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| | Reviewing Gödel’s and Rosser’s meta-reasoning of “undecidability” |
 | | I also argue that Goedel’s reasoning can be constructively interpreted as implying that, from the PA-provability of [(Ex)H(x)], we may not always assume the existence of some numeral [h] such that [H(h)] is provable in PA. |
 | | In Anand [An02], I outline in general terms a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, formalisation PP of our Intuitive Arithmetic M of the natural numbers in which the Axioms and Rules of Inference are recursively definable. |
 | | The non-terminating series of numerals “[0], [0+1], [(0+1)+1], [((0+1)+1)+1],...”, is taken as formally representing, in PA, the various non-terminating, intuitive, natural number series such as “0, 1, 10, 11,...” (in binary format), or “0, 1, 2, 3,...” (in the more common decimal format). |
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