic information plan.
		Counterinsurgency campaigns are often protracted affairs; establishing secure operating bases, developing lines of communication, maintaining public support, and recruiting local militia are carried out to enable the security forces to sustain a long operation.
	carlisle-www.army.mil /usawc/Parameters/96summer/bulloch.htm (6063 words)

	Counterpunch - The Boston Globe
		Counterinsurgency, with its emphasis on improving social conditions and spreading democracy, was initially a favorite among liberals.
		Counterinsurgency might have had some short-term success in Vietnam, but it was a long-term failure.
		Successful counterinsurgency involves a deep familiarity with the local culture, which is difficult to gain on the fly.
	www.boston.com /news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/01/04/counterpunch (1882 words)

	The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		This exploration of why counterinsurgencies fail avoids the American experience in Vietnam, a subject that continues to evoke images and arguments that could possibly overshadow the central purpose-that is, discussing the lessons of previous counterinsurgencies and their applicability to US strategy in Iraq.
		Trinquier was introduced to counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina before being assigned to Algeria in 1957 as a Lieutenant Colonel with the French 10th Parachute Division.
		Counterinsurgents direct propaganda operations at the population with a limited goal of obtaining their neutrality.
	www.army.mil /prof_writing/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_04_1.html (4741 words)

	Counterinsurgency - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In the context of an occupation or a civil war, counterinsurgency is a military term for the combat against a political rebellion, termed an "insurgency," by forces aligned with the standing government of the territory in which the combat takes place.
		As such, known counterinsurgency operations have often rested on a confused, relativistic, or otherwise situational distinction between combatant and civilians, and use of the terms "insurgent" and "counterinsurgent" themselves therefore have hinged on a subjective perception of the government's legitimacy.
		Counterinsurgency tactics usually involve human rights abuses and violations of civil liberties; such as internment, detention of family members of suspected insurgents as de facto hostages, extra-judicial killing of civilians and prisoners and torture.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Counterinsurgency (2007 words)

	Preface to Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by John A. Nagl
		Linking up in theater and inventing doctrine on the run, these Counterinsurgency Teams were essential to the success of the battalion in winning the hearts and minds of the good guys—and of uncovering, capturing, and killing the bad ones.
		The army is adapting to the demands of counterinsurgency in Iraq at many levels, from the tactical and operational through the training base in the United States.
		Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all elements of national power—diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial, and military—to achieve the predominantly political objectives of establishing a stable national government that can secure itself against internal and external threats.
	www.press.uchicago.edu /Misc/Chicago/567702.html (2532 words)

	U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War
		The first lesson of counterinsurgency, then, is to encourage innovative, adaptive military leadership at the local level, rather than trying to micromanage the conflict from afar.
		The Philippine War also illustrates the extent to which the success of a counterinsurgency is ultimately defined by the degree and intensity of indigenous support it is able to secure, whether by carrots or sticks.
		In the latter respect, the counterinsurgency campaign was aided by the emergence of the Federalist Party, a nationwide political movement that championed the progressive modernization of the Philippines along American lines.
	www.newamericancentury.org /defense-20031103.htm (4063 words)

	Joes \| Recapturing the Essentials of Counterinsurgency
		In successful counterinsurgency as in all types of warfare, politics must be primary and decisive, as all students of Clausewitz know.
		From Spain to Afghanistan the road of warfare is littered with the wreckage of counterinsurgencies that forgot, or disdained, rectitude.
		Intelligence is of course key to any successful campaign against guerrillas, because among the more difficult tasks facing the counterinsurgents are finding the exact location of guerrilla units and identifying their sympathizers and agents.
	www.unc.edu /depts/diplomat/item/2006/0406/joes/joes_counterins.html (1867 words)

	Counterinsurgency, by the book - Editorials & Commentary - International Herald Tribune
		The current draft of this counterinsurgency manual, which has been shown to civilian experts and been posted on the Internet by the Federation of American Scientists, amounts to an introductory course in the history of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
		Yes, such steps are keys to victory; they played a central part in counterinsurgency victories in the 1950s by the Philippine government of Ramon Magsaysay and by the British in Malaya.
		This is a key counterinsurgency tool that must be included in the final version of the Pentagon's counterinsurgency manual.
	www.iht.com /articles/2006/08/07/opinion/edshultz.php (657 words)

	Army.com - Army Unveils Counterinsurgency Manual
		It had been 20 years since the Army published a formal field manual devoted to counterinsurgency operations, and 25 years since the Marine Corps published its last manual on the subject.
		Crane described insurgency and counterinsurgency as two sides of an internal war, emphasizing that the terms are not new.
		According to Crane, counterinsurgency operations are a mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations and in order to be successful, our forces need to be to be adaptive and flexible.
	www.army.com /news/item/2526 (492 words)

	Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Military Review - Find Articles
		The British Army developed a successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Malaya because of its success as a learning institution, whereas in Vietnam, the U.S. Army was not a learning institution and was opposed to learning how to fight and win a counterinsurgency.
		It is not that a major component of the Army did not learn and adapt to counterinsurgency; a more accurate characterization is that the Army was fighting a conventional jungle war and a counterinsurgency simultaneously.
		Counterinsurgency should not be the exclusive realm of the SOF community because many of the tools for counterinsurgency belong to the conventional force.
	www.findarticles.com /p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_2004_May-June/ai_n6123976 (699 words)

	Why War? Analysis: Counterinsurgency Tactics in Iraq (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		Comparing the two efforts, Nagl demonstrated that a key issue for a counterinsurgent army is to calibrate correctly the amount of lethal force necessary to do the job with the minimum amount of nasty, counterproductive side effects.
		This is the inherent messiness and slowness of counterinsurgency that T.E. Lawrence wrote of, and it is a key reason that the failure rate in counterinsurgency is so high.
		It is, in the annals of counterinsurgency, a notable achievement.
	why-war.com /news/2004/01/11/counteri.html (8312 words)

	Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century--Creating a National Framework
		Classical counterinsurgency (COIN) activity spans centuries; military literature is rich in case studies of how governments have dealt over time with insurgent movements that threatened indigenous or colonial governance and terrorized civilian populations.
		It is a potentially crippling irony that the parts of the U.S. Government (USG) most potentially suited to providing the decisive capabilities in counterinsurgency challenges are the ones least engaged in the current efforts to frame COIN doctrine and policy.
		Taking into account the enormous body of intellectual capital invested in relevant efforts, these experts will help formulate an approach to development of a national counterinsurgency strategy and implementation plan that will enable the USG to dissuade and defeat the distributed, networked, lethal insurgents that threaten global peace and security in the 21st century.
	www.state.gov /t/pm/rls/othr/misc/72027.htm (1195 words)

	WP: Army takes lessons in counterinsurgency - washingtonpost.com Highlights - MSNBC.com
		After decades of being told that their job was to close in on and destroy the enemy, officers are being taught that sometimes the best thing might be not to attack but to co-opt the enemy, perhaps by employing him, or encouraging him to desert, or by drawing him into local or national politics.
		Conscious that it largely walked away from counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War -- the subject was not mentioned in the mid-1970s version of the Army's key fighting manual -- the service now is trying to ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
		The biggest change there has been the admission that counterinsurgency is exceedingly difficult, and that the Army has not been preparing its people well for it, officials said.
	www.msnbc.msn.com /id/10955831 (1199 words)

	Gumption: Cancer Counterinsurgency
		Amy started running a fever this afternoon, and it was close enough to the end of regular office hours that we went to the emergency room to have her examined.
		Other family and friends have been in touch recently, and Amy said that some who have read my posts on the cancer counterinsurgency have not understood that her cancer, or rather, its treatment, has a very high cure rate (95%, up from the 90% I initially reported).
		The week in Amy's cancer counterinsurgency started out "normally" (in sharp contrast to events unfolding in the southeast US in the wake of Hurricane Katrina), with Amy heading in for her daily dose of radiotherapy on Monday.
	gumption.typepad.com /blog/cancer_counterinsurgency (6651 words)

	Relearning counterinsurgency warfare Parameters - Find Articles (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		Meanwhile, with knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare waning among policymakers, resurgent terrorism scholarship and counterterrorism policy initiatives avoided the issue of a strategic terrorist campaign to destabilize nation-building.
		This exploration of why counterinsurgencies fail avoids the American experience in Vietnam, a subject that continues to evoke images and arguments that could possibly overshadow the central purpose--that is, discussing the lessons of previous counterinsurgencies and their applicability to US strategy in Iraq.
		Counterinsurgencies require "an interlocking system of actions--political, economic, psychological, military--that aims at the [insurgents' intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime." (2)
	www.findarticles.com /p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_1_34/ai_115566394 (734 words)

	Supernatural Counterinsurgency in the Congo
		This evaluation of supernatural counterinsurgency was written during an era when U.S. foreign policy was increasingly focused on quelling rebellions against allied governments.
		The CIA and Defense Department deemed the country a test case for modern counterinsurgency methods, and financed numerous studies of Congolese society to probe the psychological strengths and weaknesses of the rebels.
		For example, "counterinsurgency planners will be able to concoct 'medicines' and other devices within in the superstitious framework of the target group, with which to neutralize and overpower the spells cast by insurgent witch-doctors."
	karws.gso.uri.edu /Marsh/Bay_of_Pigs/congo.htm (1163 words)

