| | The Huff Report » Soames Chapter 4: Kripke’s error (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-19) |
 | | If we take students who have learned just enough philosophy to get a sense of the difference between de dicto and de re knowledge ascriptions, but haven’t yet taken on board all the theoretical apparatus of direct reference, etc, my expectation is that a majority will judge that (5) is true while (6) is false. |
 | | Regarding this scenario, one must say either (i) that the name hasn’t been successfully introduced after all, (ii) that the speaker doesn’t understand the name he has introduced, or (iii) that understanding and justifiably accepting a true sentence containing the name is not sufficient for knowing the proposition p which it expresses to be true. |
 | | To resist it, Kaplan has to either accept that we can have the relevant de re knowledge a priori, or deny that the apriority of ‘dthat[the F] is the F (if anything is)’ is determined by the apriority of the relevant content (e.g., maybe it’s determined by the apriority of the relevant character). |
| www.huff-report.com /news/84/soames-chapter-4-kripkes-error (2565 words) |