
	Where results make sense

Topic: Epistemic minimalism

Related Topics

YtseJam Records

Oology

IKEA

Salihorsk

San Diego Chargers

Brent

Contraindicated

290

In the News (Mon 7 Dec 09)

Northern Trust

Marvin Harrison

Peter Chernin

Gary Locke

Match Play

Penelope Cruz

Mickey Rourke

AR Rahman

Danny Boyle

Hugh Jackman

	Epistemic minimalism - Biocrawler (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Epistemic minimalism is the epistemological thesis that mere true belief is sufficient for knowledge.
		Epistemic minimalism turns in exactly the opposite direction, and argues for a much more inclusive analysis--one which includes even Gettier cases, lucky guesses, and completely unjustified beliefs, as long as they happen to be true.
		The thesis is a minimalism in the sense that it eschews the additional requirements piled on top of true belief and argues that the intuitive reasons given for the JTB analysis and its descendents are either misleading or misunderstood.
	www.biocrawler.com /encyclopedia/Epistemic_minimalism (287 words)

	Epistemic minimalism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Epistemic minimalism is the epistemological thesis that mere true belief is sufficient for knowledge.
		Epistemic minimalism turns in exactly the opposite direction, and argues for a much more inclusive analysis--one which includes even Gettier cases, lucky guesses, and completely unjustified beliefs, as long as they happen to be true.
		The thesis is a minimalism in the sense that it eschews the additional requirements piled on top of true belief and argues that the intuitive reasons given for the JTB analysis and its descendents are either misleading or misunderstood.
	bopedia.com /en/wikipedia/e/ep/epistemic_minimalism.html (368 words)

	IngentaConnect Confidence in unwarranted knowledge
		Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge.
		I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others.
		I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan's objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence.
	www.ingentaconnect.com /content/klu/erke/2006/00000065/00000002/00009007 (152 words)

	CHAPTER 7: Contemporary Moral and Epistemic Irrealisms
		They think that, given the moral and epistemic discourses’ similarities, i.e., they are both what they call “normative” or “evaluative” discourses, arguments for either position suggest comparable arguments for the other, or that the same kind of argument justifies a general kind of irrealism about the normative or evaluative.
		I argued that the hypothesis that epistemic judgments are, first, either true or false (i.e., cognitivism) is more plausible than its denial (i.e., non-cognitivism) and that, second, that there’s more reason to think that epistemic judgments are sometimes true than never true and, third, that the best candidates for these truth-makers are stance-independent epistemic facts.
		I have argued that admitting epistemic facts and properties is not only merely tolerable, but a precondition for argumentation and reasoning since their denial could not be coherently argued for by reflective people.
	homepage.uab.edu /nnobis/papers/dissertation/ch7.html (9679 words)

	Minimal Epistemology: Precis
		Minimal epistemology starts by conceding to the skeptic, provisionally, not only that nothing is known, but that nothing is justified even in the weak sense of being merely more likely true than not.
		Minimal epistemology emphasizes "prerequisites for truth" -- conditions that are logically necessary for a belief to be true.
		Anything that is not a logically necessary condition of the truth of the explanatory hypothesis is excluded from consideration in the repeated culling or filtering of the rivals in K as regards the extent to which they have survived so far in the trial by prerequisites for truth.
	www.vanderbilt.edu /~postjf/precistphil.htm (3524 words)

	Encyclopedia :: encyclopedia : Epistemology
		Epistemology, from the Greek words episteme (knowledge) and logos (word/speech) is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge.
		This distinction is often traced back to Plato, who used the term techne or skill for knowledge how, and the term episteme for a more robust kind of knowledge in which claims can be true or false.
		from the Greek words episteme (knowledge) and logos (word/speech) is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge.
	www.hallencyclopedia.com /topic/Epistemology.html (3882 words)

