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Topic: General Possibility Theorem

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	Liberalism
		This is generally dated from the work of John Locke (1632-1704), whose Two Treatises on Government established two fundamental liberal ideas: economic liberty, meaning the right to have and use property, and intellectual liberty, including freedom of conscience, which he expounded in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689).
		They are generally opposed to any but the milder forms of nationalism, and usually stand in contrast to conservatives by their broader tolerance and in more readily embracing multiculturalism.
		Generally identified with the term 'Liberal' in current UK politics, they hold a comparatively small proportion of the seats in parliament, but manage to pull much higher percentages of the popular vote, over 20% at the last election.
	www.arikah.net /encyclopedia/Liberalism (7069 words)

	Buchanan: Collected Works, Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional ...
		More commonly, however, none of the possible courses of action is the first preference of a majority of the voters, a fact which is reflected in the popular view that democracy requires a willingness to compromise.
		No general function has yet been calculated to show what portion of possible preference patterns would lead to this result, but it seems likely that where there is any sizable number of possible issues and voters this is very common—quite probably this is the normal case.
		It may be that the possible choices can be arranged on a single line in such a way that any individual will always prefer a choice which is closer to his own to any that is farther away.
	www.econlib.org /library/Buchanan/buchCv3c22.html (7973 words)

	Vote Aggregation Methods
		Use of this criterion is generally motivated by the fact that it prohibits voting systems that use information that may be considered arbitrary (cardinal preferences) or that tend to promote strategic behavior.
		Generally, the winner of an approval voting election is the alternative that receives a plurality of votes.
		The use of STV generally results in elections with high average effectiveness because all ballots that can be used to elect a candidate, either as a first-choice or on a transfer, have some degree of effectiveness.
	users.erols.com /aejohns/node4.htm (8353 words)

	votes06.htm (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		The only possible way to avoid this would be to present the proposals in an order such that none of the participants subsidiarily supported the proposal first in the sequence.
		Generally, the voting problem has to a great extent been the question of the ranking of proposals in cases involving voting on many alternative proposals, i.e., of which proposal or proposals shall be put to the vote first.
		There is a possibility here for a participant to benefit by declaring his preferences insincerely in a concrete case, provided that he has sufficient knowledge of the relations between the alternatives for the other participants.
	www.simnet.is /bss/votes06.htm (7631 words)

	BBC - h2g2 - Arrow's Possibility Theorem
		The situation to which the possibility theorem applies is when there is a society of citizens, a set of policies which they are going to vote on such that each citizen has certain preferences about the different policies.
		The simplest example is the case of a general election (or presidential election for Americans) where there are various candidates (these are the policies) standing for election and each citizen casts a vote for their preferred candidate (who they cast their vote for represents their preference).
		The proof of the theorem proceeds by assuming that the social welfare function is neither imposed nor dictatorial, from which is derived a contradiction, proving that any social welfare function satisfying the first three conditions is either imposed or dictatorial.
	www.bbc.co.uk /h2g2/guide/A520372 (2494 words)

	RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHOICE[A] Magazine: American Economic Review, March, 1995 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		Social Welfare Judgments and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem The subject of welfare economics was dominated for a long time by the utilitarian tradition, which performs interpersonal aggregation through the device of looking at the sum-total of the utilities of all the people involved.
		If, in general, processes leading to the emergence of a social state were standardly included in the characterization of that state, then we have to construct "equivalence classes" to ignore some differences (in this case, between some antecedent processes) to be able to discuss cogently the "same state" being brought about by different decision mechanisms.
		The contrast between the procedural and consequential approaches is, thus, somewhat overdrawn, and it may be possible to combine them, to a considerable extent, in an adequately rich characterization of states of affairs.
	mgv.mim.edu.my /Articles/00027/9602131.Htm (10150 words)

