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| | Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 |
 | | The single-echelon formation brought maximum firepower to bear on the forward area, but it also denied the commander the ability to reinforce his defenses, shift laterally to meet threats, or launch counterattacks. |
 | | Rifle divisions defended in one or two echelons of regiments, and rifle regiments in two echelons of battalions supported by artillery groups, antitank strongpoints and regions, artillery antitank reserves, and mobile obstacle detachments. |
 | | The deeply echeloned infantry in well-constructed defenses that were laced with antitank weapons, supported by an improving array of armor and artillery, and backed up by operational and strategic reserves, exacted an awful toll on attacking German units. |
| www-cgsc.army.mil /carl/resources/csi/glantz2/glantz2.asp (13301 words) |
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