	Self-Ascriptions as Self-Express
		Given that a speaker with an adequate command of appropriate concepts sincerely says that he is, or that he is not, in a certain intentional state, his utterance is presumed to be true.
		For in general the mere fact that a property is capable of being instantiated by a subject does not confer a presumption of truth on his sincere claim that he instantiates it.
		An apparent corollary of minimalism is that a meaningful sentence is truth-assessable or truth-apt—i.e., apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity—as long as it is a suitable substitute for ‘p’ in DS.
	facweb.bcc.ctc.edu /wpayne/selfascriptions_as_selfexpress.htm (2639 words)

	Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
		Minimalism about truth plus the non-cognitivist account of the use of moral utterances secures the first requirement, while the indicative form of the relevant atomic moral sentences plus our linguistic practices of allowing them to embed wherever predicative sentences embed secures the latter.
		Minimalism allows us to generate a minimal truth condition for any meaningful indicative sentence, such as ‘Lying is wrong’ is true iff lying is wrong.
		If minimal truth conditionality is all that is needed for a domain of discourse to count as factual, then moral discourse will be factual and semantic nonfactualism about morality and normativity will be mistaken (Divers and Miller 1994).
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/moral-cognitivism (15420 words)

	Truth - Wikipedia (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		This is an example of the Epistemic Conception of Truth and is called the coherence theory, and is associated with the Idealist school of philosophers, such as Hegel and so on.
		Another epistemic theory was introduced by American philosophers, Charles Peirce (pronounced "purse") and William James, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
		Pragmatism is another example of the Epistemic Conception of Truth, since it closely relates the notion of truth to the notions of belief and justification.
	wikipedia.findthelinks.com /tr/Truth.html (4120 words)

	Certain Doubts » Minimalism about Intuitions (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		While investigating the nature of fundamental beliefs whose source is opaque is an interesting project, I think it might be a different project from that of investigating what philosophers are up to when they appeal to our intuitions in support of their views or in thinking about counterexamples.
		I admit that I am unhappy with the term “minimalism”, since given Paul Horwich’s success in using that term as a name for deflationary outlooks, it is apt to be misleading.
		S doesn’t know, justified (or have some other positive epistemic status), rather than saying that it is your grasp of the concept that causes you to find it believable that S doesn’t know.
	bengal-ng.missouri.edu /~kvanvigj/certain_doubts/index.php?p=344 (6263 words)

	Learn more about Truth in the online encyclopedia. (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		A related class of epistemic theories of truth, popular with sociologists and those who emphasize that all statements are social, interpersonal acts, is the Consensus Theory of Truth.
		Two further epistemic theories of truth were introduced by the American philosophers, Charles Peirce (pronounced "purse") and William James in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
		But this survey introduces you to the terrain: among different conceptions of truth there are the correspondence conception, the deflationary conception (including the redundancy theory, minimalism and disquotationalism), Tarski's semantic conception and the epistemic conception (including the coherence and consensus theories and pragmatism).
	www.onlineencyclopedia.org /t/tr/truth.html (4828 words)

	John Shoemaker - papers
		In the second section, I discuss the notion that truth is a gappy predicate of sentences and suggest that this puts pressure on the expressivist to reject minimalism.
		In the third section, there is a rather fuzzy discussion of the effect that minimalism has on a distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive expressions, a distinction built into the expressivism.
		Having explained these two aspects of Reid’s theory and attempting to unify them, I consider two puzzles for his view, each of which threatens to show that Reid’s insistence on the immediacy of perception is incompatible with his theory of sensations as signs.
	mail.rochester.edu /~jshoemak/papers.html (2512 words)

	FELIX CULPA: LUCK IN ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
		Since some virtue epistemologists maintain that both the causal history and efficacy of a person and her motivational states are important in conferring virtue, both internalist and externalist requirements must be satisfied in the possession of virtue.
		…when the knowing-self moves to center stage, epistemic evaluation, whether it is of beliefs or of character, cannot function within the constraints of a strict internalism.
		An ideal epistemic agent has beliefs formed by reliable processes, is cognitively well-integrated because ‘properly affected’ or attuned to her environment, and seeks to acquire virtuous habits or dispositions both for their own sake and as a means of appropriately basing her reflective beliefs on good reasons.
	www.scs.unr.edu /~axtell/AxtellApril03.htm (7192 words)

