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| | Frege's New Science, Aldo Antonelli, Robert May |
 | | We propose that Frege's critique rests on his view that language is a set of propositions, each immutably equipped with a truth value (as determined by the thought it expresses), so to Frege it was inconceivable that axioms could even be considered to be other than true. |
 | | Because of his adherence to this view, Frege was precluded from the sort of metatheoretical considerations that were available to Hilbert; but from this, we shall argue, it does not follow that Frege was blocked from metatheory in toto. |
 | | Frege had reservations about the method, however, primarily because of the apparent need to stipulate the logical terms, those terms that must be held invariant to obtain such proofs. |
| projecteuclid.org /getRecord?id=euclid.ndjfl/1038336844 (1036 words) |
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