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Topic: Fact-Value Distinction

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quine: terms explained Better understood as "what is" (fact) and "what ought to be" (value), the fact/value distinction is the thin line between what is truth and what is right. Fact, value, and perception : essays in honor of Charles A. Baylis. Value, on the other hand, is not accessible via the senses; it can only be derived through one's own subjective reasoning about ethics. www.rit.edu /~quine/fact_value.html   (553 words)

Distinguishing Facts from Values Despite important differences, facts and values are often confused -- a conflict of values may be thought to be a conflict of facts, or vice versa. Facts exist at every point on the spectrum between what is knowable and what is unknowable, and this changes over time -- some things that we cannot know today may be within our grasp at some point in the future. Values are much closer to the core of a person or group, a central part of what makes them unique and gives them identity. www.beyondintractability.org /m/facts_values.jsp   (3073 words)

Fact and value Turnabout An example is the “fact/value distinction.” That distinction involves the belief that two quite different sorts of things are involved in the way things are for us: facts, neutral statements about a world that’s just there, and values, human attitudes based on our projects and preferences. Facts belong to the realm of happenstance and circumstance, the realm of the visible and the ephemeral; truth belongs to the realm of meaning and values, the realm of the invisible and the lasting. The distinction was always basic to the position of the “scholars” and “experts” whose voice counts as that of neutral expertise and therefore carries the only kind of authority liberalism is really happy with. jkalb.org /node/1107   (1724 words)

Gerald Doppelt Those who advance critique, may justify their allegiance to rival epistemic values by appeal to wider ethical or political concerns; but such concerns need to be articulated at the level of epistemic values, and transformations in the sorts of phenomena, methodologies, or theories, taken as normative for knowledge-making. Value commitments can shape the knowledge we desire, the concepts, methods, or hypothesis at our disposal, our motives, how the 'we' is constituted, etc. - but maybe none of these determine whether or not it is scientific knowledge that we have achieved, when it is indeed achieved. Because commitments to epistemic values and larger social interests or values are amenable to reasoning and the logic of justification, the thesis of the value-relativity of scientific knowledge promises a more, not less, rational practice of inquiry. www.uab.edu /ethicscenter/doppelt.htm   (3222 words)

Bag of Worms Yet Words: Values The collapse of the distinction between facts and values, beginning in the 1970s, and the concept of cultural relativism are central to post-modernist ideology that became popular in academia. Values are central to culture, in anthropological theory; but the way in which values work culturally, from the point of view of a person holding them, is philosophically awkward. Also, social science values are relative; their characteristics are determined by persons of specified states of mind, or are relative to groups of shared mentality in which persons participate, such as a local culture. shroudedindoubt.typepad.com /bag_of_worms_yet_words/values   (10568 words)

Less than Total: A Review of Total Truth by Nancy Pearcey The Buckingham Inquirer First of all, the distinction between facts and values is an epistemological rather than metaphysical distinction" Okay, you've asserted that, but I am not sure you have explained this adequately (for my feeble mind, at least.) I am not sure that this distinction proves her view to be nonsensical. She glosses Kant's distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms as the distinction between the "really real" and the constructed, and then identifies those with the more recent distinction of fact and value. Perhaps she means to rest her claim on the broadly Thomistic distinction between faith and reason, and the later move of all value from the realm of reason to the realm of faith. reasonablereflection.net /buckinghaminquirer/21   (3072 words)

PES Yearbook: 1998: Robert E. Orton, Samuel Messick's Consequential Validity This distinction, in the case of novel situations with tests, will be such that the "facts" are likely to be so regarded by the largest number of untrained observers, just as a jury is ideally composed of ordinary citizens. Though it may be often difficult or impossible to distinguish between facts and stipulations, or between facts and values, a test interpreter ought to distinguish between stipulations and values, or so it will be argued. After a brief overview of the analytic-synthetic distinction and its relationship to construct validity, the discussion turns to two ways in which practical aspects of testing can be problematic: as technical and as ethical muddles. www.ed.uiuc.edu /EPS/PES-Yearbook/1998/orton.html   (3857 words)

