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	David Kay Fringe Reviews
		David Kay attempts completely deadpan delivery, and it took great effort from the surreal stand up to keep schtum as there was an extreme laughter in the small audience - you know the kind, they make a booming guffaw look polite and are usually blonde.
		By fixating on scones, David Kay perhaps does his sense of the surreal and his oblique observations about Scottish culture a disservice, because he actually possesses the ability to transcend the parochial boundaries.
		According to Kay, the earth is currently in a trajectory of a giant scone and in 17 years time, scone and planet will collide, destrying life as we know it.
	www.david-kay.com /dkfrarc.htm (1163 words)

	Why War? Keywords: David Kay (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		David Kay assures us that intelligence analysts were not pressured by the Bush admin...
		David Kay is an American scientist who is best known for acting as a weapons inspector in Iraq.
		Kay worked as Chief Scientist for the Pentagon from 1983 to 1988 and also was the UN Chief Weapons Inspector from 1983 to 1992.
	www.why-war.com /encyclopedia/people/david_kay (1163 words)

	Encyclopedia: David Kay (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		DAVID KAY: You have to realise it was not a Eureka moment with me hopping out of a bathtub saying I've concluded that; (a) there were no bathtubs in Iraq, but it was a gradual process, which really started almost from the time I was appointed and got access to classified information.
		DAVID KAY: I had contentious disagreements with the British about what should be in the report and what should not be in the report and interpretations of it.
		DAVID KAY: Well, first of all, if you mean to target actual - putting weapons steel on target, I think we'll discover that we don't know all the targets, and so you will be surprised that you'll destroy less of the Iranian capability than you had thought you had.
	www.nationmaster.com /encyclopedia/David-Kay (442 words)

	David Kay - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In testimony on the progress of the Iraq Survey Group on October 2, 2003 he revealed to House and Senate committees that the ISG had found that Iraq had a network of clandestine laboratories containing equipment that should have been (but was not) disclosed to the UN inspectors.
		Kay told the commitees that between 1999 and 2002 Iraq attempted to obtain missile technology from North Korea that would allow them to build missiles with a range of 1300 kilometers, far beyond the UN limit of 150 kilometers that Iraq agreed upon in UN Resolution 687.
		After the interview, Kay told National Public Radio that Iraq "had a large number of WMD program-related activities." He said "So there was a WMD program.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/David_Kay (997 words)

	David Kay Says Iraq's WMD 'Program' Didn't Exist Either
		Kay said the fundamental errors in prewar intelligence assessments were so grave that he would recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations overhaul their intelligence collection and analytical efforts.
		Kay added that there was now a consensus within the United States intelligence community that mobile trailers found in Iraq and initially thought to be laboratories for biological weapons were actually designed to produce hydrogen for weather balloons, or perhaps to produce rocket fuel.
		Kay said he was convinced that the analysts were not pressed by the Bush administration to make certain their prewar intelligence reports conformed to a White House agenda on Iraq.
	www.democrats.com /view.cfm?id=19102 (2303 words)

	Online NewsHour: Newsmaker: David Kay -- October 2, 2003
		DAVID KAY: What we have found is a substantial body of evidence that reports that the Iraqis had an intention to continue weapons production at some point in the future.
		DAVID KAY: The nuclear program at best on the evidence that we have today is one in which there was an interest in restarting it.
		DAVID KAY: Well, Jim, in a sense, no, quite frankly, I think that's a risky gamble that even the riskiest poker player would be hesitant to play because he lost his country if that was his gamble for it.
	www.pbs.org /newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec03/kay_10-02.html (2221 words)

	David Kay Stand Up Comedian Biography
		David is one of the most original, imaginative, surreal and - most importantly - downright funny comics currently performing in Scotland.
		David is no stranger to the Edinburgh festival and after a critically acclaimed debut solo Fringe Show at the 2002 Edinburgh Festival, “David Kay : Some Like a Sonce” which was followed up in 2003 with “David Kay : Fireball”.
		David has since moved up a gear from cult performer to fully-fledged phenomenon on the comedy scene.
	www.david-kay.com /dkbiog.htm (415 words)

	Online NewsHour: Newsmaker Interview: David Kay -- January 29, 2004
		DAVID KAY: Well, I think, first of all, because that were the estimates -- not just the estimates by the CIA or the Defense Intelligence Agency, we were going in against the background in which the U.N. had spoken of large numbers of missing material that could have been weaponized.
		DAVID KAY: Well, there were on paper very specific things with regard to the reports of movement in the weapons, a protection of weapons, of weapons being assigned to specific units as well as specific locations on paper.
		DAVID KAY: I think part of it, Jim, is because we got in the habit of believing that the Iraqis always lied because they did lie and cheat to a large extent in the early '90s; made it hard to accept pieces of information that the Iraqis provided that showed they didn't have it.
	www.pbs.org /newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june04/kay_01-29.html (2711 words)

