
 Frege's New Science, Aldo Antonelli, Robert May 
  We propose that Frege's critique rests on his view that language is a set of propositions, each immutably equipped with a truth value (as determined by the thought it expresses), so to Frege it was inconceivable that axioms could even be considered to be other than true. 
  Because of his adherence to this view, Frege was precluded from the sort of metatheoretical considerations that were available to Hilbert; but from this, we shall argue, it does not follow that Frege was blocked from metatheory in toto. 
  Frege had reservations about the method, however, primarily because of the apparent need to stipulate the logical terms, those terms that must be held invariant to obtain such proofs. 
 projecteuclid.org /getRecord?id=euclid.ndjfl/1038336844 (1036 words) 
