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 | | Introduction In his opening chapter, Daniel Dennett reports that his task in Freedom Evolves is “to provide a unified, stable, empirically well-grounded, coherent view of human free will” and that his conclusion is that “Free will is real, but is not a preexisting feature of our existence, like the law of gravity. |
 | | If that perception is correct, then given the psychological similarities between the two agents, the difference in their current status regarding freedom and moral responsibility would seem to lie in how they came to have certain psychological features, hence in something external to their here-and-now psychological constitutions. |
 | | Also, if you are inclined toward a history-sensitive position on freedom and moral responsibility, you would be inclined to believe that some of the things you did for your kids years ago you did not do freely and were not morally responsible for doing. |
| gfp.typepad.com /online_papers/files/Al.doc (4837 words) |
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