| | [No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-26) |
 | | So let's apply the Doomsday argument to Figure 1 If I've parachuted randomly into the world in time as well as in space, and IF this parachuting is considered to be randomly targeted but weighted according to population density by some hypothetical experi menter, then the Doomsday Solution is right. |
 | | The familiar argument says I should say I'm probably near the right wall, wherever that is. In this case, the argument is sound, although again it is not the temporal or spatial character of the scenario that matters but just its episte mological form. |
 | | The difference that this extraneous information makes is that once we've decided that the Doomsday problem, treated as a logical problem, is underdetermined, an appropriate response is to drop the argument but to continue to pursue the sub stantive issue (the human race dying out) by invoking all that extra-logical knowledge. |
| www.usyd.edu.au /hps/preprints/preprint2/Doomsday.txt (4287 words) |