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Topic: Heterophenomenology

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	Heterophenomenology - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Heterophenomenology ("phenomenology of another not oneself"), is a term coined by Daniel Dennett to describe an explicitly third-person, scientific approach to the study of consciousness.
		Heterophenomenology is put forth as the alternative to traditional phenomenology, which Dennett calls "autophenomenology" to emphasize the fact that it accepts the subject's self-reports as being authoritative.
		In other words, heterophenomenology requires us to listen to the subject and take what they say seriously, but to also look at everything else available to us and be ready to sometimes conclude that the subject is wrong even about their own mind.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Heterophenomenology (363 words)

	Heterophenomenology Text - Physics Forums Library (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		Heterophenomenology does not, in fact, specify any particular mechanisms or methods of experimentation to be used in investigation.
		Heterophenomenology is only the stance you take (a stance of neutrality regarding whether or not the reports made by conscious subjects are correct) while conducting the investigation.
		Heterophenomenology is predicated on the existence of experiences but is incapable, by its own choice of methodology, of showing that experiences exist.
	www.physicsforums.com /archive/index.php/t-63144.html (17185 words)

	HETEROPHENOMENOGY VERSUS CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY: A DIALOGUE WITH DAN DENNETT (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		The total set of details of heterophenomenology, plus all the data we can gather about concurrent events in the brains of subjects and in the surrounding environment, comprise the total data set for a theory of human consciousness.
		Heterophenomenology “leaves out … no subjective phenomena of consciousness” only if there are no first-person phenomena to leave out.
		In various ways, Dennett’s heterophenomenology (HP) bears a family resemblance to the critical phenomenology (CP) that I have described in Velmans (1999, 2000a,b)—although I would argue that the latter more closely reflects a practice that is theory-neutral about subjective, first-person evidence—as well as being common practice in psychological research.
	cogprints.org /4741/01/HP_versus_CP_for_web.htm (4154 words)

	The Fantasy of First-Person Science
		On the contrary, heterophenomenology is neutral on just this score, for surely we mustn’t assume that Chalmers is right that there is a special category of “phenomenological” beliefs–that there is a kind of belief that is off-limits to “zombies” but not to us conscious folks.
		Heterophenomenology allows us to proceed with our catalogue of a subject’s beliefs leaving it open whether any or all of them are Chalmers-style phenomenological beliefs or mere zombie-beliefs.
		It is important to remember that the burden of heterophenomenology is to explain, in the end, every pattern discoverable in the heterophenomenological worlds of subjects; it is precisely these patterns that make these phenomena striking, so heterophenomenology is clearly the best methodology for investigating these phenomena and testing theories of them.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm (9167 words)

	Gallagher 1997
		Heterophenomenology involves taking the intentional stance toward the speech-acts of subjects who are in controlled experimental situations.
		One might even suggest that since in heterophenomenology everything depends on detached interpretation rather than communication, the means for the clarification of meaning are somewhat diminished.
		In the case of heterophenomenology, however, such an appeal seems to lack justification since it does not make the ultimate source of such meanings apparent (the source, one suspects, is either folk psychology or some implicit and unsaid phenomenology).
	pegasus.cc.ucf.edu /~gallaghr/gall97.html (9838 words)

	Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology: A dialogue with Dan Dennett
		In Round 1, I suggest that scientific investigations of consciousness are better described as a form of "critical phenomenology" that accepts conscious experiences to be real rather than as a "heterophenomenology" which remains neutral about or denies their existence.
		Given that there is no methodological difference between heterophenomenology and critical phenomenology, but only the latter adopts the common sense belief that at least some conscious experiences are real, and that experimenters who study consciousness are investigating what they say they are investigating, why should we prefer heterophenomenology?
		My point is that heterophenomenology allows the scientists to vary quite radically in their ideology while their science is conducted in neutral terms.
	www.mi2.hr /~ognjen/tekst/Dennett-Velmans.html (6312 words)

	Abstract of
		To this end, in section 3, I analyse the heterophenomenology that has been developed by Dennett as a method for integrating the first-person perspective into the third-person perspective.
		John himself justifies his act perhaps to the judge by saying that he immediately needed money, that he could not get a loan, and that he was in a desperate situation, because he was flmailed.
		It is a problem with Dennett’s heterophenomenology and his approach of the first-person "what it is like"-question that he places his method within the frame of the third-person approach – so within the frame of an objective approach –, and that in this way he tries to answer this question from the third-person perspective.
	home.hetnet.nl /~wegweeda/Summaryexplaining.htm (8070 words)

	dennett-chalmers.htm
		Verbal reports are different from all other sorts of raw data precisely in that they admit of (and require, according to both heterophenomenology and the 1st-person point of view) interpretation as speech acts, and subsequent assessment as expressions of belief about a subjects private subjective state.
		Heterophenomenology is nothing but good old 3rd-person scientific method applied to the particular phenomena of human (and animal) consciousness.
		On the contrary, heterophenomenology is neutral on just this score, for surely we mustn't assume that Chalmers is right that there is a special category of phenomenological beliefs that there is a kind of belief that is off-limits to zombies but not to us conscious folks.
	www.ecs.soton.ac.uk /~harnad/Tp/dennett-chalmers.htm (10733 words)

