| |
| | [No title] |
 | | And he says his own “sophisticated methodological falsificationism offers new standards for intellectual honesty,” specifically “that one should try to look at things from different points of view, to put forward new theories which anticipate novel facts, and to reject theories which have been superseded by more powerful ones” (37-38). |
 | | Genuine intellectual honesty in studying politics risks doing scholarship that governments may find unpatriotic, even seditious; that offends the legislatures, voters, and private and corporate donors who fund our institutions; that some see as blasphemous and morally corrupting; and that invades the privacy and damages the reputations of some whom we study. |
 | | As that provocative statement suggests, in these remarks I want to lay out some propositions about what intellectual honesty involves, and hence what methodological rigor involves, that go beyond the admonitions that Lakatos provides and that are specifically pertinent to how we study politics. |
| www.clas.ufl.edu /users/jkassel/rogerssmith.doc (1962 words) |
|