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Topic: Epistemic virtue

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  Virtue Epistemology [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
Virtue reliabilists are concerned with traits that are a critical means to intellectual well-being or “flourishing” and virtue responsibilists with traits that are both a means to and are partly constitutive of intellectual flourishing.
Epistemic responsibility, she claims, is the chief intellectual virtue and the virtue "from which other virtues radiate" (44).
Since Code maintains that epistemic responsibility should be the focus of epistemology and thinks of epistemic responsibility in terms of virtuous intellectual character, she views the intellectual virtues as deserving an important and fundamental role in epistemology.
www.iep.utm.edu /v/VirtueEp.htm   (6365 words)

 Harvey Siegel - Is Inclusion an Epistemic Virtue?
I argued that it is not a criterion by which to evaluate epistemic worthiness.
The satisfaction of the other methodological canons enhances epistemic virtue in the first sense; inclusion does not.
However, independently of these epistemic considerations, inclusion of diverse persons/perspectives is also morally required in all cases in which exclusion constitutes a lack of respect for the excluded.
www.ed.uiuc.edu /EPS/PES-Yearbook/97_docs/siegel.html   (1188 words)

 20th WCP: What is Virtue Epistemology?
In Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski announces her intention to construct a "pure virtue epistemology" in which the notions of knowledge and justified belief are analyzed solely in terms of virtue notions.
In epistemology, a virtue theory is a systematic account of the relationships between belief evaluations, and the virtues and vices and that which is good from an epistemic point of view, that establishes the primacy of the virtues.
She thinks the virtues are enduring, acquired excellences of a person that involve the motivation for truth and reliable success in attaining that end of that motivation.
www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuBatt.htm   (3964 words)

 Philosophy @ UIUC - Reza's Dissertation Proposal   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
Virtue epistemology is a recent development in epistemology, distinguished by a focus on the contribution that the character of epistemic agents makes to their epistemic accomplishments.
Virtue epistemologists are united by their belief that the study of intellectual virtues (and vices) should occupy a prominent place (most of them would say the prominent place) in any adequate epistemology.
Virtue epistemologists inquire into the definition and criteria of intellectual virtues (and vices), their various relations to epistemically desirable ends such as knowledge and understanding, and different methods of identifying and classifying them.
www.phil.uiuc.edu /grad/reza.html   (1387 words)

 Virtue Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
As with the moral virtues, it is possible for a conflict among the intellectual virtues to arise.
Specifically, we may understand virtue epistemology primarily as a thesis about the direction of analysis: that the normative properties of beliefs are to be defined in terms of the normative properties of agents, rather than the other way around.
Sosa, E., 1985, "The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence: Justification in Epistemology," Synthese 64: 3-28.
plato.stanford.edu /entries/epistemology-virtue   (8079 words)

 Virtue Epistemology   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
In a pure virtue theory the concept of a right act is defined in terms of the concept of a virtue or a component of virtue such as motivation.
Goldman, Alvin, "The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues" in Fairweather and Zagzebski (2001).
Sosa, Ernest, "The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence: Justification in Epistemology," Synthese 64 (1985): 3-28.
www.science.uva.nl /~seop/archives/spr2004/entries/epistemology-virtue   (5803 words)

 [No title]
If virtue theory is to survive at all, we must assume that people have sufficient control over the development of their own virtue, moral or intellectual, to be responsible for their moral and epistemic character.
The value derived by intellectual virtues is epistemic, and if she lacks this value she has surely not achieved the \'93highest epistemic good.\'94 This is not to deny that having the knowledge and the understanding is also good.
But their intellectual virtue resides in their being the kind of people who sinc erely and conscientiously attempt to find out the truth about things that provide us with a deeper explanation of why those things are the way they are, even when their results ultimately do not turn out to be correct.
www.ou.edu /cas/ouphil/faculty/wriggs/Understanding-revised.rtf   (9703 words)

 Feminist Epistemology [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
What is common to feminist epistemologies is an emphasis on the epistemic salience of gender and the use of gender as an analytic category in discussions, criticisms, and reconstructions of epistemic practices, norms, and ideals.
However, the claim that social marginalization confers epistemic privilege seems to depend on a concept of identity that needs to be grounded in the experience of social marginalization, and this has led to charges that standpoint epistemology cannot avoid assuming a great deal of commonality in the experiences of marginalized groups.
However, the virtue of these approaches is that they allow feminist epistemologists to claim that the gender of the reasoner is epistemically significant, which in turn can support the claim that the fact that women are absent from particular studies.
www.iep.utm.edu /f/fem-epis.htm   (4865 words)

