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Topic: Fred Dretske

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	Engineering the Mind
		Dretske's "phenomenal externalism" is externalist on two counts: the properties of a perceptual experience, insofar as it is mental, are determined entirely by the properties it represents things as having, and which properties it represents things as having is not determined by the perceiver's physical state.
		Dretske claims not only that "experiences have their representational content fixed by the functions of the sensory systems of which they are states," but that "the quality of a sensory state-how things look, sound, and feel at the most basic (phenomenal) level-is thus determined phylogenetically" (15).
		Dretske need not rely on the model of displaced perception to formulate a conception of introspection of experience that is consistent with his view that the character of an experience consists in the properties it represents its objects as having.
	userwww.sfsu.edu /~kbach/Dretske.html (4159 words)

	Psyche 9(01): 'Neither HOT Nor COLD: An Alternative Account Of Consciousness' by Robert W. Lurz
		Fred Dretske (1995) is perhaps the best-known proponent of the COLD position.
		Dretske (1997), for instance, writes that "[w]hat makes [mental states] conscious is not S's awareness of them, but their role in making S conscious -- typically (in the case of sense perception), of some external object" (p.
		Dretske's argument, then, appears to assume that state consciousness is not an extrinsic property, and such an assumption, it would appear, begs the question against the very idea behind the truth of proposition 1.
	psyche.cs.monash.edu.au /v9/psyche-9-01-lurz.html (7233 words)

	[No title]
		Dretske’s Naturalizing the Mind sets out the case for holding that mental states in general are natural representers of reality.
		Dretske holds that if one is an externalist with regard to propositional content, as one should be, one should also be an externalist with regard to sensations and qualia.
		Dretske’s externalism is incompatible with the possibility of an inverted spectrum (which he cites as an advantage, Naturalizing p.
	www.d.umn.edu /~dcole/mirror.txt (3511 words)

	Contemporary Skepticism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		Dretske thus concludes that we should instead allow that an agent might be able to know (P) whilst failing to know (Q), and thus, given that the entailment is known, that closure fails.
		Dretske is thus in a position to offer a plausible account of knowledge that can accommodate all of the claims that we saw him wanting to make earlier.
		For both Dretske and Nozick, for example, the sensitivity condition is a condition that merely needs to be met by the agent for that agent to be a potential knower - it is not further demanded that the agent should have the relevant reflective access to the facts which determine that sensitivity.
	www.incywincy.com /default?catid=49538&cached=www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/skepcont.htm (15794 words)

	The Case For Closure (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		Fred Dretske’s discussion provides us with a case against epistemic closure that is intuitively rather compelling.
		Dretske begins with the idea that to know that P one has to “rule out”, that is to “exclude” all relevant alternatives to P. He claims in passing that this approach to the analysis of knowledge leads “quite naturally (not inevitably, but naturally)” to a denial of closure.” I find this claim hard to evaluate.
		Dretske tells us if one knows P, then one would not have reasons R unless P. Let us say that reasons R are conclusive for P just in case this condition is satisfied.
	www.sims.berkeley.edu /~kahern/hawthorne/closurePaper.htm (8092 words)

	Metapsychology Online Book Reviews - Naturalizing the Mind
		Dretske presents the basic ideas of his representational theory of the mind (or, as he calls it, "The Representational Thesis") in the first chapter of his book.
		Dretske discusses two main assumptions regarding the mental domain that he takes to be grounding the intuition that facts about the qualitative character of one's experience depend only on one's intrinsic properties.
		According to Dretske, this is a misunderstanding about the explanatory relevance of facts "outside" one's head that rests on a conflation of the notions of behavior and pure bodily movements.
	www.mentalhelp.net /books/books.php?type=de&id=466 (1616 words)