Philosophy, et cetera: Evaluative Meaning Non-cognitivists will want to say that the two are entirely distinct, mirroring the fact-value distinction. They hold facts and values to be entirely separate spheres, such that no descriptive facts can entail an evaluative conclusion. Evaluative meaning is just a particular kind of descriptive meaning, namely, the kind concerned with facts about desire fulfillment (or whatever the natural 'reduction basis' for value turns out to be). pixnaps.blogspot.com /2005/03/evaluative-meaning.html   (1828 words)

Ecological Health Yet not to value one's own health is ultimately self-destructive—and that, too, is not merely a matter of opinion but a matter of fact. This implies that values are not only built factually into the telos of individual organisms; they pervade the system of life at all levels. Science tells us the facts, but what we value is merely a matter of opinion or judgment. web.utk.edu /~nolt/radio/ecohealth.html   (662 words)

Faces, Chapter 6 Introduction Indeed no such effort can possibly succeed, assuming the irreducibility of values to facts, so long as (i) the world is identified with the totality of fact, and (ii) the only sense in which the world could contain or exhibit an element of value is via derivability from or reducibility to the factual. The existence of objective values is a matter not of extra entities but of there being a truth of the matter as regards the correctness or incorrectness of our value judgments, a truth of the matter determined by objective, natural fact. More revealing would be a physicalistically acceptable argument that there are objective values in the first place. www.vanderbilt.edu /~postjf/fech6int.htm   (1741 words)

stuques1 Illustrate your explanation with an example of a "fact" and an example of a "value." Explain Stevenson's reasons for rejecting the "fact" part of the distinction. Explain Rolston's reasons for rejecting the "value" part of the distinction. Explain the importance of this in cases in which you are judging the ethical value of behaviors that appear to have minimal effect upon the natural environment. www-rohan.sdsu.edu /faculty/troxell/332_f99/stuques1.htm   (835 words)

Robert C. Koons: Phl 327 Lecture #10/11 All judgments of value derive from an apprehension of the Tao. Lewis considers the scientific innovator, who argues that true (scientific/rational/biological) values are rooted directly in instinct, as opposed to false values, that depend on artificial sentiments, created by culture. Presupposing that moral values are merely the projections of human nature as presently consituted, and so, could be radically changed through the very re-fashioning under consideration. www.leaderu.com /offices/koons/docs/chrphlec10.html   (694 words)

Re: positivistic view of language The importance to those of us in other disciplines, such as linguistics, NT, etc., is that positivism was relatively short-lived in philosophy, and yet many persons (even scholars) seem to continue with a fact/value distinction that should have gone the way of Newtonian physics (understood as a world-view). What is a loss is to think we are doing this when in fact we are answering different questions (such as the very practical question of how to translate something into another language, or how to explain it or apply it in a given context). That left matters of value, including all metaphysics, theology and ethics, in the realm of the "merely" emotive. www.ibiblio.org /bgreek/archives/greek-2/msg00498.html   (524 words)

Search Results for distinction - Encyclopædia Britannica The distinction between the history and theory of architecture did not emerge until the mid-18th century; indeed, the establishment of two separate academic disciplines was not even nominal until... If the blurring of the distinction between concepts and propositions has confused discussions of Empiricism, another influence at least equally vexing is that which, embodied in the traditional... Distinction between the theory of architecture and the theory of art www.britannica.com /search?query=distinction&submit=Find&source=MWTAB   (572 words)

Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy Second, the fact that scientific inquiry involves evaluations does not mean that the distinction between facts and values becomes "hopelessly fuzzy", as Putnam puts it. In one place he says that one particular answer to the question of fact and value has assumed the status of a cultural institution, namely the answer "that fact and value are totally disjoint realms, that the dichotomy ‘statement of fact or value judgment’ is an absolute one". His reference to the claim that "fact and value are totally disjoint realms" fits (1), but it might also be taken to indicate (2) and/or (3). www.philosophy.su.se /texter/putnam.htm   (5074 words)

