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Topic: Epistemic justification

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	20th WCP: The Significance and Priority of Evidential Basis in Epistemic Justification
		Now, context of justification has a complicated structure, and in my opinion one effective way of inquiring about the concept of justification could be to investigate it in a definite, problematic case of justification; for instance, in trying to solve a paradox of justification one could understand the notion of justification better.
		It could be seen that in an epistemic context they did not compromise with each other, because the individual justifications on the grounds of the high probabilities of belief-propositions/events were overridden by the low probability of the conjunction of them.
		In conclusion, justification means to build a bridge between the subject side (believing/belief internally) and the object side (external facts related with a specific case), since S (the believer) is connected with the factual realm in believing and her beliefs are about some facts related with the case.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoKutl.htm (4793 words)

	Internalism Defended
		Likewise, the epistemic internalist is principally opposed to the existence of any justification determining role for plainly external factors such as the general accuracy of the mechanism that produces a given belief or the belief's environmental origin.
		According to deontological conceptions of epistemic justification, one has a justified belief in a proposition when one deserves praise (or does not deserve blame) for having the belief or when it is one's duty or obligation to believe that proposition (or believing it violates no duty or obligation).
		The "epistemizing" sense of justification is said by Goldman to be a sense according which a belief that is justified is one that has been carried "a good distance toward knowledge." This fits with our initial characterization of epistemic justification as the sort that is necessary for knowledge.
	www.ling.rochester.edu /~feldman/papers/intdef.html (11829 words)

	Practicing Safe Epistemology (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained.
		These additional epistemically valued states are "objective" in much the sense that reliability in the actual world is. We here develop a way of thinking about one such epistemic value and suggest that it may also have an important role in our thinking about an agent being objectively justified in holding a given belief.
		The pragmatic justification of induction supposes that we have observational input from the world that is to be trusted; thus, for purposes of the argument, it is supposed that we are in a non-demon-world.
	www.people.memphis.edu /~dkhndrsn/safepist.html (14977 words)

	Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification
		Coherentists typically hold that justification is solely a function of some relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged beliefs in the way maintained by foundationlists, with different varieties of coherentism individuated by the specific relationship among beliefs appealed to by that version.
		Premise 1 assumes that justification is linear rather than holistic in virtue of characterizing justification in terms of inferential chains of reasons, and it is this feature of the regress problem to which typical coherentists object.
		One obvious fact about justification is that not all beliefs are justified to the same degree, so once we know what the overall coherence level is for a system of beliefs, we will need some further account of how this overall coherence level is used to determine the justificatory level of particular beliefs.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/justep-coherence (6996 words)

	Philosophy 180 Sample Exam 2
		A characterization of epistemic justification in terms of epistemic probability amounts to the claim that a belief is justified if its degree of justification is sufficiently high.
		To the contrary, externalism contends that epistemic justification is based, in part, on the goal of acquiring beliefs that are probably true.
		In seeking to provide a complete account of epistemic justification that withstands the force of intuitively persuasive counterexamples, neither probabilism nor reliabilism succeeds in satisfying the externalist intuition that the goal of epistemic evaluation is to ensure that our beliefs are probably true.
	www.csus.edu /indiv/m/mayesgr/phl180sampexam3.htm (3080 words)

	Phil 211: Class #11 - Epistemic justification
		Epistemic probabilities, in contrast, our degrees of justification relative to a body of evidence and attach to propositions.
		It makes requirements for justification to stringent) so the deontologist reasonable position of claiming that the doctor's belief was epistemically justified even no false and, a position not allowed by Alston's criteria.
		To so in reply to Alston's original criticism that deontological justification is not truth conducive, the deontologist can reply that, in fact, it is epistemically truth conducive, simply not factually truth conducive which is an undesirable result anyway.
	www.arts.uwaterloo.ca /~celiasmi/courses/old_courses/WashU/Phil211/class11.html (2153 words)

	THREE KINDS OF INTERNALISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
		Call any condition that is necessary for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at time t) a J-factor with respect to S and p (at t).
		(Access Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification): Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following: For S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that S have reflective access to the holding of all J-factors with respect to S and p (at t).
		Epistemic justification is: (1) "nearly always" directly recognizable (Why "nearly always"); (2) deontological; (3) evidentialist.
	faculty.washington.edu /wtalbott/phil450/trinternal.htm (404 words)

	Evidentialism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		As evidentialism is a thesis about epistemic justification, it is a thesis about what it takes for one to believe justifiably, or reasonably, in the sense thought to be necessary for knowledge.
		One may here appeal to the distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification in an effort to motivate the claim that the detective is justified in believing that Jones did it and the student is justified in believing that the argument is valid.
		This is a sustained explication and defense of a novel evidentialist theory of the structure of epistemic justification.
	www.iep.utm.edu /e/evidenti.htm (8022 words)

	Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		Philosophers have sometimes construed the problems of justification as though they were problems concerning the knowledge possessed by a social group; and it does of course make perfectly good sense to ask what statements we (e.g., you and I, our "culture circle," etc.) are justified in believing, and why we are justified in believing them.
		It is a matter of some importance, which we shall consider later, that Lewis often discusses the problems of epistemic justification as problems concerning judgments, and may thus be restricting his attention to the epistemic status of statements that are actually believed (judged to he true) by a particular person at a particular time.
		A position of this kind seems to me to avoid Lewis's logical objection to the coherence theory of justification and thus to demonstrate that the issue between this theory and the thesis of epistemic priority must ultimately be decided on purely empirical grounds.
	www.ditext.com /firth/firth.html (2916 words)

	Certain Doubts » justification (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		An epistemic obligation principle cites certain conditions in its antecedent, and has as consequent the claim that believing a certain proposition is required or obligatory.
		Suppose we think of epistemic principles as (propositional analogues of) rules of belief formation and revision (including reasoning but not limited to it), and that there is a difference between belief change in accord with a rule and belief change that follows a rule.
		You have settled justification when your total evidence justifies your belief and also justifies you in thinking that your belief is justified, true, and ungettiered (i.e., your justification is not accidentally related to the truth of your belief in the way that leads to the intuition that you don’t know).
	bengal-ng.missouri.edu /~kvanvigj/certain_doubts/index.php?cat=2 (3388 words)

	Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification
		If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1.
		If foundationalists are united in their conviction that there must be a kind of justification that does not depend on the having of other justified beliefs, they nevertheless disagree radically among themselves as to how to understand noninferential justification.
		Noninferential justification is, after all, a kind of justification and if the impossibility of error is essential to noninferential justification, it may be more plausible to locate the source of infallibility in a special kind of justification available in support of a belief.
	www.science.uva.nl /~seop/archives/win2004/entries/justep-foundational (5448 words)

	ipedia.com: Epistemology Article (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		This might turn out to be true - and there might be a connection between the truth and the belief in it, if the patient's optimistic attitude helped bring about this confirmation.
		Still, most philosophers today would probably say that the patient did not have knowledge that he would get well before he did - because there was not enough justification, or warrant, for the belief.
		In the aftermath of the publication of the Gettier problems and other similar scenarios a number of new definitions were formulated.
	www.ipedia.com /epistemology_1.html (2168 words)

	Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification
		It should be noted, however, that the presupposition that the structure of knowledge parallels the structure of justification is controversial.
		Justification may have foundations but only because we end a regress of justification with propositions that are known—the evidential foundational on which all justified belief rests is knowledge (186).
		The coherence theorist rejects the foundationalist's presupposition that justification is linear.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/justep-foundational (5994 words)

	Democracy and Epistemic Justification
		On the so-called epistemic conception of democracy, what makes a democratic decision justified is not so much the fact that the decision procedure allows everyone to participate and that the procedure is fair in certain ways, but rather that the decision is likely to be "correct" by some procedure-independent standard.
		The classical argument in favour of the epistemic conception of democracy is given by the Condorcet jury theorem.
		However, the grand question underlying the discussion will be whether it is appropriate to think that the aim of democracy should be to "track the truth".
	www.nuff.ox.ac.uk /users/list/konstanz_lectures.htm (317 words)

	OUP: Epistemic Justification: Swinburne
		He maps the various totally different and purportedly rival accounts that philosophers give of epistemic justification ('internalist' and 'externalist'), and argues that they are really accounts of different concepts.
		He distinguishes (as most epistemologists do not) between synchronic justification (justification at a time) and diachronic justification (synchronic justification resulting from adequate investigation) -- both internalist and externalist.
		He argus that most kinds of justification are worth having because (for different reasons) indicative of truth.
	www.oup.co.uk /isbn/0-19-924379-4 (417 words)

	Epistemic Justification Review and price
		In Epistemic Justification, Richard Swinburne defends his version of epistemic internalism while also trying to account for the intuitions motivating externalist theories.
		He notes at the outset that our concepts of knowledge and justification are ambiguous: a belief may count as "justified" in one sense but not in another.
		In fact, it is disappointing that the book does not say more about the epistemology of religion in general, since this area of expertise sets Swinburne apart from many others writing on epistemology today (particularly internalists).
	www.wi-fitechnology.com /Wi-Fi-Products-0199243794.html (597 words)

	Open Directory - Society: Philosophy: Epistemology (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority - By Roderick Firth.
		Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification - Survey of theories according to which knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief.
		KLI Theory Lab - Data base that allows scientific literature search in the domain of evolution and cognition, thus indexing the litterature in Evolutionary Epistemology.
	dmoz.org /Society/Philosophy/Epistemology (572 words)

	Gourt :: Society :: Philosophy :: Epistemology
		Quantum Mechanics and the End of Modern Dualism: From History and Philosophy of Science, Fall, 1997.
		Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority: By Roderick Firth.
		Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification: Survey of theories according to which knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief.
	society.gourt.com /Philosophy/Epistemology.html (547 words)

	Academic Integration Page: Christian Scholarship: Knowledge, Reality, and Method
		Alston’s published articles number more than one hundred and range over many topics including the problem of evil, realism, epistemic warrant and justification, divine action, and religious language to name a few.
		Five recent books include: A Realistic Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Perceiving God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. Press, 1991); Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. Press, 1989); and Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. Press, 1989).
		His works have been cited for "combining subtle and detailed argument with comparative brevity."
	www.leaderu.com /aip/conference.html (379 words)

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