	Dretske
		Suppose Fred is at the zoo and claims to know that the animal in front of him is a zebra.
		Two possible replies: (1) Dretske could agree that he would and does perform the inference, but deny that the resulting belief counts as knowledge.
		He would have to reject the principle that what is consciously inferred from knowledge by a simple deduction known to be valid is itself knowledge, but that shouldn't be hard for someone who already rejects closure.
	www.unc.edu /~ujanel/Dretske.htm (820 words)

	Evolution, Error and Intentionality
		Dretske seems to be trying to do two things at one stroke: first, he wants to draw a principled (and all-or-nothing) distinction between free-floating and--shall we say?--"fully appreciated" rationales; and second, he wants to remove all interpretive slack in the specification of the "actual" or "real" meaning of any such appreciated meaning-states.
		Burge and Dretske argue against the traditional doctrine of privileged access, and Searle and Fodor are at least extremely reluctant to acknowledge that their thinking ever rests on any appeal to such an outmoded idea.
		Dretske happens to discuss the problem of predator-detection in a passage that brings out this problem with his view: "If (certain) bacteria did not have something inside that meant that that was the direction of magnetic north, they could not orient themselves so as to avoid toxic surface water.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/evolerr.htm (12345 words)

	datafacts.html
		In an article from 1974 Fred Dretske points out an interesting thing about explanations within this field: "...if we confine our attention to language instead of the actual speech acts that embody a use of language, there is, quite literally, nothing happening." Obviously, speech acts, localised in time and space, are events.
		However that may be, it seems important to distinguish between these to types of facts which to a large extent have been derived from the same kind of data: facts about institutional properties of linguistic expressions considered as types, and facts about specific utterance acts of expression tokens in specific situations.
		Dretske discusses this distinction and illustrates it with an analogy which I find helpful.
	www.hf.uib.no /i/LiLi/SLF/ans/Dyvik/datafacts.html (6871 words)

	DretWays
		For some years now, Fred Dretske has been seeking a counter-etymological account of introspection—that is, a theory that does not portray introspection as anything like, my looking inward and thereby finding out what is going on in my own mind.
		Dretske offers the analogy of a simple measuring instrument whose job is to announce the value of some magnitude Q (temperature, voltage, velocity or the like).
		Dretske makes an unexpected announcement: “[W]hat I am calling protopain is simply the bodily condition we ‘perceive’, the physical condition we are made aware of, when we are in pain” (p.
	www.unc.edu /~ujanel/DretWays.htm (6299 words)

	The Relativity of Perceptual Knowledge (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		The paper begins by arguing for Austin's claim that perceptual knowledge must not be understood as an inference based upon sensory data.
		Dretske's non-inferential account of perceptual knowledge can therefore escape skeptical attack, but only if his distinction between a merely logical possibility and any "relevant" or "genuine" possibility that one be mistaken can be justified.
		Fred Dretske, “Dretske's Replies: Knowledge: Sanford and Cohen,” in Chapter 10 of Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, 185-96 (Blackwell: 1991).
	www.lawrence.edu /fast/BOARDMAW/Relat_Knowl_list.html (251 words)

	Inner Sense until Proven Guilty - Eric Lormand (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		Dretske has no good argument that the viewer lacks all fact-awareness of Spot and E(Spot)—about which intrinsic properties they have, for example; all he has is an argument that the viewer lacks the fact-awareness that Spot and E(Spot) have certain complex comparative relations: that they differentiate Alpha and E(Alpha) from Beta and E(Beta).
		Dretske objects similarly to the idea that sensing a state—being "conscious of" the state, in one sense—is sufficient for a state itself to be conscious (phenomenally or otherwise).
		Dretske’s talk of "higher-order experiences" and "lower-order experiences" seems to embody his commitment to Accusation 1—about experiences of experiences.
	www-personal.umich.edu /~lormand/phil/cons/inner_sense.htm (17326 words)