360/250 Philosophy That means that, as soon as the discussion moves from facts to values, scientists (or other socially designated experts about matters of fact) have to set aside their mantle of expertise and dialogue at a horizontal level (a discussion between equals), not a horizontal or top-down one. But in the realm of values, no human being is any more of a defined expert than anyone else: there's nothing about the scientific role (or the teaching role) that gives the values of the scientist (or teacher) any particular significance or validity above and beyond the values of those in other social roles. When we think of facts, we think of something observable, and often (not always) something that can be determined objectively, even scientifically (since science is a form of systematic formal observation). www.uwmc.uwc.edu /psychology/360_250_philosophy.htm   (939 words)

Lonergan Web Site: The Debate on the Judgment of Value©. Judgment of values are similar in structure to judgments of fact. In Method value judgments proceed from the pivotal act of affective cognition that is the outcome of deliberation (= an apprehension of value). Cassidy suggests that the three levels of the good and the differentiated notions of potential, formal and actual value suggest a series of differentiated evalutative operations that are parallel to cognitional operations of the first three levels of consciousnes. www.lonergan.on.ca /monette/jofv.htm   (1258 words)

Is theology just God-talk? Firstly, while Anglo-American philosophy has, by-and-large, rejected a positivist criterion of meaning, and the fact/value distinction is by no means as firmly established as it once was, the public attitude to the difference between the sciences and theology has not changed. To many people it was just obvious that religion fell on the value side of the divide, and since it seemed of the very essence of science that it deal with fact, it was equally obvious that theology could in no way be scientific. Though the distinction is of course primarily one intended for use in moral philosophy, inevitably it came to be applied more widely. homepage.mac.com /peterhunter/iblog/C1147620628/E149588400   (1386 words)

mar04.html Realists are required to say what in the world grounds the alleged truths of the form "X is good" - what makes it a fact (note that realists also deny that there is such a thing as the fact-value distinction...values are subclass of facts). A realist conception of value maintains that statements of the form "X is good" can be objectively assigned a truth value. Relativist conceptions of value maintain that we can never say that X is good simpliciter - we can only say that X is good relative to some Y, but various forms of relativism make different assessments of what Y should be. grimpeur.tamu.edu /~colin/Phil205/mar04.html   (721 words)

mar02.html Realist views about the good tend to deny that the fact/value distinction is well founded - values are a of fact. Answers to this will be considered next time, but they include theological underpinnings, views about the consequences of rationality (Kantian) and varieties of biological/naturalistic approaches that take facts about pain and pleasure as an objective basis for values (some versions of utilitarianism). For example you might think that the values enocoded in certain rules of etiquette are entirely relative to a particular culture while also maintaining that the extermination of millions of people is not good (period). grimpeur.tamu.edu /~colin/Phil205/mar02.html   (267 words)

309 Unit 2 Because many of the issues below are matters of value rather than matters of fact, it's useful at the outset to make sure that you clearly understand what is meant by the fact-value distinction. Problems: (a) our legal tradition is to penalize before, not after, the fact; (b) prediction is far from statistically perfect. Here are some of my personal, subjective thoughts about the value issues covered in this unit. www.uwmc.uwc.edu /psychology/309_unit_2.htm   (577 words)

User:Mikerussell - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Burford, Ontario University of Detroit Mercy Fact-Value Distinction Junkie (novel) Librarian Political Science Republic (Plato) Renaissance Center Livernois-Fenkell riot Mike Russell was born, raised and educated in Toronto. en.wikipedia.org /wiki/User:Mikerussell   (214 words)

