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 | | In large part, frequentism represents an extension of the “classical” theories of Laplace and Pascal, in which probability was treated as a “ratio of favorable to equally possible cases”—the paradigmatic events here being series of coin tosses, dice rolls, and other recreations of the French aristocracy. |
 | | While the toss referred to in the first statement can be related to a well-defined collective of, precisely, coin tosses, the deictic “next” in the second statement forecloses the possibility of relating the event to any collective whatsoever—for the simple reason that there can only ever be one next toss of the coin. |
 | | If “to make a statement about a probability is no less factual and objective that to make a statement about the length of a stick,” certain matters of belief and doubt—such as whether the stick actually exists in the first place—must be foreclosed from the very beginning (Kyburg, p. |
| cas.uchicago.edu /workshops/semiotics/papers/rizzo2.doc (3195 words) |
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