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| | Moral Epistemology [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20) |
 | | David Copp (2000), the reliabilist moral epistemologist whose example this is, wants us to see that the traditional internalist outcome seems preposterous. |
 | | David Copp (2000), whose moral epistemic reliabilism we sketched above, conceives his reliabilism as a naturalized moral epistemology, and defends it against several objections, including those we mention below. |
 | | For instance, “Cornell Realists,” such as Nicolaus Sturgeon (1989), David Brink (1989), and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1988) think that every particular instantiation of the Good can be identified with a natural state of affairs, such as an instance of moral rightness with some act of kindness under a natural description. |
| www.iep.utm.edu /m/mor-epis.htm (7225 words) |
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