	Analysis of Dennett's Case for Reductive Materialism
		Heterophenomenology while radical in relation to the philosophical standard of first-person point of view, conjures a “yeah, that sounds plausible” response from those studying Dennett because he carefully and logically lays out his plan.
		Dennett does not make any fatal flaws in offering his theory to the reader, so it is easy to allow Dennett to continue with heterophenomenology as his base.
		While it is difficult to grasp throughout its introduction due to the theories lack of a “point of consciousness,” Dennett’s writing and explanatory ability afford him some leeway.
	newmedia.cgu.edu /mind/redmet/critrm.htm (951 words)

	Science & Society \| 2001 Bioethics Conference
		Phenomenology: a 20th-century philosophical movement, the primary objective of which is the direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions.
		Heterophenomenology (Dennet): a 3rd person account of subjective experience.
		Someone can relate their experience to you, and you can collect this data through a recording device and then transcribe the recordings.
	www.scienceandsociety.emory.edu /consciousnessApr5.htm (605 words)

	Daniel Dennett
		In order to make a more comprehensive although brief exposition of Dennett’s Philosophy, we shall develop in a more detailed way the main ideas in his method of heterophenomenology, his characterization of the ‘intentional stance’, his Multiple Drafts model to explain consciousness, and his Darwinian perspective in philosophy.
		The challenge is to construct a theory of mental events, using only the data allowed by scientific method.
		The method is neutral for investigating and describing the phenomena belonging to our conscious experience.
	www.vusst.hr /ENCYCLOPAEDIA/Daniel-English.htm (2726 words)

	Chapter Summaries of Consciousness Explained by D. Dennett: Philosophy Forums (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		Dennett proposes heterophenomenology as a theoretically neutral way to collect data about people’s inner experiences that sticks to the standard methodologies of science.
		Heterophenomenology must be neutral with regards to those possibilities, and others we can think of as well.
		Now Chalmers has objected (in the debate) that this “behavioristic” treatment of belief is itself question-begging against an alternative vision of belief in which, for instance, “having a phenomenological belief doesn’t involve just a pattern of responses, but often requires having certain experiences.” (personal correspondence, 2/19/01).
	forums.philosophyforums.com /comments.php?post=235464 (11401 words)

	Synesthesia and Method
		Introspective method aims to take as the data of psychology one's own phenomenology, on the assumption that one's observations of one's own mental life are reliable.
		Heterophenomenology, on the other hand, takes the reports as data--not whatever subjective phenomonology may (or may not) have given rise to those reports; the reports themselves are as public as any other phenomena recorded in scientific data and may be recorded as reliably.
		Heterophenomenology allows for Titchner's methodology to be deeply confused even while taking his subjective reports seriously, that is as standing in need of scientific explanation.
	psyche.csse.monash.edu.au /v2/psyche-2-24-korb.html (6557 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		His major work, Consciousness Explained, posits a theory that consciousness is an abstraction built from a linear narrative of one's life, based on a functionalist view of cognitive science.
		He developes the method of "heterophenomenology", a procedure in which a person is asked about their experiences, and these accounts are passed through a third party who collates and organizes them.
		Through this sandardizing process, we are able to begin to make a picture of the phenomenology of the mind.
	www.oswego.edu /~trice/cogsci1/dennett.text (93 words)

	Caveat Emptor
		I go to some lengths in my book to explain that heterophenomenology is nothing other than the scientific method applied to the phenomena of consciousness, and thus the way to save the rich phenomenology of consciousness for scientific study.
		And I do give examples of how we can sometimes "move from heterophenomenology back to real experiences," summarized in the passage that to Mangan's overheated imagination appears to be a "begrudging" admission.
		But my point remains that all this can be accomplished within the (familiar, already adopted) constraints of heterophenomenology; the only internal matters we need attend to are those objectively discernible happenings in the brain.
	pp.kpnet.fi /seirioa/cdenn/caveatem.htm (4372 words)

	[No title]
		He tells us explicitly that Heterophenomenology lumps introspective reports alongside other forms of evidence about mental processes.
		Second heterophenomenology holds that these embellished reports must now be re-interpreted by the experimenter.
		In doing so, they illustrate that first-person investigations should be recognised as an integral part of the scientific enterprise.
	www.nil.wustl.edu /labs/corbetta/personnel/ajack_files/Jack_reply_to_Dennett.doc (1774 words)