	ARPA: New threats to truth or just the old ones?
		1) Epistemic relativism about justification holds that what counts as justification (or evidence) for a claim can change with context (for example, the availability of evidence, the difficulty and importance of obtaining it, our audience, our standards of evidence and so on)—a position that is fully consistent with belief in non-relative truth.
		It is perhaps worth briefly considering BandS’s hasty dismissal of the last figure on this list, Richard Rorty, if only to suggest that the author’s polemical agenda often gets in the way of the accuracy of their characterisations.
		Minimalism is motivated, in part, by the difficulty philosophers have had in providing a plausible metaphysical account of truth.
	www.australianreview.net /digest/2006/10/macarthur.html (3578 words)

	Truth, Prosentential Theory of [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		Epistemic theories of truth always have epistemic operators (e.g., ‘justifiably believes that…,’ ‘warrantedly asserts that…’) of some sort on the right-hand side of their analyses of truth.
		In the eyes of prosentential theorists, epistemic theories of truth are incompatible with the equivalence schemata and their instances.
		Grover claims that the truth predicate is not used to ascribe a property to propositions, but this is compatible with the truth predicate expressing a property in a minimal sense (à la Horwich) nonetheless.
	www.utm.edu /research/iep/t/truthpro.htm (6647 words)

	[No title]
		However, I think the most striking way to exhibit the epistemic character of Dennett's perspectivalism is to contrast it with that of a philosopher whose perspectivalism about the mental is clearly non-epistemic, namely Ryle.
		But semantic and ontological minimalism undercut this conception at its foundation; for they entail that our notions of truth, factuality, existence and the like are simply too insubstantial to bear the metaphysical weight.
		Having rightly taken Wittgenstein's minimalism to provide a reason for not asking one sort of question, they wrongly take it to provide a reason for asking no questions at all--or else simply fail to notice that there is another question to be asked.
	www.usyd.edu.au /time/price/preprints/psych.html (5666 words)

	Philosophy of Mind publications
		However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or nonscientific.
		Southern Fundamentalism, a form of realism about folk psychology, asserts that there is only a minimal conceptual gap between (1) satisfying ordinary, behavior-based standards for the attribution of propositional attitutdes, and (2) being a true believer; hence it is overwhelmingly likely that there are true believers.
		Under Southern Fundamentalism, the integrity of folk psychology is not threatened by debates about whether folk psychology is destined to become part of mature science, whether there is a language of thought, or whether any other of the strong empirical commitments sometimes attributed to folk psychology are satisfied.
	minimalism.linguistics.arizona.edu /~thorgan/publications/philofmind.htm (2272 words)

	Department of Computer Science, University of Otago, New Zealand
		The theory of Minimalism is used to map sentences onto an underlying syntactic structure.
		We start with a very concise introduction in epistemic logic, by the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge.
		We investigate the effect of certain epistemic actions on such models, with special interest for minimality of the resulting models and the stream of information between groups of agents.
	www.cs.otago.ac.nz /research/techreports.html (8175 words)

	Habits vs Preferences as Predictors of Choice
		I shall then argue for a conception of political legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension in deliberative democracy seriously, but that avoids procedure-independent standards.
		It is argued that both standard versions of hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesian confirmation theory are too permissive, in that they allow for the confirmation of irrelevant conjunctions, and too restrictive, in that they do not guarantee that confirmation is transmitted over all the content of a confirmed hypothesis.
		We cannot, save in exceptional cases, know the micro-derived chances for macro-level events; and even if we could know them, there is no good argument to show that they, rather than the macro-level chances, deserve to guide our expectations.
	www.lse.ac.uk /collections/CPNSS/events/Abstracts/PopperSeminar.htm (570 words)

