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	Georges Rey
		Georges Rey is a professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland[?].
		One major focus of Rey's effort is on the attempts of other philosophers of mind to be "eliminativists" or "instrumentalists" with respect to the mental states (states like beliefs and desires) that we are subjectively aware of by way of introspection.
		Rey takes a few tentative steps towards the daunting task of trying to describe an algorithm by which sensory experiences (inputs) can be translated into abstract mental representations (elements of a Language of Thought) which can then be subjected to computational processes and so produce new representations and human behaviors (outputs).
	www.ebroadcast.com.au /lookup/encyclopedia/ge/Georges_Rey.html (369 words)

	Georges Rey - Wikinfo
		One major focus of Rey's effort is on the attempts of other philosophers of mind to be "eliminativists" or "instrumentalists" with respect to the mental states (states like beliefs and desires) that we are subjectively aware of by way of introspection.
		Rey suggests that people like Daniel Dennett are wrong to view "beliefs" as only being useful instruments by which Folk Psychology allows us to predict future human behaviors.
		Halfway through the book Rey finally makes clear that he is proposing a theory of thought that will have to be built upon some foundation (such as neural networks), but he is uninterested in developing such a foundation.
	www.wikinfo.org /wiki.php?title=Georges_Rey (1387 words)

	Georges Rey - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Georges Rey is a professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland.
		One major focus of Rey's effort is on the attempts of other philosophers of mind to be "eliminativists" or "instrumentalists" with respect to the mental states (states like beliefs and desires) that we are subjectively aware of by way of introspection.
		Rey takes a few tentative steps towards the daunting task of trying to describe an algorithm by which sensory experiences (inputs) can be translated into abstract mental representations (elements of a Language of Thought) which can then be subjected to computational processes and so produce new representations and human behaviors (outputs).
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Georges_Rey (402 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Rey puts the point in terms of having thoughts about mental states; consciousness will be "too easy," "[g]iven how easy it is for anyone to think about most anything." Thinking by itself shouldn't be able to make it so in the case of conscious qualitative states.
		Balog and Rey both object that, as Balog puts it, "[i]t certainly seems possible" that a mental state might remain inac- cessible despite its being accompanied by a roughly simultaneous HOT that one is in that state.
		In Rey's case, Ann thinks of herself as selfish or vicious, but that is Ann's having a thought about her character, not a HOT to the effect that she is in a particular mental state.
	web.gc.cuny.edu /cogsci/mhot.htm (6065 words)

	Concepts
		Rey argues that their research in how people access concepts is irrelevant to the nature of concepts themselves.
		This does not show that Rey is wrong; on the contrary, it asserts that he is being consistent in that his conclusion for a metaphysical account follows from (indeed is assumed in) his premises.
		Rey might say that the lay people are wrong to the extent that chemists have a more 'optimal' theory, and so even though lay people think they know defining conditions, they are mistaken.
	people.bu.edu /kevinlee/yale/object/concepts.htm (3207 words)

	Siris: In Which Georges Rey Makes a Pretense at Saying Something Constructive
		What Rey wants is a mechanism, in some undefined sense; and his complaint is that theism doesn't provide one.
		But the fact that they present anecdotal evidence (whether or not Rey considers it of a sort that is 'unreliable and subject to a multitude of alternative explanations') is itself prima facie reason to think they do really believe it.
		And, further, even if Rey considers it 'unreliable and subject to a multitude of alternative explanations', the question that is relevant for Rey's argument is whether the theists in question do.
	branemrys.blogspot.com /2005/02/in-which-georges-rey-makes-pretense-at.html (1371 words)

	The Philosophy Corner: Nothing and Noise in Cognitive Science - Opinions
		Georges Rey; the noise that Rey is referring to is both literal and metaphorical, representing the disruption in communication both auditory and otherwise.
		Georges Rey from the University of Maryland, spoke to a mixture of philosophy and psychology students in the Phi Beta Kappa Room.
		Rey argues that some intentional content must "depend in some way or other on relations a computational system bears to things outside itself," that is, our thoughts about objects must at some level be related to something external to us.
	media.www.concordy.com /media/storage/paper858/news/2006/05/04/Opinions/The-Philosophy.Corner.Nothing.And.Noise.In.Cognitive.Science-1901370.shtml?norewrite200612101636&sourcedomain=www.concordy.com (518 words)

