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Topic: Direct realism

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	Direct realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Direct realism is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.
		Direct realism proposes no physical theory of experience and does not identify experience with the quantum phenomena that are things in themselves or even with the twin retinal images.
		This conclusion shows that direct realism simply defines perception as perception of external objects where an 'external object' is allowed to be a photon in the eye but not an impulse in a nerve leading from the eye.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Direct_realism (1397 words)

	Critical realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In the philosophy of perception, critical realism is the theory that some of our sense-data (for example, those of primary qualities) can and do accurately represent external objects, properties, and events, while other of our sense-data (for example, those of secondary qualities and perceptual illusions) do not accurately represent any external objects, properties, and events.
		The American critical realist movement was a response both to direct realism (especially in its recent incarnation as new realism), as well as to idealism and pragmatism.
		In very broad terms, American critical realism was a form of representational realism or representationalism, in which there are objects that stand as mediators between independent real objects and perceivers.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Critical_realism (1126 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		In common-sense or direct realism, the objects perceived are believed to be exactly what they appear to be, that is they are perceived directly or immediately, and in such are the direct objects of perception.
		Direct realism may appear to have the upper hand in that it can easily account for the existence and properties of the object.
		Representative realism may be seen as a doctrine on the nature of reality, possibly positing a notion of transcendence.
	www.webfusion.net.nz /realism.html (2223 words)

	Direct realism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Direct realism is a theory of perception that claims thatthe senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.
		In contrast, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only ofinternal representations of the external world.
		Direct realists often argue, contra representationalists, that the fact that one becomes aware of a treein perception through a complex neurophysical process does not argue in favour of indirect perception.
	www.therfcc.org /direct-realism-42342.html (191 words)

	Direct realism - Wikipedia
		This is contrasted with IndirectRealism or representationalism, which claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
		Direct realists sometimes claim that indirect realists are confused about conventional idioms of perceptions (JlAustin is well known for arguing this).
		Direct realists often argue, contra representationalists, that the fact that one becomes aware of a tree in perception through a complex neurophysical process does not argue in favor of indirect perception.
	nostalgia.wikipedia.org /wiki/Direct_realism (231 words)

	Theory & Psychology (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		The dominant approach in psychology to the explanation of human cognition is information-processing theory, which is a version of the representative realist theory of knowledge, according to which knowledge of external states of affairs is not direct but rather comes about through the immediate awareness of representations of such states internal to the knower.
		An alternative to information-processing theory that to date has received little attention in the psychological literature is direct realism, which is the view that the external world, not a representation of it, is the immediate object of awareness.
		That objection must be overcome if direct realism is ever to be entertained seriously as a means by which to account for the phenomena of human cognition.
	www.psych.ucalgary.ca /thpsyc/abstracts/abstracts_10.5/galloway.html (191 words)

	Direct realism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		This is contrasted with indirect realism[?] or representationalism[?], which claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
		Direct realists often argue, contra representationalists, that the fact that one becomes aware of a tree in perception through a complex neurophysical process doesn't argue in favour of indirect perception.
		If they were so cruel to him now, he could not expect them floor with the poor negro, and, if he could do nothing.
	www.termsdefined.net /di/direct-realism.html (315 words)

	Peter John Olivi
		But if we direct our attention to the various parts of the soul, then it is wrong to say that the rational part, "per se and considered as such," is the form of the body.
		The first horn of the dilemma leads in the direction of materialism, because it forces one to claim that the powers of the rational soul are instantiated in the body.
		Direct realism is attractive as a theory of sensation because it seems clear what the objects of sensation are.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/olivi (5073 words)

	[No title]
		The claims of this chapter are that all of the major contemporary versions of foundationalism are representationalist in principle, that representationalism fails, that the major arguments against foundationalism attack only (with one exception) representationalist foundationalism, and that the problems that typically motivate representationalism can be solved without resort to representationalism.
		The important point for foundationalism is that by dropping the necessary relation between acts of awareness and real objects one makes indirect and thus more difficult the process by which one arrives at justified propositions about external reality.
		From this brief defense of direct realism, focusing on its rejection of the diaphanous model, it follows that representationalism is not needed in response to perceptual illusions and relativity.
	enlightenment.supersaturated.com /essays/text/stephenhicks/diss/hicksdiss3.html (9642 words)

