| |
| | Newsletter Apr. 25, No. 26 |
 | | Two ways in which they differ (not necessarily common to all recent accounts) stand out: first, these abstract objects are metaphysically primitive, not set theoretic constructions out of possible worlds and individuals; second, they are untyped--properties can exemplify each other as well as themselves, relations can fall within their own field, and so on. |
 | | Time permitting, I will apply the logic to two issues, one in semantics and the other in the philosophy of mathematics--specifically, to the analysis of noun phrases involving terms of order like `fourth' and `last', and the question of what the (ordinal) numbers are, to which I will give a logicist answer adumbrated by Russell. |
 | | It has occasionally been suggested that the formal properties of this mental metalanguage could be the source of universal properties of natural languages. |
| www-csli.stanford.edu /Archive/calendar/1984-85/msg00028.html (784 words) |
|