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Topic: Epistemic probabilities

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	SPT v8n1: Philosophical Perspectives on Risk by Sven Ove Hansson
		By an objectivist probability is meant a probability that is interpreted as an objective frequency or propensity, and thus not (merely) as a degree of belief.
		Therefore, strictly speaking, the only clear-cut cases of "risk" (known probabilities) seem to be idealized textbook cases that refer to devices such as dice or coins that are supposed to be known with certainty to be fair.
		One possible approach to all this epistemic uncertainty, and perhaps at first hand the most attractive one, is that we should always take all uncertainty that there is into account, and that all decisions should be treated as decisions under epistemic uncertainty.
	scholar.lib.vt.edu /ejournals/SPT/v8n1/hansson.html (9081 words)

	Principle of maximum entropy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		These arguments take the use of epistemic probability as given, and thus have no force if the concept of epistemic probability is itself under question.
		Now, in order to reduce the 'graininess' of the epistemic probability assignment, it will be necessary to use quite a large number of quanta of epistemic probability.
		She has found that the maximum entropy distribution is the most probable of all "fair" random epistemic distributions, in the limit as the probability levels go from discrete to continuous.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Principle_of_maximum_entropy (1581 words)

	Certain Doubts » Rational Acceptance and Conjunctive/Disjunctive Absorption (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		The non-comparability of probability is the starting point for this work in progress, which is a study of conjunction and disjunction for rationally accepted propositions understood to be an event’s lower probability.
		He develps a nonstandard probability calculus in which the probabiilty of a conjunction is equal to its least probable conjunct.
		In consequence, one couldn’t compare the probability of P on E with the probability of Q on E, even though these probabilities are each defined for their “correct” measures.
	bengal-ng.missouri.edu /~kvanvigj/certain_doubts/index.php?p=282 (3478 words)

	ipedia.com: Probability Article (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		Some examples of epistemic probability are to assign a probability to the proposition that a proposed law of physics is true, and to determine how "probable" it is that a suspect committed a crime, based on the evidence presented.
		Probabilities are equivalently expressed as odds, which is the ratio of the probability of one event to the probability of all other events.
		Governments typically apply probability methods in environment regulation where it is called "pathway analysis", and are often measuring well-being using methods that are stochastic in nature, and choosing projects to undertake based on their perceived probable effect on the population as a whole, statistically.
	www.ipedia.com /probability.html (2519 words)

	STATS 246.3 - Glossary (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		The probability distribution of the number of distinctive units in a simple random sample from a finite population.
		Of two events, the property that the probability of their intersection is the product of their probabilities; of a collection of more than two events, the property that the probability of the intersection of any subcollection is the product of their respective probabilities.
		The probability of occurrence of a disease in the presence of a putative causal agent divided by the probability of occurrence in the absence of the agent.
	math.usask.ca /~bickis/courses/stats246/glossdef.html (4724 words)

	The probability of an event occurring is represented by a rational number if it can be associated with random drawing ... (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		Every one of the probabilities indicating whether the event had the observed value on a particular classification variable is itself the sum of an unlimited number of probabilities each corresponding to one of the distinguishable combinations of classifications that include the observed value on the current variable.
		In the probability model it is supposed that uncertainty surrounding the arrival of a bus is completely specified by the route it is on (1, 2 or 3) and whether it is a single or double-decker bus as shown in table 1.
		Probability models were conceived of as idealised games of chance which people use to characterise uncertainty but which are not complex enough to encompass all aspects of their beliefs.
	www.stir.ac.uk /staff/psychology/rrm1/lpmrev.html (10830 words)

	Truth
		Epistemic probability might be probably false on the evidence that the weather forecast reported a 70% chance of rain.
		Epistemic probability might be almost certainly false based on the evidence in his resume and letters of recommendation.
		Epistemic probability might be very probably true on the evidence that it's that hay fever time of year and not many colds are going round from all I've heard.
	members.aol.com /wutsamada2/crithink/wilson9.htm (3262 words)

	Phil 211: Class #11 - Epistemic justification
		Epistemic probabilities, in contrast, our degrees of justification relative to a body of evidence and attach to propositions.
		Thus, perceptual beliefs are typically probable and because there are laws of nature which determine that such beliefs and are likely to be probable.
		In that case, than the deontologist could reply that it is impossible for one to belief in in accordance with the evidence while not believing what is epistemically probable.
	www.arts.uwaterloo.ca /~celiasmi/courses/old_courses/WashU/Phil211/class11.html (2153 words)