	Georges Rey Article, GeorgesRey Information (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		One major focus of Rey's effortis on the attempts of other philosophers of mind to be "eliminativists" or "instrumentalists" with respect to the mental states(states like beliefs and desires) that we are subjectively aware of by way of introspection.
		Rey suggests that people like Daniel Dennett are wrong to view "beliefs" as only being usefulinstruments by which Folk Psychology allows us to predict future human behaviors.
		Rey takes a few tentative steps towards the daunting task of trying to describe an algorithm by which sensory experiences(inputs) can be translated into abstract mental representations (elements of a Language of Thought) which can then be subjectedto computational processes and so produce new representations and human behaviors (outputs).
	www.anoca.org /mind/mental/georges_rey.html (405 words)

	materialism
		Georges Rey’s argument was largely an attempt to contest the request for divorce by pleading that Functionalism is deserving of a role in the Science of Mind.
		Rey might claim that CRTT seeks to describe the changes in a person’s mental states or he might say that CRTT is trying to define an algorithm that would allow us to make sense of the sequence of mental states that a person has.
		Rey seems unaware of the fact that this failure of AI research is what has driven so many AI researchers to the kind of bottom-up methods used by connectionists.
	www.geocities.com /ResearchTriangle/System/8870/books/materialism.html (9436 words)

	Georges Rey - FreeEncyclopedia (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		One major focus of Rey's effort is on the attempts of other philosophers of mind to be "eliminativists" or "instrumentalists" with respect to the mental states (states like beliefs and desires) that we are subjectively aware of by way of introspection.
		Rey suggests that people like Daniel Dennett are wrong to view "beliefs" as only being useful instruments by which Folk Psychology allows us to predict future human behaviors.
		Halfway through the book Rey finally makes clear that he is proposing a theory of thought that will have to be built upon some foundation (such as neural networks), but he is uninterested in developing such a foundation.
	openproxy.ath.cx /ge/Georges_Rey.html (369 words)

	UM Dept. of Philosophy - Georges Rey
		Georges Rey (PhD Harvard University) is Professor of Philosophy.
		Rey's most recent work has focused on the role of intentionality in early cognitive processing, particularly in vision, sensation and language.
		He argues (against recent pronouncements of Chomsky) that not only representational content, but "empty" representations of "intentional inexistents," such as of lines, circles, cones, words, phonemes and qualia, are likely to be essential to explanations in these domains, despite the fact that many of these "things" do not exist.
	www.wam.umd.edu /~wkallfel/deptwebsite/people/corefaculty/rey_georges.html (395 words)

	Theory of mind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In functionalist theories, functionalists like Georges Rey explore computational theories of mind that are independent of the physical instantiation of any particular mind.
		In brain-mind identity theories, biologists like Gerald Edelman are concerned with the details of how brain activity produces mind and work within the confines of the identity theory of mind
		Georges Rey and Gerald Edelman were mentioned above as examples of people who deal with different broad categories of theories of mind within which they have each produced their own personal theories of mind.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Theory_of_mind (1084 words)

	Contemporary Philosophy of Mind - Book Information
		This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind.
		In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
		Georges Rey is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland.
	www.blackwellpublishing.com /Book.asp?ref=9780631190691 (218 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Georges Rey, in his criticism of Edward E. Smith and associates, proposes a view of concept which is fundamentally metaphysical.
		Rey's proposal is that concepts have to do with the world, the real world not necessarily the psychologically real one, and how it divides up ontologically.
		As I will propose, Rey's suggestion that a concept is a real-world object of sorts, and that it is then represented in the mind is inconsistent with Smith, et al's contention that what a concept itself is, is a mental representation of an object in the real world.
	www.uweb.ucsb.edu /~jpearl/Concept.html (2661 words)