Mind: Beyond Positivism and Relativism. - book reviews I take this to imply that a transition from endorsing one theory to endorsing another is subjective or emotive in regard to the explanation for its occurrence, not because all endorsements of the form "x is better than y with respect to m" are non-factual. As Kuhn notes, it is because of this fact that a transition from one scientific theory to another will not be one step at a time, but all at once; a conversion experience, in other words (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. Laudan's supposition that Kuhn was a closet non-cognitivist is appealing: it certainly explains, both philosophically and historically, why Kuhn would infer from the fact that there are disagreements between scientists on methodological issues, that such disputes do not admit of rational closure. www.findarticles.com /p/articles/mi_m2346/is_n425_v107/ai_20418161   (1330 words)

Harvard University Press/The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays/Reviews He acknowledges the usefulness of the fact/ value distinction but denies that anything metaphysical follows from it...Putnam covers such matters as imperative logic, economics vis-à-vis ethics, and preference theory and such thinkers as V. Walsh, L. Robbins, and R. Hare. The collection as a whole thus fulfils two rather different functions: (a) bringing new and original arguments to bear against the erroneous thesis that there is a dichotomy between fact and value, and (b) guiding the reader around the contours of the issue and pointing to interesting relevant arguments developed elsewhere by others. Anyone tempted by Milton Friedman's famous claim that concerning differences of value "men can ultimately only fight" should read this elegant and wonderful book. www.hup.harvard.edu /reviews/PUTCOL_R.html   (231 words)

The Claremont Institute: Having it Both Ways on "Values" If it is a value-judgment, an expression of some arbitrary personal preference harbored by Max Weber or his followers, there is no reason to believe the fact-value distinction is true, or even a way to speak meaningfully of the possibility that it might be true. The more practical problem with the fact-value distinction is that no one, including those who espouse it, actually believes it. They insisted that their study of society was scientific because it was confined to statements of fact, which could be empirically verified or disproven, differentiating such statements from "value-judgments." "Values" were irrational, subjective personal preferences. claremont.org /writings/050413voegeli.html   (1407 words)

Lecture Notes on Max Weber Values are a matter of cultural norms or personal faith, the truth of which cannot be decided by science. Value rationality: action that done in conformity with absolute moral or ethical values, independently of any assessment of the probable success or ultimate consequences of such action. Weber speaks of this trend as the "iron cage." He believes that it undermines some of the fundamental values of Western society (individualism, spontaneity, autonomy of action) in the name of increasing efficiency. darkwing.uoregon.edu /~vburris/soc310/310weber.htm   (1038 words)

Book Review: Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order In any case, the fact/value distinction did not come into economics through Weber but through the association of a number of influential early twentieth-century economists with logical positivism. Since Weber is mentioned so often it might have been worth examining his attitude to facts and values from his lectures on economics during the time he held the chair in Nationalokonomie. In fact, a defence of the legitimate autonomy of economics is implicit in the professional work of most economists who are Christians. www.acton.org /publicat/m_and_m/2001_spring/oslington.html   (2235 words)

Hume's Law As with the fact/value distinction, the present distinction has proved hard to maintain in its pristine clarity, though the issue is far from settled. Derived from the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), an informal name for a distinction (rather like the Fact/Value Distinction) between statements of fact and utterances with an 'ought' in them. In his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), Hume claimed (as usually interpreted) that the latter could never be logically derived from the former, and this has been the subject of considerable debate in the last 30 years or so. www.philosophyprofessor.com /philosophies/humes-law.php   (141 words)

Search Results for fact - Encyclopædia Britannica Cancer Facts and Figures (annual), published by the American Cancer Society, a compilation of rates and trends of cancer in the U.S. population, useful as a comprehensive source of statistics. Facts on listeria for pregnant women, the elderly, and anyone with suppressed immunity. So far, attention has been directed to what are essentially the preliminaries to vision; it is now time to examine some of the elementary facts of vision and to relate them to the structure of the... www.britannica.com /search?ref=B04319&query=fact&submit=Find   (594 words)

Rational Reconstruction, continued Kuhn and Keller both reject this project and the sharp fact/value distinction www.ku.edu /~acudd/phil140-s24/tsld002.htm   (12 words)

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