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| | Ehle, Autumn 1998 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-03) |
 | | The problem before the Bundeswehr was a formidable one: from a personnel strength of 583,000 on 3 October 199093,000 of them from the former East German armed forces, the National People's Armyit had to shrink to 370,000 by the end of 1994. |
 | | The deployment of German minesweepers to Kuwait, the evacuation of the army contingent from Somalia, and the deployment of destroyers, frigates, and maritime reconnaissance and |
 | | From the German view, what is needed are capabilities for: reconnaissance; rapid and coordinated operations against surface forces offshore; independent long-term presence under all weather and climatic conditions; defense against surface, subsurface, and air threats; mine countermeasures and minelaying; extensive sea surveillance; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. |
| www.nwc.navy.mil /press/review/1998/autumn/art4-a98.htm (8527 words) |
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