	COULD DANIEL DENNETT BE A ZOMBIE? (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		In this mood he affects a warm regard for consciousness, assuring us that all of its fine features will be encompassed in his third-person account.
		By practicing an admirable "heterophenomenology", by embracing the "Intentional Stance" with all the passion that behaviorism allows, he will produce a theory that confines itself to what third-person scientists and their unexpected allies the Martians are able to know – yet that theory will not neglect any nuance of consciousness worth mentioning.
		Zombies talk and act like they have consciousness, and they perform perfectly as subjects of heterophenomenology, thus meeting all the demands Dennett thinks an adequate theory of consciousness would make of them.
	www.kearnsianthoughts.com (4440 words)

	Sample Questions for Rel 263 Quiz #1 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		Not all of them will appear on the quiz, and there may be other, related questions.
		Do you think that it is a constructive way to come to an understanding of religion.
		Try to give examples of both as we have encountered them in our texts, and assess whether you think that it is a constructive way to come to an understanding of religion.
	www.westminster.edu /staff/brennie/263Q1Sam.htm (369 words)

	Publications
		Transpersonal psychology, which often studies personally transcendent phenomena such as religious experience and peak-experiences, claims to be post-Cartesian, or non-dualistic (no subject-object or mind-body split).
		An article by Anthony Freeman documented the ways in which the field was in fact hopelessly dualistic, but proposed that Daniel Dennett's concept of heterophenomenology could be brought to the rescue.
		My commentary argues that heterophenomenology is a functionalism that would merely displace the problem of dualism, not solve it, and on the other hand that Tart would not be able to collect unambiguously objective data until the problem is solved.
	members.bainbridge.net /~bill.adams/publications.htm (1406 words)

	Discussion of Dennett's "Consciousness Explained": Philosophy Forums (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		Uh, he's been making the cartesian materialism argument since chapter two (are you sure you read carefully?)- in any case the quote you are using is from a paper that was published 10 years later.
		You claim that Dennett is saying that: “What he means by "not going all the way" is that we shouldn't just believe that these accounts are infallible just because the subject himself believes them.”, and I agree; that is indeed what he’s saying.
		The point of this chapter is that a scientific approach to the mind must be conducted from the third person perspective, and that Dennett is going to steer clear of certain ideological excesses—described above.
	forums.philosophyforums.com /thread/6031/11 (8240 words)

	[Philnet] JEAN-NICOD LECTURES 2001
		Auditorium du CNRS, 3 rue Michel-Ange, 75016 Paris Professor Dennett will be awarded the Jean-Nicod Prize after the lecture.
		Abstract: The objective, "third-person" methods of science can be adapted to the ne= utral study of consciousness, in the approach I call heterophenomenology.
		Challenges to this approach have recently be expressed, but a close examination shows that they do not offer a genuine alternative to heterophenomenology, which continues to be the best approach for a science of consciouness.
	lists.ccil.org /pipermail/philnet/2001-September/003628.html (377 words)

	Center for Consciousness Center . Tucson . Arizona
		To support his “heterophenomenological” view of consciousness, Daniel Dennett has introduced the metaphor of “vim.” Vim describes the intrinsic worth of a currency as imagined by those who use that currency.
		The metaphor is intended to poke fun at those who posit the existence of qualia—or, to use Dennett’s coinage, those with the “zombic hunch.” I will argue that, contrary to Dennett’s intentions, the vim metaphor argues for panpsychism better than it discredits qualia.
		I will also present a more fitting metaphor for heterophenomenology: the “Anti-Matrix.” In the “classic” Matrix, the extrinsic is an illusion, but in the Anti-Matrix, the intrinsic is an illusion.
	www.consciousness.arizona.edu /abstracts.htm (18954 words)

	Jeff’s Space and Time » Blog Archive » Dennett’s Dumb Agents (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-23)
		There is a pattern of miscommunication bedeviling the people working on consciousness that is reminiscent of the classic Abbot and Costello ‘Who’s on First?’ routine.
		Much of the problem seems to have been caused by some misdirection in my apologia for heterophenomenology (Dennett, 1982; 1991), advertised as an explicitly third-person approach to human consciousness, so I will try to make amends by first removing those misleading signposts and sending us back to the real issues.
		Some opponents to heterophenomenology seem intent on building the mystery into the very setting of the problem, so that such deflationary theories are disqualified at the outset.
	jefflindstrom.com /blog/2006/03/11/dennetts-dumb-agents (3451 words)

	: : : p h e n o t y p i c a l : : : ...
		Dennett introduces the term heterophenomenology as a strategy for wrapping phenomenological studies around his multiple drafts model of consciousness: how people describe their internal subjective experiences is accepted as evidence, but only of how things "feel" and not necessarily of how things actually are.
		And so heterophenomenology is a way to sort of bracket the bracketing, I suppose, of the discourse, and proceed with collecting multiple streams in the hopes of abstracting from them a common center of narrative gravity (I love that metaphor.)
		But I don't know if it's the nine-syllables or what, but I've never really liked the vagueness of what to do next.
	phenotypical.com /index.cfm/id/120 (763 words)

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