	Diana Mertz Hsieh: Representationalism and Perceptual Error (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		In opposition to representationalism, both (direct) realism and idealism agree that perception is direct and unmediated, despite their disagreements about what the object of perception is. (Dancy, 145) In any form of direct perception, no correspondence relationship is possible, since there is only one object of perception.
		I will then explicitly defend a direct realist account of perception, all the while focussing on accounting for the facts underlying "perceptual errors," given that it was the inability of naive realism to account for perceptual errors which initially lead to the rise of representationalism as an alternative theory.
		Naive realism can not account for such simple perceptual illusions as the "bent" stick in water, because (according to naive realism) the visual information that the stick is bent necessarily means that it is bent, while the tactile information that the stick is straight necessarily means that it is straight.
	www.dianahsieh.com /undergrad/rape.html (5028 words)

	Dissertation
		Direct awareness of x is understood as awareness of x which is not based on awareness of anything else, and the "based on" relation is understood as a particular way in which one state of awareness can be caused by another state of awareness when the contents of the two states are logically related.
		The only point of the metaphor is really this: there is a distinction between assertions and other, non-assertive speech acts (such as questions), and this is analogous to the distinction between beliefs and non-assertive propositional attitudes (such as wonderings-whether), and to the distinction between perceptual experiences and other non-assertive mental representations of particulars (namely, imaginings).
		Indirect realism is the view that we are sometimes inferentially justified in believing a proposition asserting the existence of a physical object, but we're never noninferentially justified in believing such a proposition.
	home.sprynet.com /~owl1/dis.htm (18059 words)

	Michael Tooley's Philosophy Home Page
		If either reductionism or indirect realism is correct, one may very well be able to explain the necessary truths in question, since the fact that causal concepts are, on either of those views, analyzable means that those necessary truths may turn out to be analytic.
		Direct realism, by contrast, in holding that the concept of causation is analytically basic, is barred from offering such an explanation of the asymmetry and irreflexivity of the basic relation of causation.
		Thus, features such as the direction of increase in entropy, or the direction of the transmission of order in non-entropic, irreversible processes, or the direction of open forks, often provide evidence concerning how events are causally connected.
	spot.colorado.edu /~tooley/CausationSection3.html (750 words)

	Philosophical basis of Psychological Science, Paul F. Ballantyne
		Direct perception is the supportive argumentative tool which the above Naive or Direct realists were missing in their epistemological arguments for the objectivity of scientific discourse or practice.
		Rather than the usual half self-refuting indirect realism, or the progressive but vulnerable "stand-alone" direct or naive realisms (see Wilcox and Katz, 1984), direct access to the indicators of perceptual or scientific veridicality is allowed more consistently by the adoption of an explicitly outlined direct perception theory.
		The "direct" in direct perception means simply that the traditional conception of "sensation" (i.e., as a middle segment -of a linear three moment sequence- which stands as a "barrier" between the object and the accomplishment of a perception about it) is thrown out.
	www.comnet.ca /~pballan/Appendix1.htm (7417 words)

	SIEGEL- The Problem of Perception
		Section 5 argues that Smith takes his target to be a significantly restricted version of indirect realism, that he has no substantive argument against views that many would consider to be versions of indirect realism, and that his own view about the structure of perceptual experience is compatible with such views.
		First, she can posit sense-data that really have the properties (or analogs of the properties) that public objects are (wrongly) perceived to have in cases of illusion.
		direction relative to the eyes – one’s visual experience of regular phosphenes is not neutral on whether the phosphene appears to be in front of you or behind you, for instance.
	people.fas.harvard.edu /~ssiegel/papers/DRPC.htm (13576 words)

	Direct Realism
		I argue that this direct realism presupposes Aristotle’s ontology according to which the world has a somewhat conceptual structure: our percepts and concepts are qualitatively identical with the very forms of the things themselves.
		Thus, the challenge for a direct realist is to either accept such an ontology or to show how a direct intentional relation of thoughts to the world is possible without such an ontological commitment.
		The 'realism' is generally taken to imply that the 'external' objects of perception are mind-independent or material objects.
	mywebpages.comcast.net /dantsmith/nexu25.htm (2038 words)

	Reid’s Non-Naïve Direct Realism
		By direct realism I mean the theory that we are directly aware of external objects and that we know them without requiring awareness of mental entities which act as cognitive links informing us of an external world.
		This understanding of Reid’s direct realism also explains how he can speak of the interpretation of sensations and remain a direct realist.
		Reid’s own understanding of direct realism is compatible with his notion of sensations as signs.
	humanities.ucsc.edu /NEH/copenhaver.htm (5112 words)