	Boston.com / News / Boston Globe / Opinion / Editorials / David Kay's concession
		Kay did make it clear, however, that the CIA as well as other US intelligence agencies, UN weapons inspectors, and the intelligence services of many other countries had all come to the same mistaken conclusion.
		Kay's answer to the question of why there had been such a stunning intelligence failure is that the CIA was too dependent on technical intelligence gathering after 1998, when UN weapons inspectors left Iraq.
		Kay described a system in which scientists went directly to Saddam for funds, which he granted on the understanding they would be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.
	www.boston.com /news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2004/01/28/david_kays_concession (476 words)

	Potomac Institute - David Kay
		Currently, Dr. David Kay is a Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies with a concentration on counterterrorism and weapons proliferation.
		Dr. Kay has frequently testified before Congress, and his articles have appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, The Washington Quarterly and The New Republic, and a number of scholarly journals.
		Dr. Kay holds a Bachelors degree from the University of Texas at Austin and a Master's in International Affairs and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University.
	www.potomacinstitute.org /aboutus/staff/kay.htm (507 words)

	Petrified Truth: Obfuscatory David Kay
		David Kay has resigned and been replaced as head of the Iraq Survey Group, and has given an interview with Reuters that is getting a lot of play this weekend, for obvious reasons.
		David Kay, the former head of the coalition's hunt for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, yesterday claimed that part of Saddam Hussein's secret weapons programme was hidden in Syria.
		David Kay needs to either give a public extended interview in the U.S. with a knowledgeable questioner or testify before an appropriate Congressional committee and say what he's ready to say.
	www.petrifiedtruth.com /archives/001300.html (443 words)

	C&EN: Cover Story - DAVID A. KAY
		Kay left IAEA in 1992 to serve for one year as director general of a London-based trade association, the Uranium Institute.
		Kay recently sat down with CandEN Senior Correspondent Lois R. Ember to talk about why he believed Iraq had WMD, why he changed his mind, and why he resigned from his CIA assignment so publicly after only six months.
		KAY: It's one of those offers when it is put to you that the President has decided to do something and wants you to do it, and you feel it's important and what has been done to date has been done poorly, you accept the challenge.
	pubs.acs.org /cen/coverstory/8231/8231kay.html (5394 words)

	David Kay (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		Kay worked as Chief Scientist for the Pentagon (additional info and facts about the Pentagon) from 1983 to 1988 and also was the UN (An organization of independent states formed in 1945 to promote international peace and security) Chief Weapons Inspector from 1983 to 1992.
		Before the 2003 war, as U.S. government officials were pushing the idea that Saddam Hussein was in possession of WMD, many people would direct reporter (A person who investigates and reports or edits news stories) s toward David Kay to reinforce their point of view.
		On January 23, 2004, Kay was replaced in his role by Charles Duelfer (additional info and facts about Charles Duelfer), and spent the following days discussing his discoveries and opinions with the news media (Newspapers and magazines collectively) and the United States political establishment.
	www.absoluteastronomy.com /encyclopedia/d/da/david_kay.htm (532 words)

	David A. Kay - SourceWatch
		David A. Kay, arms inspector for the Central Intelligence Agency in search of a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction allegedly hidden in Iraq by Saddam Hussein, resigned his position on January 23, 2004.
		October 2002: Kay leaves SAIC and becomes a 'senior fellow' at the Potomac Institute for Policy Research, where he is thus positioned to become an 'objective expert' for nuclear weapons for the Bush administration in its run up to the war.
		In all of Kay's citations in the news and before interviews, he is invariably referred to as "David Kay, former chief UN weapons inspector and senior fellow at the Potomac Instsitute for Policy Research.
	www.sourcewatch.org /index.php?title=David_Kay (414 words)

	Boston.com / News / Local / Mass. / Kay implores US to admit mistakes in Iraq
		Kay's comments came as the White House sought to fend off accusations from its former antiterrorism chief, Richard Clarke, who said President Bush ignored the Al Qaeda threat before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and focused on Iraq, rather than on the Islamic militant group, afterward.
		Kay resigned in January, saying that he believed no such weapons existed and that the failure to find them raised serious questions about the quality of prewar intelligence.
		Kay, who had a role in United Nations weapons probes in Iraq in the early 1990s, said US intelligence there was poor in the decade before the war, relying entirely on international inspectors, Iraqi defectors, or intelligence from allies such as France and Britain.
	www.boston.com /news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/03/23/kay_implores_us_to_admit_mistakes_in_iraq (360 words)

	CRG: Dr David Kay's Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee
		KAY: Senator Warner, that's certainly true, particularly with regard to the foreign countries and individuals that assisted that program which remain a continuing threat in other countries, unless we know fully who they were and what they contributed.
		KAY: During the 1980s, they ran a number of tests using both what were normal simulants that you use in a physics experiment, as well as they had separated out a small quantity of plutonium, and they had some high-enriched uranium that had been supplied in French fuel.
		KAY: As best as has been determined -- and this is obviously something the investigation is continuing -- in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear establishment had deteriorated to such a point that it was totally useless.
	www.globalresearch.ca /articles/KAY401A.html (18120 words)

	Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		David Kay, former lead inspector of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), spoke with ACT editor Miles Pomper and research analyst Paul Kerr March 5 on the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.
		Kay: I certainly think it’s important to continue the search for reasons of the procurement network, if nothing else, and I think all of us recognize that, since Iraq had weapons pre-1991, it is possible that their efforts to destroy them were less than 100 percent complete.
		Kay: Well, when you get there, when you’re on the inside and you have freedom to look at both what went on, as well as to interview the Iraqis who were involved, it’s hard not to come away with the impression that they greatly feared [UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)][1] inspections and monitoring.
	www.armscontrol.org /act/2004_04/KayExcerpts.asp (5398 words)

	The World Today - Kay warns US to tread warily in actions with Iran
		David Kay led the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
		DAVID KAY: Well I think it's not only the American intelligence and the American administration got it so wrong.
		DAVID KAY: Well, look, what I do believe is what the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported, that is that there is an 18-year record in which they've engaged in clandestine nuclear activities and they haven't reported.
	www.abc.net.au /worldtoday/content/2005/s1300997.htm (819 words)

	Evidence of arms 'intent' found - The Washington Times: Nation/Politics (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		David Kay,left, special advisor to the CIA in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, makes his way to brief the Senate Intelligence Committee.
		Kay stressed that the report is preliminary and that weapons may still be found.
		Kay said the team has not determined the functions of two suspect trailers found in April, but that they would have been poor choice for producing hydrogen, biological weapons or missile propellant — three of the original theories.
	www.washtimes.com /national/20031002-114825-8585r.htm (976 words)

	FrontPage magazine.com :: Proof of Saddam's WMDs by David Kay (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		KAY: Well, we have found right now — and we're still finding them — over two dozen laboratories that were hidden in the Iraqi intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, were not declared to the U.N., had prohibited equipment, and carried on activities that should have been declared.
		KAY: His senior head of the arms industry has told us that in 2000 he believed that Saddam had simply gotten fed up with the UN restrictions and was ready, in the face of them, to start restarting the program.
		David Kay is the CIA special adviser on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction programs and head of the Iraqi Survey Group.
	www.frontpagemag.com /Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=10165 (2294 words)

	Baltimore Independent Media Center: CHERYL SEAL SPECIAL REPORT: Did David Kay Engineer WMD Evidence for Bush I -and Now ...
		Kay produced "retroactive" evidence of WMDs for Bush I. Now he's Bush and Tenet's pick to get the goods...tho' he was fired in 1992 from his UN job for unethical behavior.
		Although Kay produces a report that includes the allegations on Saddam's nuke program, he is removed from his position with the UN for his unethical behavior.
		In all of Kay's citations in the news and before interviews, he is invariably referred to as "David Kay, former chief UN weapons inspector and senior fellow at the Potomac Instsitute for Policy Research.
	baltimore.indymedia.org /newswire/display/4430/index.php (4994 words)

	WorkingForChange-David Kay's September surprise
		When the president needed someone to hawk his "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are an imminent threat to homeland security" thesis to the American people, David Kay was the man. During the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, Kay was a ubiquitous presence on the cable news networks, backing the president's assertions.
		The loyal David Kay appears poised to hand in a report marked by speculation, innuendo and circumstantial evidence.
		Kay was fired from his the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Iraq Action Team in the early 1990s because of his contacts with the U.S. intelligence community.
	www.workingforchange.com /article.cfm?itemid=15619 (743 words)

	Ex-Inspector Says C.I.A. Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program
		The inspector, David A. Kay, who led the government's efforts to find evidence of Iraq's illicit weapons programs until he resigned on Friday, said the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies did not realize that Iraqi scientists had presented ambitious but fanciful weapons programs to Mr.
		Kay said the fundamental errors in prewar intelligence assessments were so grave that he would recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations overhaul their intelligence collection and analytical efforts.
		Kay said that based on his team's interviews with Iraqi scientists, reviews of Iraqi documents and examinations of facilities and other materials, the administration was also almost certainly wrong in its prewar belief that Iraq had any significant stockpiles of illicit weapons.
	www.nytimes.com /2004/01/26/international/middleeast/26KAY.html?ex=1390453200&en=aa6636a7be1d3b5a&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND (692 words)

	David Kay comes clean, almost. - By Fred Kaplan - Slate Magazine
		David Kay's remarks over the weekend—that Iraq didn't have weapons of mass destruction before the war and that U.S. intelligence agencies missed the signs that would have told them as much—held few surprises for anyone who'd closely read his official report on the matter last October.
		Kay is changing his opinions based upon new evidence, not exactly something I was taught to avoid), but he leaves out damned near every bit of qualification Kay makes to his claims that could possibly contradict his (Kaplan's) thesis, and that reeks of shoddy journalism.
		Kay spends a lot of time speaking of stockpiles, the only thing on which there was much certainty (they had some, but were destroyed in Gulf War I), but doesn't mention much at all of small-scale development, precisely due to the complete inability to make a definitive statement one way or the other.
	www.slate.com /id/2094415 (1951 words)

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