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| | Nuclear deterrence in South Asia: the 1990 Indo-Pakistani crisis. |
 | | At a minimum, Kashmir was in flames, the Indian and Pakistani armies were preparing for conflict, a shrill war of words had erupted between the two capitals, public passions were aroused, and, hovering over it all, the two sides had the capability to inflict enormous damage against each other. |
 | | A strong case can be made that India and Pakistan were deterred from war in 1990 by the existence of mutual nuclear weapon capabilities and the chance that, no matter what Indian and Pakistani decision-makers said or did, any military clash could escalate to the nuclear level. |
 | | In this instance, one would have to get authoritative Indian or Pakistani officials to admit that they were planning to go to war, but were dissuaded from doing so by the possibility that conventional conflict might escalate to a nuclear exchange. |
| www.mtholyoke.edu /acad/intrel/sasianuk.htm (11564 words) |
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