	Philosophy 180 Sample Exam 2
		A characterization of epistemic justification in terms of epistemic probability amounts to the claim that a belief is justified if its degree of justification is sufficiently high.
		The second form Pollock considers is subjective probability as actual degree of belief; under this interpretation, the simple rule assigns epistemic justification in relation to the firmness with which one holds a belief.
		When the higher-order probability of our inference is evaluated with the probabilities of our premises, we run into the same problem as with modus ponens, in that deductive inference from multi-premise arguments are not probabilistically invalid.
	www.csus.edu /indiv/m/mayesgr/phl180sampexam3.htm (3080 words)

	Sleeping Beauty Awakened: Why the New Day Brings New Odds
		Dorr employs a ‘soritical argument by analogy’: he appeals to the alleged parallelism between a case he constructs, in which it seems intuitively clear that the probabilities of HEADS and TAILS respectively are 1/3 and 2/3, and the original Sleeping Beauty case—where the putative analogy is bolstered by a sorites sequence of intermediate cases.
		Exclusion of epistemic possibilities counts as acquisition of new information, in the context of ascertaining probabilities on the basis of current evidence.
		irreducibly indexical: because ‘today’ is essentially indexical for her, some statements in the partition have probabilities (both prior probabilities and current probabilities) different from the probabilities of the corresponding non-indexical statements that result from replacing essential indexicals by co-referential non-indexicals.
	dingo.sbs.arizona.edu /~thorgan/papers/Beauty.htm (4088 words)

	Philosophy and Probability - International Summer School 2002 at the University of Konstanz
		We should reject Kolmogorov's axiomatization of probability, and in particular his taking unconditional probability as primitive; instead, conditional probability is the proper primitive of probability theory, and it should be axiomatized directly.
		On the so-called epistemic conception of democracy, what makes a democratic decision justified is not so much the fact that the decision procedure allows everyone to participate and that the procedure is fair in certain ways, but rather that the decision is likely to be "correct" by some procedure-independent standard.
		The classical argument in favour of the epistemic conception of democracy is given by the Condorcet jury theorem.
	www.uni-konstanz.de /ppm/summerschool2002/program.htm (3395 words)

	Probabilistic update, Epistemic Update, Old Evidence, Logical Omniscience, Bayesian Learning, Fenrong Liu (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		The theory of epistemic actions of Baltag, Moss and Solecki (1) seems to be a natural framework to study probabilistic actions as well.
		Such probabilistic epistemic actions may be observations about a probabilistic processes, communication acts that are about probabilities or happen with a certain probability, etc. To extend the theory of epistemic actions with probabilities, there are several choices to be made.
		There are two obvious options: (A) the probabilities express 'Bayes factors', 'rates of change' that say to what extend we should change the prior probabilities, or (B) they are Jeffrey-style probabilities that tell us what the posterior probabilities must look like.
	www.illc.uva.nl /lgc/IPEU.html (1035 words)

	Contextualism in Epistemology [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet) in order for such a statement to be true.
		An alternative (to p) h is relevant if the probability of h conditional on reason r and certain features of the circumstances is sufficiently high (where the level of probability that is sufficient is determined by context).
		S knows that p if and only if her belief that p is epistemically rational to some degree d, where epistemic rationality has both an evidential and a non-evidential component, and where d is determined by context.
	www.iep.utm.edu /c/contextu.htm (9878 words)

	Bayesian Epistemology
		The assumption that degrees of belief satisfy the probability laws implies omniscience about deductive logic, because the probability laws require that all deductive logical truths have probability one, all deductive inconsistencies have probability zero, and the probability of any conjunction of sentences be no greater than any of its deductive consequences.
		Objective Bayesians are the intellectual heirs of the advocates of a Principle of Indifference for probability.
		There seem to be at least two different concepts of probability: the probability that is involved in degrees of belief (epistemic or subjective probability) and the probability that is involved in random events, such as the tossing of a coin (chance).
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/epistemology-bayesian (4863 words)

	What Monte Carlo Cannot Do: Introduction to Imprecise Probabilities
		This tutorial introduces the notions of interval-valued probability and imprecisely specified probability distributions and reviews their uses in risk analysis.
		It will address the approaches of interval probabilities, probability bounds analysis, Dempster-Shafer theory, robust Bayes methods, and the theory of imprecise probabilities.
		This full-day tutorial introduces the notions of interval-valued probabilities and imprecisely specified probability distributions and their uses in risk analysis.
	www.ramas.com /ippalmsprings.htm (1094 words)