	Georges Rey, Philosophy, Univ of Maryland, College Park 20742; georey@carnap
		Georges Rey, Philosophy, Univ of Maryland, College Park 20742; georey@carnap
		Georges Rey, Philosophy, Univ of Maryland, College Park 20742; georey@carnap.umd.edu
		(1966), Lectures and Conversations on Religious Belief, Berkeley: UC This is a much expanded verison of Rey (2001) that appeared with a similar title in Martin and Kolak (2001), with a commentary by Christopher Bernard and my replies to him (most of which I’ve integrated here).
	www.underlevel.net /philclub/meta-atheism.html (9734 words)

	Theory of mind (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		In Functionalist theories, functionalists like Georges Rey explore Computational Theories of Mind (see external links, below) that are independent of the physical instantiation of any particular mind.
		In Brain-mind Identity theories, Biologists like Gerald Edelman are concerned with the details of how brain activity produces mind and work within the confines of the Identity theory of mind (see external links, below).
		Goerges Rey and Gerald Edelman were mentioned above as examples of people who deal with different broad categories of theories of mind within which they have each produced their own personal theories of mind.
	www.1-free-software.com /en/wikipedia/t/th/theory_of_mind.html (889 words)

	Untitled Document
		Its specification relies on personnal handling by Francis Rey and the different members of his team to perform the different missions and services with best conditions in efficiency, cost and time allowed.
		In relation with an international audit firm, Georges Rey Conseils is able to take in charge its clients everywhere in the world in the different economic fields.
		Francis Rey, an appointed expert to the Paris Court of Appeal, uses its experience of mid sized companies as well as of registered firms on the stock Exchange, and also its experience of large associations, for all those who look for a reliable partner in audit, tax and consulting.
	www.grc-frc.com /pr%E9sentation.anglais.htm (159 words)

	Consciousness: Philosophical Issues, 1 edited by E. Villanueva
		Georges Rey and John Biro have rather different agendas, but their best arguments contribute to the reductive project.
		First Rey defends a modified version of the language of thought hypothesis (Fodor, 1987) which is carefully tweaked to cope with perceptual experience as well as linguiform thinking.
		3.5 Rey's arguments strike me as effective, if not entirely novel (see, for example, the bracing discussion of these issues in Dennett, 1969, chapter 7, and 1978); but I do find it strange that he feels the need to link them to his language of thought based account of content.
	psyche.csse.monash.edu.au /v1/psyche-1-16-elton.html (5112 words)

	Meta-Atheism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Editor's note: Like my colleague Georges Rey, whose essay appears below, many of us ended up in philosophy in part because of an interest in issues about the existence of God.
		Georges Rey offers a rather surprising take on the whole controversy.
		And in the interest of furthering the debate, I have also solicited a reply to George Rey's essay by Chris Bernard, one of our graduate students, who has a particularly strong interest in this topic.
	brindedcow.umd.edu /logo/meta-atheism.html (1663 words)

	Philosophy/Psychology 346 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		John Haugeland, Mind Design II Georges Rey, Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
		The main objective of this course is to find an answer to the question, "How should we approach the scientific study of the mind?" Philosophy, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, linguistics and artificial intelligence (AI) are just a few of the disciplines that are involved in the study of mental phenomena.
		Georges Rey defends a version of CTRM in
	www.bilkent.edu.tr /~cowley/MBC-syllabus.html (1070 words)

	The Mind's I (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		For example, Dennett has tried to help the MIT COG project develop formal computer programming methods towards the goal of producing human-like intelligence.
		In his book "Contemporary Philosophy of Mind", Georges Rey provides an example of continuing attempts to express human intelligence in machines through computational processes over formally defined elements.
		An alternative but minority approach has grown out of the work of people like Gerald Edelman and his student Olaf Sporns through which it is suggested that machine intelligence can most efficiently be achieved by creating autonomous robotic systems that can learn the way human children learn through interacting with their environment.
	www.1-free-software.com /en/wikipedia/t/th/the_mind_s_i.html (781 words)