 Simulation and Epistemic Competence   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
It means that the epistemic agent must somehow be sensitive to what other beliefs within that agent’s enormous set of beliefs are relevant to a given candidate belief, and that the agent should then bring these relevant beliefs together in maintaining or rejecting the candidate belief.
Given that the epistemic situation is intrinsically one of uncertainty regarding what the world is like, it is desirable to employ processes that would be reliable in a wide range of possible worlds.
Epistemically, it is not enough to be lucky; one should also be good—and this is to employ processes with the epistemic virtues of robustness and systematicity, as well as reliability.
cas.memphis.edu /philosophy/dkhndrsn/SimulationandEpist.html   (11551 words)

 Religious Imagination and Virtue Epistemology   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
What has recently been called ‘virtue epistemology’; is, by contrast, mainly concerned with the reliability (and not justification) of beliefs, the intellectual qualities of knowers, their motivations and the sense they have of their own responsibility in believing what they believe (and not their right to believe something).
Classical internalist foundationalism is the thesis that epistemic justification is entirely up to the individual, through the internal examination of his or her beliefs, and is within the power of the individual will, subject to the individual’s decision to believe or not to believe.
In virtue epistemology, by contrast, rationality is not confused with reason; rationality is the good epistemic health of the whole person, and not of reason alone.
www.arsdisputandi.org /publish/articles/000054/article.htm   (5183 words)

 Chapter 2
Indeed, an emphasis on the primacy of rationality in the hierarchy of epistemic concepts is one of the hallmarks of internalist metaepistemology.
One advantage of an epistemic interpretation of probability is that it makes evident the relation between probability and truth, since rational confidence is epistemically pertinent to the question of whether a proposition is true or false.
Since an epistemic principle appears at the next epistemic level, he can claim that he does not need to argue for it in order to be justified at the first level.
homepages.wmich.edu /~mcgrew/truth.htm   (10489 words)

Virtue Epistemology (VE) is committed to the proposition that an epistemic agent possesses knowledge if and only if she is exercising intellectual virtue in coming to hold a belief.
The divisions we see within virtue epistemoloy are largerly explainable in terms of disagreements over which general concpet of virtue to use in defining the particular virtue of Intellectual Virtue.
I consider three plausible analyses of virtue: (1) as the excellence of a faculty (2) as a skill (3) as a state of character.
www.usfca.edu /philosophy/bio13.htm   (366 words)

 Virtue Epistemology
Greco rolls up his sleves to explain the 'because of'; he provides a carefully thought through account that makes recourse to the requirement that the exhibition of intellectual virtue be explanatorily salient in a causal explanation for why the agent came to form the true belief.
The second objection, if not met, would cast the stone from the other side: there would be cases of knowledge that, by virtue of not requiring an achievement, would be bereft of an explanation for why they are more valuable than that which falls short.
To believe truly, however, is no such diachronic component since it carries no promise to the effect that the belief was formed in response to the way the world is rather than as a result of mere luck.
virtuepistemology.blogspot.com   (5966 words)

 Certain Doubts » Thick Epistemology   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
One way of becoming interested in virtue epistemology is to be interested first in traditional epistemology, and hope that talk of the virtues can be useful for traditional topics such as knowledge and justification.
The virtues in question may still tend to produce mental states that are justified or rational, but if they don’t involve these notions, then the tendency would be contingent, I would expect.
Maybe, but I guess a virtue epistemologist who wanted to say that the justified beliefs are just the epistemically virtuous ones would say all you were thereby doing was being less conservative with the extension of ‘justified’.
bengal-ng.missouri.edu /~kvanvigj/certain_doubts/index.php?p=337   (1111 words)

 [No title]
Such virtues are no doubt often implicated when we know things, but epistemic virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing, in my humble opinion.
But to the extent that such theories are explicit about the }{ \i\insrsid4671787 telos}{\insrsid4671787 that drives their account of virtue, they tend to focus on either truth or knowledge as the ultimate end toward which all virtues must aim.
I will spend the rest of this paper arguing that }{\insrsid9796272 two}{\insrsid3892307 of our most important epistemic virtues are best understood as character}{\insrsid4728283 traits}{\insrsid3892307 that help us acquire understanding, rather than as character}{\insrsid4728283 traits}{\insrsid3892307 that help us acquire truth or knowledge.
www.ou.edu /cas/ouphil/faculty/wriggs/scotland.rtf   (2686 words)

 Joel Garver - Responsible Believing - Chapter Eight: Section Two
The question also arises whether epistemic justification may be analyzed in a way that essentially involves responsibility: a deontological notion of justification.
We conclude, then, that epistemic virtue requires us to shape our doxastic lives in such a way that we acquire, utilize, and maintain only doxastic practices that are permissible and in permissible ways.
Epistemic values coupled with more centrally ethical ones (as well as other kinds of value) will help define which permissible doxastic practices in which we will engage.
www.lasalle.edu /~garver/EIGHTa.html   (695 words)

