| |
| | NATO REVIEW 9505-3 |
 | | However, the discovery in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme involving the separation of a few grams of plutonium from irradiated fuel, together with an extensive programme of uranium enrichment involving large quantities of undeclared uranium, was a watershed in the history of IAEA safeguards. |
 | | Discovery of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons programme led to the recognition that the IAEA safeguards system must be strengthened to provide assurance, not only of the non-diversion of declared material but also, as far as possible, of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in states which have comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. |
 | | More information on a state's nuclear programme, and the proposed design of new plants, together with increased access for IAEA inspectors to operating records and to all locations within declared facilities, will, we believe, contribute to greater confidence that nuclear materials and facilities are not being used for undeclared purposes. |
| www.nato.int /docu/review/1995/9505-3.htm (3212 words) |
|