	Will Wilkinson / The Fly Bottle » Blog Archive » Meta-atheism, Death by Accident, and the Mysteries of ...
		For some time I have been persuaded by Georges Rey’s account of meta-atheism.
		(Georges was one of my teachers at Maryland.) His claim is that many people who say they believe in God don’t really.
		Rey, I had to believe that, in their heart of hearts, the fanboys rating Enterprise episodes that were just badly acted ripoffs of previous ST shows, were truly bad…but no, they seemed to truly think each episode made Blade Runner and 2001 look like bad cartoons.
	www.willwilkinson.net /flybottle/2005/02/02/meta-atheism-death-by-accident-and-the-mysteries-of-religious-experience (4411 words)

	Get Real
		Georges Rey is surely right that the key to the profound disagreements he and other Fodorians have with me is that I espouse a view he deftly labels "superficialism." Who would ever want to be called a superficialist?
		Rey is far from being alone when he responds to the siren song of hysterical realism.
		Rey sketches his alternative, the CCC theory of consciousness, and suggests that in many regards I could go along with his way of speaking--all my multiple drafts being carried along as sentences of LOT in all his registers.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/getreal.htm (18779 words)

	CONSCIOUSNESS AS INTERNAL MONITORING
		Georges Rey and I hit upon that solution independently a few years ago.
		What troubles Rey is that he or you or I should contain subsystems that are conscious on their own though we know nothing of them, and whose conscious contents are not at all like ours.
		My own preference is to doubt there to be any fact of the matter, as to how many consciousnesses live in a single human body (or as to how many bodies can be animated by the same consciousness).
	www.nd.edu /~lstubenb/Lycan.html (9048 words)

	Georges Rey information - Search.com (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Rey builds on Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind to produce his own version of a Computational/Representational Theory of Thought that tries to incorporate and extend our ordinary day-to-day world of mental experience: our beliefs, hopes, and desires.
		Halfway through the book Rey makes clear that he is proposing a theory of thought that will have to be built upon some foundation (such as neural networks), but he is uninterested in developing such a foundation.
		FranÃ§ois Laffanour - 20th Century furniture by Georges Jouve
	domainhelp.search.com /reference/Georges_Rey (434 words)

	The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
		Perhaps this wouldn't be so bad should the revisability of logic and mathematics permit their ultimately admitting of a justification that didn't involve experience.
		Certainly, though, as an observation about the essentially empirical status of scientific definitions, such as Locke's (unfortunate?) example that we noted at the start of ‘Lead is metal,’ Quine's claim seems right.
		Rey, G. (1998), “A Naturalistic A Priori,” Philosophical Studies 92: 25-43.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/analytic-synthetic (8176 words)

	Dinner Table Donts: 01/30/2005 - 02/05/2005
		I think that this is a strawman, that Dr. Rey would have had a more convincing case had he talked of hypocrisy within the Christian community.
		I disagree with Dr. Rey’s idea that absence of evidence is evidence of absence, you cannot merely turn around and make a non-existential claim about some being just because there is not enough (albeit some) evidence to establish conclusively that that being in fact does exist.
		So Dr. Rey’s objection to blind faith is acceptable; however my contention is that belief in God is not blind, and therefore does not fall victim to Dr. Rey’s claim that religious faith is merely self-deception.
	dinnertabledonts.blogspot.com /2005_01_30_dinnertabledonts_archive.html (4845 words)

	Amazon.com: "Georges Rey": Key Phrase page (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-04)
		Key Phrases: Jerry Fodor, Meaning Solipsism, New York, Georges Rey, Harvard University Press, Basil Blackwell, content holism, inferential role semanticist, punctate mental representations, recurrence compositionality, generic semantic properties, punctate representations (see more)
		I am indebted to Sylvain Bromherger, Hartry Field, Jerry Fodor, I)avid Hills, Paul Horwich, Bill Lycan, Georges Rey, and David Rosenthal for their detailed comments on one or another earlier draft of this paper.
		Extended comments on the manuscript by Georges Rey were extremely helpful.
	amazon.com /phrase/Georges-Rey (348 words)

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