	Sartrean Theory of Consciousness, Direct Realism, and Correspondence Theory.: Philosophy
		This is why direct realism is often accompanied by the footnote of direct irrealism.
		In this philosophy, an hallucination is as real as a thought, as real as a concept, and as real as a tree.
		When X corresponds to Y in direct realism, it means that one conscious object corresponds to another by way of statement.
	hatteraslight.com /navy/Philosophyhall/cas/17.html (2191 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Direct realism (DR) can be represented as the conjunction of the following three theses: (X) that physical objects are mind-independent; (Y) that physical objects are perceivable; and (Z) that we can perceive these objects directly, or without epistemic intermediaries (i.e.
		What the direct realist must deny is that perception of the physical world is epistemically mediated (in the sense that my perceptual awareness of physical objects ultimately depends upon my perception of my subjective representational states).
		A: Recall that according to Direct Realism (DR), (X) physical objects are mind-independent; (Y) physical objects are perceivable; and (Z) we can perceive these objects directly Representative Realism (RR): accepts X and Y, rejects Z (Physical objects are mind-independent; we can indeed perceive them; but we perceive them indirectly, by perceiving sense-data or "ideas").
	euclid.trentu.ca /dmcdermid/OVERHEADSLECTURE5.doc (2406 words)

	Epistemological Problems of Perception
		The central idea of direct realism is that the view we have called perceptual subjectivism is false, that is, that instead of immediately experiencing either sense-data or adverbial contents, we instead directly experience external material objects, without the mediation of these other sorts of entities.
		Perhaps the sort of direct presence to the mind that is involved in the idea of immediate experience considered earlier yields the result that one's beliefs or awarenesses concerning the objects of such experience are automatically justified, simply because there is no room for error to creep in.
		Such reliabilist views might in a way be viewed as versions of direct realism, but it is less misleading to simply regard them as rejecting the issue which all three of the more traditional theories attempt to respond to: the issue of how sensory experience provides a reason for thinking that perceptual beliefs are true.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/perception-episprob (6956 words)

	Don't Go There
		Direct realism is not only consistent with the all the known neurophysiological facts, it coheres far better with surrounding and grounding science — and the neuroscience itself — than the Smythian alternative towards which Crooks tends; and it may be had for a reasonable naïve phenomenological cost.
		Direct realism can be had, it seems, at the price of adverbialism.
		Direct realism avoids both the mystery and the metaphysics for what seems — by comparison with competing offers of dualism and despair — a reasonable cost to naïve dualistic beliefs about the object-of-experience.
	members.aol.com /lshauser/dontgo.html (3424 words)

	LRB \| Jerry Fodor : A Science of Tuesdays (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		If he really wants to mount a respectable attack on cognitive science (or ornithology for that matter) he has to show that the truths it claims to have discovered are spurious, or that they can be explained just as well without appeals to representational mental states and processes.
		Rather, 'in my opinion, "direct realism" is best thought of not as a theory of perception but as a denial of the necessity for and the explanatory value of positing "internal representations" in thought and perception.' (Elsewhere, Putnam says that the defining question is whether, in perception, 'our cognitive powers.
		A last-ditch position might hold that direct realism is a story that applies only to the explanation of veridical perception.
	www.lrb.co.uk /v22/n14/fodo01_.html (2594 words)

	Theory & Psychology (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Many theorists have argued that the existence of error refutes the direct realist thesis that cognition is a relation between an organism and an external state of affairs.
		The constructivist view, widely preferred in contemporary psychology, is that knowledge is pieced together by the mind from inadequate data (commonly termed 'symbols', 'representations' or 'appearances').
		It is only under a direct realist programme that the distinction between error and cognition becomes meaningful: error is not a variety of cognition 'gone wrong', but occurs only in the absence of cognition.
	www.psych.ucalgary.ca /thpsyc/abstracts/abstracts_3.2/Rantzen.html (206 words)

	Perception
		You won’t be able to justify a claim that they correspond to or resemble or give us information about the real world because you won’t (according to this theory) have any direct contact with the real world to compare your perceptions to.
		For the present, I’ll just say that directness does not mean or imply infallibility and is consistent with saying that the quality of our experiences depends on us, on the states of our sensory organs and brains as well as on that of which we are aware.
		If you accept direct realism, there isn’t a general problem (lots of problems in the details) about how we know the natures of the things we perceive.
	personal.bgsu.edu /~roberth/perception.html (489 words)

	The Function of Conscious Experience
		In particular, whether the world of experience is the external world itself, as suggested by direct realism, or whether it is merely a virtual- reality replica of that world in an internal representation, as in indirect realism, or representationalism.
		The problem with the direct realist view is of an epistemological nature, and is therefore a more fundamental objection, for direct realism is nothing short of magical, that we can see the world out beyond the sensory surface.
		It accounts for the realism known to common sense, by the fact that the phenomenal world, while truly internal and shut-in within the physical brain, nevertheless accurately reflects certain geometrical aspects of the external world, which is thereby knowable indirectly through its perceptual replica.
	cns-alumni.bu.edu /~slehar/webstuff/consc1/consc1a.html (19860 words)

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