	Objectivity and descriptional relativities
		The approach exposed in this work is probably the very first one in which a systematic representation of the processes of creation of knowledge is founded on strategic data drawn from physics, and correlatively, is constructed from the start on as a method for the optimization of these processes themselves, accordingly to definite aims.
		It became increasingly clear that objectivity in the classical sense was an illusion ; that scientific knowledge is constructed under certain constraints that characterize the epistemic situation and the epistemic aim of the acting observer-conceptor and imprint upon the result non removable descriptional relativities to this situation and this aim.
		Indeed, once one has clearly perceived the peculiar and very difficult epistemic situation dealt with in quantum mechanics, and the descriptional strategy that permitted to dominate it, by a variation that reminds of those which make appear certain drawings of a cube as sometimes convex and sometimes concave, a very paradoxical inversion arises.
	www.mcxapc.org /docs/conseilscient/mms2.htm (15697 words)

	knowledge and certainty (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		It would seem to be the extreme end segment of a continuum of subjective attitudes to the reasonableness of claims that range from certain rejection to certain acceptance.
		Instead, one turns aside to worry about malign demons or brains in a vat because of a stipulation that error must be avoided, not in normal investigations but in a special philosophical path from experiential knowledge to knowledge of the external world.
		It is this taking for granted of the terms of the problem that gives sceptical hypotheses their bite — indeed, on those terms they are probably unanswerable since everything we have to appeal to is by hypothesis the same, demon or no demon.
	www.uwichill.edu.bb /bnccde/ph29a/ph29acertainty.htm (1574 words)

	ISIPTA '99: Electronic Proceedings (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-22)
		The aim of this paper is that of studying a notion of independence for imprecise probabilities which is essentially based on the intuitive meaning of this concept.
		This is expressed, in the case of two events, by the reciprocal irrelevance of the knowledge of the value of each event for evaluating the other one, and has been termed epistemic independence.
		In order to consider more general situations in the framework of coherent imprecise probabilities, a definition of (epistemic) independence is introduced referring to arbitrary sets of logically independent partitions.
	decsai.ugr.es /~smc/isipta99/proc/024.html (164 words)

	OPP
		It can be thought of as a set of properties that all competent speakers associate with the word that fixes the word's reference, and that accounts for the word's cognitive significance.
		For instance, the epistemic intension of "water" might include the properties of being a clear drinkable liquid predominant in our lakes and rivers.
		I show that there are some counterexamples to this analysis, and that it rests on some fairly contentious theories about the behaviour of vague terms in propositional attitude reports.
	philosophypapers.blogspot.com (2331 words)

	Considering creatures by the name of Hard Cases, we are to assume that their perceptual beliefs are involuntary in the ...
		Because of this, they are not justified in believing what we believe, even though it may be correct with our beliefs 100% of the time by coincidence.
		If we are to view a set of beliefs, we must examine the factual and epistemic probabilities of truth for those beliefs.
		When one examines such probabilities, there is a possibility in running into a problem of mixing and matching externalist thoughts with those of internalist thoughts.
	www.coursework.info /i/47236.html (933 words)

	Fine and Coarse Tuning, Renormalizability and Probabilistic Reasoning
		The probability that the constant should fall in the life-affirming range would then be no bigger than (20.2-8.0)/1000000=0.0000122, because we could reasonably assign a uniform probability measure to the set of possible positive constants (0,1000000).
		p be the probability of the interval (0,1].
		is not a probability measure in the sense of classical probability theory.
	www.georgetown.edu /faculty/ap85/papers/renormalize-talk.html (8282 words)

	Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty
		Conventional Bayesian theory of choice under uncertainty, subjective expected utility theory, fails to satisfy the properties of admissibility and existence of well-defined conditional probabilities; weakly dominated acts may be chosen, and the usual definition of conditional probabilities applies only to nonnull events.
		This generalization can be made to satisfy admissibility and yield well-defined conditional probabilities and at the same time allow for "null" events.
		If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first.
	ideas.repec.org /a/ecm/emetrp/v59y1991i1p61-79.html (822 words)

	Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
		"Non-Archimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol.
		"On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
		"On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol.
	ideas.repec.org /a/ecm/emetrp/v59y1991i1p81-98.html (456 words)

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