| |
| | Jon Cogburn's Philosophy of Mind Notes on Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08) |
 | | First the theory provides what might be called ontological simplicity, if mental states are the same as brain states there are fewer kinds of things in the world (``So if pains are identified with their neural correlates, there are no pains in addition to C-fiber activations.'' (Kim, (1996, p. |
 | | At the heart, then, of Smart's Identity Theory is the suggestion that mental events are definable as the concomitants or products of certain physical stimulus conditions or anything that is just like those concomitants or products. |
 | | But the theory says nothing about the relationship between mental properties and physical properties, the relation between pains, itches, thoughts, consciousness, and the rest, on the one hand, and types of neural events on the other. |
| www.artsci.lsu.edu /phil/phil1/cogburn/currentcourses/4941/4941_1_3.htm (10919 words) |
|