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| | USSBS: Interrogations of Japanese Officials -- Admiral TOYODA Soemu |
 | | In the Japanese Navy, the commandants of the various fleets and the various Naval Stations, while they received instructions from Central Headquarters regarding operations, are not consulted on matters of fundamental policy; and, therefore, from the beginning of the war I was not consulted on those matters by the TOKYO headquarters. |
 | | The Navy Minister at that time was Admiral YAMAMOTO, (Gumbai), who in addition to being a good sailor, was an excellent statesman and was able through his statesmanship to equip the Navy in preparation for the war, to lead the Navy through the war by laying the foundation for the successful operational plans. |
 | | The fact that the Japanese Navy's surface units had been badly defeated was not generally known in JAPAN outside of the services, so I think that your bombing against JAPAN proper, together with our failure in the OKINAWA Operations, had a great deal to do with the decision to cease hostilities. |
| www.ibiblio.org /hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-75.html (9510 words) |
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