	Arrow’s possibility theorem (1951) states that aggregation of individual preferences into a social will is highly ...
		Hence, unlike Arrow whose theorem shows the possibility of a problematic (dictatorial, imposed or irrational) social choice even when the individuals are not restricted in their respective orderings, I show the certainty of an irrational social choice under the market mechanism.
		In the paradox of voting, which is at the heart of Arrow’s theorem, the rationality of the aggregate choice is not guaranteed.
		An additional consequence of applying the possibility criterion to the four methods of aggregation is that the market mechanism and voting have very little in common.
	www.collegium.edu.pl /chajewski/ASA99-CHICAGO.htm (4220 words)

	IVR Newsletter feb 1999 - jan 2000 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		He also considers the possibility that the knowledge-promoting criterion may be a less divisive way of evaluating laws and other social institutions than such traditional criteria as equality, justice, and utility.
		In the cover of the last IVR Newsletter (n.23, January 1999) issue it is possible to see the complete scheme of the IVR central and peripheral organization (notice that Austria, Finland and UK have elected new Officials after the printing of Newsletter n.23).
		GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Minutes of the General Assembly of the IVR, held in New York, at Pace University Downtown Theatre, on June 30, 1999.
	www.cirfid.unibo.it /ivr/newsl6.htm (8311 words)

	The Solution to Arrow’s Problem
		It is possible, though, to integrate all these kinds of preferences into an integral utility index, when we replace a point x in the commodity domain by a statement "The state of the world is x".
		Theorem I: For a reasonable society, the AMC is invalid.
		Generations of students have been taught by Nobel Prize laureats that research into social welfare would be subject to impossibilities.
	econwpa.wustl.edu /eps/get/papers/9707/9707001.html (5044 words)

	Get a Document - by Citation - 65 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 3
		Post-Chicago law and economics is extending the focus of economic analysis beyond the substance of the law to the judicial and legislative processes that generate and enforce primary rules.
		Stare decisis also makes it possible for a judicial system to establish much-needed conventions in situations where it matters less which rule is adopted than it does that some rule be adopted uniformly.
		The movement toward the Pareto frontier (collective rationality) is only possible with cooperation, and cooperation requires a distribution that is in the interest of those from whom cooperative behavior is desired (individual rationality).
	www.bu.edu /rbarnett/postchicago.htm (6593 words)

	Amartya Sen
		This theorem posed a formal challenge to the possibility of arriving at consistent social decisions in a democracy.
		So, the utility information which is to be used to generate a given social ordering R is not a single n-tuple of utility functions, but a set of n-tuples of individual utilities which are informationally identical.
		The invariance requirement takes the general form of specifying that for any two n-tuples in the same comparability set` L, reflecting the assumptions of measurability and comparability, the social ordering R must be the same.
	www.ias.ac.in /currsci/mar25/articles12.htm (3040 words)

	General structure of the space and the motion of a body (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		The relativity is generated from a belief that the universe is in a nothingness, obviously infinite.
		Consequently, the problems is simplified and the Lam-ca theorem consists to seek a one to one side between a square and a rectangle.
		For the sake of proving the theorem on Matter Structure of a Construction, it is going hereafter to establish a proof of a constant surface relationship between a fixed point and two points of a given circle.
	www.dakhi.com /somen51.htm (18353 words)

	Introduction
		I wrote in the previous chapter that the prisoners’ dilemma had been perceived as a challenge to the Smithian ‘invisible hand theorem’ – the view that individual rationality of economic agents will, in general, lead to collective rationality at the level of the economy as a whole.
		What this shows is that there is a possible pattern of individual preference orderings such that a social ordering derived from them which satisfies the Pareto and independence conditions must be dictatorial if it is to be consistent.
		In fact, quite generally, we may suppose that they arrange all states in order of what they regard as ultimate desirability, taking everything they know and feel into account...
	www.staff.city.ac.uk /andy.denis/research/thesis/03.htm (7225 words)

