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Topic: Epsilon-equilibrium


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In the News (Thu 8 Jan 09)

  
 bond_style.html
where r0 is the equilibrium bond distance, alpha is a stiffness parameter, and D determines the depth of the potential well.
to define an anharmonic spring (Rector) of equilibrium length r0 and maximum extension lamda.
Epsilon, r0, and lamda are coefficients defined for each bond type.
www.cs.sandia.gov /%7Esjplimp/lammps/doc/bond_style.html   (493 words)

  
 SSRN-Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria by George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson
Keywords: Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a game achieved by perturbing payoffs by at most e/2, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.
We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response.
papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=305894   (248 words)

  
 GDV 2004 - Games In Design and Verification - Abstracts
We study the complexity of finding approximate equilibria, and show that the payoff of some epsilon-Nash equilibrium can be approximated in NP.
We study non-zero sum reachability games and show the existence of an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in memoryless strategies, for every epsilon >0.
For the special case of omega-regular objectives, we show exact Nash equilibria exist, and can be computed in NP when the omega-regular objectives are expressed as parity objectives.
www.soe.ucsc.edu /gdv04/abstract-majumdar.html   (248 words)

  
 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games
Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an epsilon - pure, epsilon - equilibrium for all epsilon greater than 0.
We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games.
We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.
ideas.repec.org /p/wpa/wuwpga/0412008.html   (294 words)

  
 Event information
The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walras\' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium.
In this simple institution actions of minimally intelligent agents based on local information can lead the market to approximate competitive equilibrium in a larger set of economies than the tatonnement process would allow.
We permit agents to know if they are subsidizing others at such allocations, and to veto such allocations, restricting the subsequent iterations of the algorithm only to those trades that are both Pareto-improving and provide strictly greater wealth, and ultimately utility, for such agents.
www.ssc.upenn.edu /cgi-bin/mecon/bin/calendar.cgi?task=view&event=171   (294 words)

  
 990121_C1_Jedamzik
It has been suggested that PBH formation may be facilitated when fluctuations enter into the horizon during a strongly first-order phase transition which proceeds in approximate equilibrium.
We confirm that the fluctuation density threshold \delta\epsilon /\epsilon required for the formation of PBHs during first-order transitions decreases with increasing L and falls below that for PBH formation during ordinary radiation dominated epochs.
Our results imply that, in case PBHs form at all in the early universe, their mass spectrum is likely dominated by the approximate horizon masses during epochs when the universe undergoes phase transitions.
www.physik.tu-muenchen.de /~sfb375/Publications/abstracts_1999/990121_C1_Jedamzik   (294 words)

  
 EconPapers: Edgeworth Equilibria
Theorem II: An allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium if and only if it is an epsilon-Walrasian equilibrium.
The major results of the paper are the following: Theorem I: Edgeworth equilibria exist.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
econpapers.repec.org /paper/cwlcwldpp/756r.htm   (181 words)

  
 JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING DATA,1999
TI: Isobaric Vapor - Liquid Equilibrium in the Systems 3-Methylpentane + Ethyl 1,1-Dimethylethyl Ether, + Diisopropyl Ether, and + Tetrahydrofuran
TI: Refractive Indices and Relative Permittivities of Liquid Mixtures of ç-Butyrolactone, ç-Valerolactone, ë-Valerolactone, or epsilon-Caprolactone + Benzene, + Toluene, or + Ethyl
TI: Vapor - Liquid Equilibria and Vapor Pressure Data for the Systems Ethyl tert-Butyl Ether + Ethanol and Ethyl tert-Butyl Ether + Water
webs.uvigo.es /biblioteca/sumarios/9568443.HTM   (181 words)

  
 Climate System Model
This strong positive feedback loop is represented in the model by having the emissivity of water vapor, epsilon{H2O}, treated as a function of the ground temperature.
We will assume that changes in the carbon concentration in the atmosphere occur on time scales that are much longer than the time it takes for the climate system to reach radiative equilibrium.
Note that the carbon dioxide emissivity, as determined by equations (2), (3), and (4) above, is independent of the ground temperature.
www.atmos.washington.edu /honors_220/model/model_instructions.html   (181 words)

  
 A Fictitious Play of the Nash Demand Game Implements the Nash Bargaining Solution
In the reduced static game they play at the initial period, all the epsilon-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution when the bargainers are patient.
As the bargainers make a more accurate comparison of payoffs and become more patient accordingly, the only equilibrium left is the division of the Nash bargaining solution.
We study a repeated Nash demand game, where bargainers follow a fictitious play procedure after their one-shot decision on demand in the initial period.
ideas.repec.org /p/ecm/feam04/642.html   (181 words)

  
 Game Theory at Institute of Mathematics WUT
T.Radzik(1991), Pure strategy epsilon-Nash equilibrium in two-person non-zero-sum games, Games and Economic Behaviour 3, pp.356-367.
The theory of value for cooperative games including the weighted Shapley values and their applications in resource allocation procedure.
Applications of the game theory and stochastic processes in finance theory and insurance.
neyman.im.pwr.wroc.pl /Games.html   (270 words)

  
 Nimrod Megiddo's resume and publications
Megiddo and R. Chandrasekaran, "On the epsilon-perturbation method for avoiding degeneracy," Research Report RJ 6330, IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, California, 1988.
Megiddo, " A Note on the Complexity of P-Matrix LCP and Computing an Equilibrium," Research Report RJ 6439, IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, California, 1988.
Megiddo and A. Wigderson, " On play by means of computing machines," Research Report RJ 4984, IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, California, 1986.
theory.stanford.edu /~megiddo/bio.html   (270 words)

  
 04-268
It is convenient to extend each $T^n_{ij}= \kappa_j\circ T^n \circ\kappa_i^{-1}:U_{i,j,n} \to U_j$ to a $C^\infty$ diffeomorphism from $U_i$ onto its image in $\real^d_j$, still denoted by $T^n_{ij}$, in such a way that the extended map preserves the horizontal foliation and that its derivative in block form satisfies (\ref{rem0},\ref{rem}) for the same constants $\lambda_{i,j}$, $\nu_{i,j}$, $\epsilon$.
\bibitem{Bow} R. Bowen, {\it Equilibrium states and the ergodic theory of Anosov diffeomorphisms,} Springer Lecture Notes in Mathematics Vol 470 (1975).
For $w \in \XX$, and $\widetilde T$ an Anosov diffeomorphism on $\XX$, introduce local hyperbolicity exponents ($\cdot$ denotes euclidean norm) \begin{equation}\nonumber \begin{split} \lambda_{w}(\widetilde T)^{-1} &=\sup_{v\in E^u(\widetilde T(w)), v=1} D_{T(w)} \widetilde T^{-1} (v)\,,\cr \nu_{w}(\widetilde T)&=\sup_{v\in E^s(w), v=1} D_w\widetilde T (v)\,.
mpej.unige.ch /mp_arc/p/04-268   (270 words)

  
 Preface to Scaling and Renormalization...
As a result, the study of the subject rapidly becomes overladen with formalism, and the student, if he or she is lucky, has just about time to learn how to calculate the critical exponents of the Ising model in 4 minus epsilon dimensions before the course comes to an end.
Historically, the subjects of renormalization in quantum field theory (as applied to particle physics) and in equilibrium critical behaviour have developed in parallel.
For the majority, whose goal is to understand how scaling and renormalization ideas might be applied to the rich variety of complex phenomena apparent in many other branches of the physical sciences, the main object is to learn the concepts, and the best way to do this is by covering as many examples as possible.
www-thphys.physics.ox.ac.uk /users/JohnCardy/bookpreface.html   (1762 words)

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