	Army Times - Updated counterinsurgency manual released
		Crane sees counterinsurgency as the future of U.S. war fighting and said he kept the manual general enough to apply to several possibilities.
		The COIN manual is being taught at the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College and the Counterinsurgency Academy in Iraq, which disseminates information to troops as they arrive in theater.
		For example, equipment may need to reflect troops who spend most of their time in cities or items that can be left behind for the use of newly trained local police.
	www.armytimes.com /story.php?f=1-292925-2424870.php (420 words)

	PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Spring 2004
		This exploration of why counterinsurgencies fail avoids the American experience in Vietnam, a subject that continues to evoke images and arguments that could possibly overshadow the central purpose—that is, discussing the lessons of previous counterinsurgencies and their applicability to US strategy in Iraq.
		Counterinsurgencies require “an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the [insurgents’; intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.”
		actions” and the counterinsurgent laden with a “heavy liability—he is responsible for maintaining order throughout the country” without undermining the ideals on which the new government is making its pleas for support.
	carlisle-www.army.mil /usawc/Parameters/04spring/tomes.htm (4694 words)

	Counterinsurgency and Political Control, Jochen Hippler (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		One of the results of the analyses is that the political and social aspects of counterinsurgency are of key importance.
		Counterinsurgency is not a matter of military conquest, but of social control.
		Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are basically struggles for legitimacy, both locally and internationally, using political and military means.
	www.tni.org /archives/hippler/counterinsurgency.htm (364 words)

	Willful ignorance \| thebulletin.org
		All counterinsurgency scholars agree the viability of any counterinsurgency endeavor, especially one undertaken by an occupying force, depends upon this capability.
		In his 1995 study, he wrote that the U.S. military had to be "both looking backward at previous attempts to reconstitute counterinsurgency capabilities and looking forward to speculate on future forms of insurgency and the strategic environment in which counterinsurgency might occur.
		A constant throughout all counterinsurgency literature is the importance of understanding not just the finer points of the nation and culture where one is operating, but the nature of insurgency itself.
	www.thebulletin.org /article.php?art_ofn=ja05vest (3597 words)

	Counterinsurgency: Always a Day Away \| TPMCafe
		While military thinkers of course have to think about 'counterinsurgency' as such and to devise strategies and training to fight 'fourth-generation wars,' the fundmental issue is that an insurgency occurs in a particular context.
		The counterinsurgency war is over, and continuing to think about our actions there in terms of such a war will merely exacerbate the long term damage to Iraq and to our interests.
		Counterinsurgency objectives only tempt us to intercede in intercommunal strife or to conceptualize contending Iraqi factions as primarily antagonists of the US forces.
	www.tpmcafe.com /story/2005/12/1/113140/713 (5269 words)

	DenverPost.com - Training for counterinsurgency
		The emphasis on training the lower ranks reflects the growing view among top commanders that the Iraq war cannot be won by military might alone and that U.S. troops at all levels must be taught how to win the allegiance of the local population.
		Counterinsurgency experts do not always agree on who should be trusted with sensitive decisions, such as how much force to use against local populations.
		But counterinsurgency strategists emphasize that to win over locals, the military must learn in many instances to accept risk.
	origin.denverpost.com /nationworld/ci_4483927 (915 words)

	FRONTLINE: the insurgency: can it be defeated? \| PBS
		So, their tacit objective is not to expel the coalition forces and defeat the Iraqi army and police, but to make as much of Iraq as they can ungovernable.
		It's worth noting that the counterinsurgency most often cited as a model of success, the British-led fight against the communist insurgency in colonial Malaya after World War II, began with great difficulty.
		In the first three years of what became a 12-year war, serious errors were made, high-ranking leaders had to be replaced, and the communist movement grew in military and political power.
	www.pbs.org /wgbh/pages/frontline/insurgency/can (2209 words)

	CIA Inside U.S. Counterinsurgency: A Soldier Speaks
		We knew perfectly well, as did the host-nation commanders, that narcotics was a flimsy cover story for beefing up the capacity of armed forces who had lost the confidence of the population through years of abuse.
		McCaffrey -- not coincidentally the former commander of Southcom, the Theater Command for the U.S. armed forces in Latin America -- is "admitting" that the lines between counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency are "beginning to blur" in Colombia.
		The guerrillas are involved in drug trafficking, a ubiquitous claim that it is repeated uncritically in the press.
	www.thirdworldtraveler.com /CIA/US_Counterinsurg_Soldier.html (4272 words)

	DefenseLINK News: Gunners Pull Counterinsurgency Missions in Baghdad (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		Though the soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, were not trained for counterinsurgency operations, a year in Iraq has made them experts.
		The unit traded in its Paladin artillery for Humvee vehicles, and fire missions for on-the-ground counterinsurgency operations, said Army Capt. David Underwood, commander of B Battery, 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery.
		He said the unit did receive some training in their new mission before moving in to Iraq, but the real learning experience happened on the streets around this forward operating base in East Baghdad.
	www.defenselink.mil /news/Dec2005/20051214_3653.html (549 words)

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