	"A Possibility Theorem on Dynamic Organizational Research," Social Science Quarterly (1971)
		The organizational patterns are myriad; although the development of graph theory has shown promise, in general the analytical tools of mathematics are of limited application.
		Revision of "Structural Models and Dynamic Organizational Research: A Possibility Theorem" presented at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Atlantic City, New Jersey (April 2, 1970).
		For a further discussion of the complex issues of the effects of public predictions in general social contexts, cf.
	www.wright.edu /~gordon.welty/Socsq_71.htm (1884 words)

	Liberal Paradox - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		The Red Cross and other charities also need your help.
		Since this theorem was advanced in 1970, it has attracted a wide body of commentary from philosophers such as James M. Buchanan and Robert Nozick among many others.
		The most contentious aspect is that it seems, on one hand, to contradict the libertarian notion that the market mechanism is sufficient to produce a Pareto optimal society - and on the other hand it argues that degrees of choice and freedom, rather than welfare economics should be the defining trait of that market mechanism.
	www.wikipedia.org /wiki/Liberal_Paradox (148 words)

	On The Possibility Of Democracy And Rational Collective Choice
		The paper challenges the 'orthodox doctrine' of collective choice theory according to which Arrow's 'general possibility theorem' precludes rational decision procedures generally and implies that in particular all voting procedures must be flawed.
		All voting procedures that have been proposed, with the exception of approval voting, involve restrictions on voters expressions of their preferences.
		These restrictions, not any general impossibility, are the cause of various well known pathologies.
	ideas.repec.org /p/lmu/muenec/429.html (329 words)

	Mark's Paradox Page
		But obviously, it is possible to cross a room and touch the other wall and obviously it does not take an infinite amount of time to do this.
		Political scientists have been looking at the Voter Paradox as an example of a "government failure." Just as individual choice sometimes fails to promote social values in desired and predictable ways, so to does collective choice.
		Collective choice exercised through governmental structures offeres at least the possibility for correcting the perceived deficiencies of individual choice (See The Prisoners Dilemma as an example).
	www.geocities.com /CapitolHill/Lobby/3022/index.html (1434 words)

	BookWebPro 洋書検索
		The author argues, therefore, for a contractarian alternative which emphasizes the importance of endogenously generated ethical constraints, assigns lexical priority to rights and forces attention upon constitutional questions.
		Part 6 The implications for the social welfare function: introduction; the interpersonal utility comparison problem, again; rights and "meddlesome" preferences; the implications for the general possibility theorem; some thoughts on the idea of "social preference"; the implications for consequence-based evaluation.
		Part 7 Alternatives to consequentialist social welfare theory: consequentialist social welfare theory debilitated -a reprise; the world as it is; Sen's consequentialist-procedural approach; the contractarian alternative - justice as mutual advantage, justice as impartiality, an economist's perspective.
	bookwebpro.kinokuniya.co.jp /booksea.cgi?ISBN=0754610098&USID= (477 words)

	Student's Social Choice
		It's possible for a winner to lose the elections after someone switched votes in its favor.
		Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility theorem (1951), which in its currently common formulation asserts that no absolutely satisfactory democratic method exists, was called by Arrow himself the General Possibility Theorem: it pointed to a method that satisfied all the reasonable requirements Arrow thought to impose on a Social Choice procedure.
		Not only it is possible to satisfy everyone's idea of fairness, in many cases a tangible part of the goods will be left over.
	www.cut-the-knot.com /ctk/LiberalArts.shtml (2677 words)

	Introduction
		“The idea that the prisoner’s dilemma or the Arrow theorem evince some sort of ‘breakdown’ or ‘paradox’ of rationality should be seen as a reaction to the discovery that the concept of rationality cannot be extended indefinitely to solve all problems of conduct and evaluation.” (368) “[T]oo much is expected of the notion of rationality.
		In the prisoners’ dilemma rational behaviour by atomistic agents cannot be relied upon to generate socially desirable outcomes.
		As an example, he refers to the problem of what to call the time: whether we choose to call a given moment nine o’clock, or to put the clock back and call it eight o’clock.
	www.staff.city.ac.uk /andy.denis/research/thesis/02.htm (6597 words)