	[No title]
		In what Dretske calls Type III or "Natural Systems of Representation," this selection of functional role is also naturally determined: in biological organisms, of the many things that the state of sensory organs may naturally indicate, one or a few are intrinsically important to the organism because its reactions are keyed to them.
		Dretske's example is someone using coins on a table to represent players in a basketball play.
		As Dretske points out, this kind of indicative relation, which arises from causally assured correlations between positions or magnitudes in one object and others, gives rise to what Paul Grice called the natural sense of meaning, in which for Y to mean X entails that X is actually the case (p.55).
	www.fordham.edu /philosophy/davenport/texts/tranphen.htm (8855 words)

	Alibris: Fred Dretske
		In this lucid and humorous portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
		This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years.
		Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties...
	www.alibris.com /search/books/author/Fred_Dretske (285 words)

	Consciousness and Intentionality
		One might argue (as do Martin Davies (1997) and Fred Dretske (1997)) that in certain relevant respects the phenomenal character of experience is also essentially determined by causal environmental connections.
		Consider also Fred Dretske's (1995) view, that phenomenally conscious sensory intentionality consists in a kind of mental representation whose content is bestowed through a naturally selected ‘function to indicate.’ Such natural (evolution-implanted) sensory representation can arise independently of learning (unlike the more conceptual, language dependent sort), and is found widely distributed among evolved life.
		Both Tye's and Dretske's views of consciousness (unlike Dennett's) make crucial use of a contrast between the types of intentionality proper to sense-experience, and that proper to linguistically expressed judgment.
	www.science.uva.nl /~seop/archives/sum2003/entries/consciousness-intentionality (13364 words)

	Amazon.com: Books: Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
		Dretske attempts to reconcile these different points of view by showing how reasons operate in a world of causes.
		Fred Dretske is Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University.
	www.amazon.com /exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0262540614/qid=1030973537/sr=1-2/ref=sr_1_2/103-2684826-1385452?v=glance&s=books (569 words)

	Get Real
		When Dretske says that the micro-cognitions I substitute for beliefs do "precisely" what potential or suppressed beliefs did for Armstrong and Pitcher, he misses a major point: I was deliberately getting away from their mistaken personal-level treatment of the issue, so my micro-cognitions do an importantly (precisely) different job.
		Dretske asks [p.4] "Are we really being told that it makes no sense to ask whether one can see, thus be aware of, thus be conscious of, objects before being told what they are?" Yes, in one sense, and no, in another.
		If we follow Dretske's usage, however, we must nevertheless insist that, for whatever it is worth, the changes in the before and after scenes were not just visible to you; you saw them, though of course you yourself are utterly clueless about what the changes were, or even that there were changes.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/getreal.htm (18779 words)

	Psyche 7(11): First Person Warrant: Comments On Siewert's The Significance Of Consciousness by Fred Dretske
		Though I was aggressive in my rejection of functionalism in (Dretske, 1995), Siewert groups me (Section 4.8) with functionalists in neglecting phenomenal consciousness.
		I argued in (Dretske, 1995) that conscious experiences are internal representations that derive their powers of representation from a process of natural selection.
		The systems that give rise to perceptual experience, for instance, were selected to do a certain job, to provide information (= indicate) how things stand with respect to external objects (in the case of exterocepton) and (in proprioception) parts of the body.
	psyche.cs.monash.edu.au /v7/psyche-7-11-dretske.html (2689 words)

	The Philosophy of Neuroscience
		(She cites the Churchlands, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, and Kim Sterelny as examples, with extensive references.) Current neuroscientific understanding of the mechanisms and coding strategies implemented by sensory receptors shows that this traditional view is mistaken.
		A common criticism of informational semantics holds that mere causal covariation is insufficient for representation, since information (in the causal sense) is by definition always veridical while representations can misrepresent.
		Dretske, Fred (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
	www.science.uva.nl /~seop/archives/win2004/entries/neuroscience (10134 words)