	John MacFarlane - Papers
		According to Semantic Minimalism, every use of "Chiara is tall" (fixing the girl and the time) semantically expresses the same proposition, the proposition that Chiara is (just plain) tall.
		Current debates about the semantics of knowledge-attributing sentences center on whether the epistemic standards relevant to the truth of such sentences vary with the context of use, the circumstances of evaluation, or neither.
		On the semantics I propose, the relevant epistemic standard varies not with the context of use, but with the context of assessment: the concrete context in which an utterance is being assessed for truth or falsity.
	sophos.berkeley.edu /macfarlane/papers.html (1173 words)

	epistemic - OneLook Dictionary Search
		epistemic : The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language [home, info]
		epistemic : Glossary of research economics [home, info]
		Phrases that include epistemic: epistemic modality, epistemic closure principles, epistemic minimalism, epistemic mood, epistemic moods, more...
	www.onelook.com /?w=epistemic&ls=a (141 words)

	LastWords.com: Read » NaNovel
		Deconstruction is put into a perspective as fictional universe where the epic evolved the blindness and sapientilaized into a literature of Greece, and then fractured into faulting plates of one-day-novel written as Ulysses in a mimetic mode of being akin to Homer, but realistic as life through the day of Stephen Daedalus, Bloom and Molly.
		In the Nanovel, the epic, poem, novel, is reduced to a minimalism of a threshold, -'Nano' which is below a second.
		Art- The decadence of the posture; the memory of an imposition; the tribunal through a repetition; the still life: stilling life; the occurrence to another origin is still a rupture, like a little creation being closer.
	www.lastwords.com /servlet/LastWords/action/Document/id/7590 (330 words)

	Lunchtime Seminar Abstracts
		Emma Borg - Referential Intentions, Semantic Minimalism and Epistemic Behaviourism
		First, the assumption that speaker intentions determine reference in these cases may be rejected; second, it may be held that current speaker intentions are relevant but that they can be accommodated within a formal semantic theory; third, reference determination and semantic content may be held strictly apart.
		I argue that the first two of these moves, respectively termed ‘conventionalism’ and ‘epistemic behaviourism’, are flawed but that the third move provides an appealing way for the formal semanticist to accommodate the content of context-sensitive terms.
	www.philosophy.sas.ac.uk /Lunchtime_Seminar_Abstracts.htm (1358 words)

	[No title]
		Moderate explanatory rationalism Peacocke distinguish two radically different general types of rationalist answer to the question about the relation between a priori ways of coming to know and the identity of the concepts in the content that is known, namely: minimalism and moderate rationalism.
		According to the moderate rationalist, for any a priori way of coming to know that p, there is a substantive explanation of why it is a way of coming to know that has a priori status, an explanation which involves the nature of the concepts in p (first component of the moderate rationalist’s view; p.
		Yet since according to minimalists —even those who insist that grasp of concepts explains acceptance of a priori principles— there is no feature of meaning and understanding which explains a priori status, they cannot account for the rationality of accepting an a priori principle.
	www.ub.es /grc_logos/activities/handouts/PeacockeII.doc (968 words)

	Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter (eds.) - Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth - Reviewed by Wayne A. ...
		In "Epistemic Modals in Context," Andy Egan, John Hawthorne, and Brian Weatherson discuss a cousin of epistemic contextualism concerned with epistemic modals, as when Stanley says "Livingston might be in Rhodesia." These seem as context sensitive as knowledge claims.
		In general, epistemic modals are true or false only relative to a "context of evaluation." On this view, however, an epistemic modal appears to express an open proposition (with an unbound variable), which is not something that can be believed, nor something that can be true even relative to a context of evaluation.
		If semantic minimalism is true, then epistemic contextualism is false, and problems for invariantism are problems for Cappelen and Lepore.
	ndpr.nd.edu /review.cfm?id=6925 (2369 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Third, alethic minimalism’s employment of the equivalence schema and its substitution instances confuse explananda with explanans.
		Alethic minimalism Alethic minimalism is constituted by the infinite conjunction of “principles” patterned on the equivalence schema, (ES) the proposition that p is true iff p.
		Horwich is sometimes accused of having formulated a non-deflationary theory because of his claim that a truth predicate names an alethic property, which departs from traditional deflationary doctrine.
	www.stanford.edu /~dlafave/truth.doc (2800 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)