	Voting matters, Issue 1: pp 1-7 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		However, it is also possible for voters to take advantage of the features of STV described in section 3, provided they are sufficiently well informed, by voting in a sophisticated manner.
		Black [5] in his discussion of STV does mention the possibility of 'an organised minority (perverting) the use of the system' but only in connection with a candidate with just the quota on first preferences who is rated last by the rest of the electorate.
		The deduction from the voter's ordering of candidates of his ordering of the actual independent alternatives (the possible subsets of the set of all candidates who might actually be elected) is by no means straightforward.
	www.mcdougall.org.uk /VM/ISSUE1/P1.HTM (3928 words)

	EconPapers: Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		Abstract: In a general setting of private information, the possibility (impossibility) theorem is said to be valid, if a balanced and ex post efficient mechanism exists (does not exist) which agents voluntarily participate at.
		Possibility and impossibility results are called robust if they hold for all priors with independently distributed private information.
		This criterion allows, not only, to simplify drastically earlier proofs, but also to generalize the existing results in a substantial way.
	netec.mcc.ac.uk /WoPEc/data/Papers/bonbonsfa590.html (255 words)

	UMSI 2000 Annual Report: Diana Richards, Principal Investigator
		One obvious application is in societal decision making, where an intriguing puzzle is how stable collective decisions are reached empirically when a group of individuals must aggregate their diverse preferences.
		Thus, a fundamental puzzle in both social science and cognitive science is how and when the information and beliefs of a collection of semi-autonomous agents is aggregated to reach stable, non-cyclic collective outcomes.
		Re-examining Arrow's General Possibility Theorem, that no democratic aggregation procedure can guarantee a stable collective ranking, these researchers focus on the assumption that agents may rank order choices in any way.
	www.msi.umn.edu /general/Reports/ar2000/depts/CLA/richards.html (433 words)

	Department of Political Science at Case
		In general, I will send such messages to your Case e-mail account, and so if you do not have a Case e-mail account or you do not check it regularly, please see me as soon as possible.
		First, you will write a 3-5 page research proposal, in which you discuss your research question, why it is significant, and possible sources of information.
		You are required to conduct interviews with at least two individuals on your policy issue as part of your project, and you should identify individuals you might talk to for your interviews in your proposal.
	www.cwru.edu /artsci/posc/posc386sp05syllabi.htm (1771 words)

	DAWN WIRE SERVICE : 03 April 1999 Issue : 05/14
		The spokesman was asked whether the prime minister during his visit to the GHQ had discussed the possibility of Pakistani milita-ry support to the Kosovar Albanians.
		He discussed Kenneth Arrow's 'impossibility theorem' (referred to by some as the 'Arrow-Sen general possibility theorem'), democracy, the tyranny of the majority, the advantages bestowed by a republic, and the accumulation of wealth.
		At a dinner given by my good old friend Haji Ibrahim Haji Karim Al-Karam who adheres to the 'Micawber theorem,' has his finger on the pulse of real commerce and industry, appreciates the true value of wealth, and is therefore a highly successful businessman and a renowned philanthropist.
	www.lib.virginia.edu /area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/03Apr99.html (9990 words)

	POLS Y303 3768 Form Public Policy in the U.S. (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21)
		The study of collective choice dilemmas focuses our attention on how government decision-makers are organized, how groups attempt to influence government decision-making, and how we can model the policy decision-making process.
		We will first consider collective choice dilemmas in the abstract, focusing on Arrow's General Possibility Theorem.
		Finally, we will take a look at the details of the public policy process in the United States.
	www.indiana.edu /~deanfac/blfal02/pols/pols_y303_3768.html (320 words)

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