	Externalism About Mental Content
		The causal-information theoretic approach explains content in terms of counterfactual or informational dependencies that hold between internal states and the environment in normal or ideal situations (Dretske (1981), Stalnaker (1993)).
		The teleological approach, on the other hand, says that the contents of internal states are fixed by their design or evolutionary function (Millikan(1984), Papineau(1993)).
		According to some authors, such as Tye (1995), Dretske (1995), and Lycan (1996), all conscious mental states have wide contents.
	www.science.uva.nl /~seop/archives/spr2004/entries/content-externalism (6587 words)

	Perception, Knowledge and Belief - Cambridge University Press (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske’s work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two.
		The first section of the book argues the point that knowledge consists of beliefs with the right objective connection to facts; two essays discuss this conception of knowledge’s implications for naturalism.
		This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students, and will also be of interest to cognitive scientists, psychologists, and philosophers of biology.
	www.cambridge.org /catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521777429&ss=toc (325 words)

	PY 5308
		Dretske, F. (2000) - "Reply to Lopes", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.
		Seager also discusses Dretske's position in Naturalising the Mind (1995), which is similar to Tye's apart from the fact that he holds a teleological view of perceptual content, not a causal covariation theory.
		Fred Dretske (2000) - "Reply to Lopes", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.
	www.gla.ac.uk /philosophy/Personnel/Fiona/py5308.html (2586 words)

	Books: Naturalizing the Mind
		In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of which the mind does its job.
		Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having.
		Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness.
	cognet.mit.edu /library/books/view?isbn=0262540894 (143 words)

	Chomsky v. Kripke Round 2
		Following Fred D'Agostino in Chomsky's System of Ideas (CSI 13-16), methodological individualism can be defined as the position holding that an adequate description of behavioral phenomena may require reference to collective facts, but that an adequate, ultimate explanation of those phenomena will have to be put in terms of facts about individuals.
		Conversely, methodological collectivism holds that an adequate description of behavioral phenomena may require reference to facts about individuals -- their particular responses, for instance -- but that any adequate, ultimate explanation of those phenomena must be in terms of collective facts.
		As Fred Dretske has suggested (Dretske 94), a content state is a cause of an instance of behavior to the extent that the behavior is undertaken on the basis of what the content state represents.
	www.personal.kent.edu /~pbohanbr/Webpage/New/Huen-Barbiero/kripke2(Barbiero).html (7172 words)

	JCS Journal of Consciousness Studies 9,8
		I agree with Horst’s conclusion but his reasoning fails to address a rebuttal to his argument made by the major proponent of such theories, namely, Fred Dretske.
		Dretske argues that artificial selection can create new features and that, in an analogous fashion, natural selection can too.
		I show that Dretske’s rebuttal is inadequate because crucial features of the analogy fail.
	www.imprint.co.uk /jcs_9_8.html (867 words)

	History of Philosophy at St. Olaf
		Chairs of the Philosophy Department since it became a separate department: Howard Hong (1949-58), William Narum (1958-69), Walter Stromseth (1969-77), Fred Stoutland (1977-87), Ed Langerak (1987-98), Charles Taliaferro (1996-97), Rick Fairbanks (1998-2001), and Corliss Swain (2001- ).
		For over two decades the department has held one or two retreats each year, usually with the Carleton philosophers, and usually with an accomplished philosopher to assign readings and lead the discussions.
		5-7, 1982: Fred Stoutland (on Putnam’s [anti]realism), Maria Lugones (on understanding other people), Karen Warren (on environmental ethics).
	www.stolaf.edu /people/langerak/Phil_Dept_history.html (1524 words)

	Dr Nick Zangwill (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-17)
		Fred Dretske, "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowing", Philosophical Studies, 1982, probably in a recent collection of his papers in CUP.
		Some of these issues are raised in Peter Unger's "A Defence of Skepticism", Philosophical Review, not sure, but widely reprinted.
		Some of the readings are on Nozick, some on Dretske, and some are relevant to both (e.g.
	users.ox.ac.uk /~scat2183/K&R-TutorialReadings.htm (1070 words)

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