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| | Mitchell N. Berman, justification And Excuse, Law And Morality, 53 Duke L. J. 1 (2004) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11) |
 | | That is, insofar as excuses bear the same meaning under the criminal law as they do in moral theory, that is for substantive, contingent reasons, not for conceptual ones. |
 | | One frequent claim about the essential or logical relationship between justification and excuse goes like this: When conduct is protected by a justification defense, third parties may help the actor, and may not hinder her; when conduct is excused, third parties may hinder, and may not help. |
 | | According to Westen and Mangiafico, (1) defenders of the excuse characterization of duress cannot justify this disparity, and (2) the disparity is appropriate. |
| www.law.duke.edu /journals/dlj/articles/dlj53p1.htm (15316 words) |
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