 Joel Garver - Responsible Believing - Chapter Eight: Section Five
For instance, having the right sort of emotional life (and this includes putting on certain virtues, eschewing the vicious, and so on) disposes a subject to believe in a responsible manner (both in terms of having justification and in more comprehensive terms of believing what one ought to believe).
Moreover, part of the value of having an emotional life of a certain shape is that it is instrumental to knowledge, which is itself a good, and that a subject's well-ordered emotional life is, in its knowledge-acquiring facility, a good in itself simply in its well-ordering.
The second and third positions (ethical anti-realism and epistemic realism or vice versa) involve situations in which the norms at work in knowledge have a different status in respect to their "reality" than the norms at work in ethics.
www.lasalle.edu /~garver/EIGHTd.html   (844 words)

 Epistemic Value
I've just finished a first draft of my paper, 'Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', a version of which I'll be presenting at next year's Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Society (Martijn Blaauw will be be my commentator).
John Greco (now at SLU don't forget) is currently putting together a session for the Society of Christian Philosophers at the American Catholic Philosophical Association meeting.
There are always lots of good discussion threads over at JanusBlog, but this one might be of particular interest to those working on epistemic value, since it concerns the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck.
epistemicvaluestirling.blogspot.com   (1193 words)

 General Theory of Religion   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
James A. Montmarque has a brilliant essay on 'epistemic virtue' in Dancy and Sosa's 'A Companion to Epistemology.' The following is a summary of the essay, but one must read it in its entirety to get its full impact.
Epistemic virtue: those qualities of character which are conducive to the discovery of truth (and the avoidance of error).
3) Justification: If a belief is virtuously formed, this fully justifies that person in having it; but the belief itself may lack adequate justification (as the evidence for it may be, through no fault of this person, still be inadequate).
world.std.com /~awolpert/gtr71.html   (199 words)

 Dr. John Greco
“Virtues and Rules in Epistemology,” in Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski, eds.
"Virtue Epistemology," in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), pp.
“Virtue Epistemology,” Series of lectures for an intensive seminar at the common graduate school of Finnish philosophy departments, University of Helsinki, March 2004.
www.fordham.edu /philosophy/Faculty/Greco.htm   (1820 words)

 [No title]   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
What is required for a disposition V to be a virtue is that in normal circumstances V would yield a sufficient preponderance of true beliefs in subjects like S. (p.
If intellectual appearances are to be classified as a priori sources of justification by virtue of the processes that produce and/or sustain them, then we need an account of which processes produce and/or sustain those intellectual appearances that justify a priori.
animal knowledge, and its constitutive cognitive virtues, from a reflective knowledge that in addition requires one's beliefs to be defensible in the arena of reflection, wherein doubts may be raised as to the true reliability of one's supposed virtues.
www.unl.edu /philosop/people/faculty/casullo/ac_Spindel.htm   (3406 words)

 Recent JB News & Discussion Posts - JanusBlog
Audi on the Ethics of Belief: Doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue
Guy has kindly asked me to be the editor for topics on virtue ethics and social psychology, and so I thought I would try to jump start some discussion of the...
Thomas Kelly argues against the adequacy of the instrumentalist conception of epistemic normativity it is associated with in Alvin Goldman's account.
janusblog.squarespace.com   (689 words)

 Certain Doubts » Simplicity   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
Neo-Bayesians (especially those of pragmatist conviction like current incarnations of van Fraassen or Putnam) have in addition considered efficiency as one of the foremost epistemic virtues (although they are less worried about convergence in the long run and therefore they tend to focus on efficiency in one-shot changes rather than in long sequences of changes).
To be sure the `enterprise of understanding’ (to borrow an expression coined by Howard Stein) is deeply intertwined with the goal of increasing the amount of error free information in the next step of inquiry (or with the Peircean goal of learning the truth in the long run).
I think one can’t actually know that science has gotten to the truth a lot, unless one presupposes the virtue of simplicity (we believe “Science has gotten to the truth a lot” because that is the simplest theory to explain certain data that we now have).
bengal-ng.missouri.edu /~kvanvigj/certain_doubts/?p=512   (7470 words)

Knowability - devoted to issues "modal epistemic," from Joe Salerno.
"Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed"
"Epistemic Norms and the Sellarsian Dilemma for Foundationalism"
www.ucs.louisiana.edu /~kak7409/EpistemologicalResearch.htm   (2567 words)

 Charlotte Katzoff,
Epistemology, with emphasis on justification, deontology and epistemic virtue.
Katzoff, C., Counter-Evidence and the Duty to Critically Reflect (Deontological Approach to Epistemic Justification, Volunteerism).
Katzoff, C., Divine Causality and Moral Responsibility in the Story of Joseph and His Brothers.
www.biu.ac.il /HU/pg/phil-gen/staff/en-katzoff.htm   (77 words)

"Virtue Theory," (a debate with Rosalind Hursthouse) forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Ethical Theory ed.
"The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue" in Metaphilosophy (April 2003), 367-83.
"Virtue and the Intrinsic Good," The University of Stirling, Dec. 2000, The University of Sheffield, Oct.
www.dartmouth.edu /~jdriver/cv.html   (1296 words)

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